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In this thesis I compare the works of Confucius and Mencius with those of Saint Augustine. My purpose 
in so doing is to show Confucian Augustinianism as a new theological perspective on Confucian-
Christian ethics and Augustinianism by discovering analogies and differences in their respective 
understandings of the formation of moral self, particularly the acquisition of virtue, and how they 
believe this leads to happiness. Using the method of inter-textual reasoning, and assuming continuity 
between Augustine’s early and later works, I compare Confucius and Mencius’s xue (學), si (思) and li 
(禮) including yue (樂) with Augustine’s moral learning, contemplation, sacrament, and music 
respectively from chapter two to four. For Augustine the formation of the moral self is the process of 
finding truth in God. For Confucius and Mencius it is the process of becoming a person of virtue, which 
follows from growth in self-understanding in relation to the Way (道). For Confucians humans already 
have potential self-in-heart bestowed by Heaven whereas for Augustine the self is the metaphor of the 
soul in the struggle of both body and soul to be directed toward the love of God in which true happiness 
exists. In the concluding chapter, I propose a Confucian Augustinian synthesis as a new theological 
perspective on Confucian-Christian ethics and Augustinianism which offers a useful medium for the 
formation of the moral self by mutually making up for their respective weaknesses as revealed by this 
critical intertextual and cross-cultural reading. I argue that Augustinians can learn the value of public 
ritual practices and the public political self from classical Confucians whereas Confucians can learn 
from Augustine the value of spiritual experience in the moral formation of the pubic self.  
Confucian Augustinianism is teleological, constructive, political, public, sacramental and sin-virtue 
oriented theology. Confucian Augustinianism which is based on virtue ethics as common ground 
between Confucians and Augustine not only shows methodologies for engaging in public issues with 
civil society for its articulation of theology in the public sphere, but also provides profound spirituality 
with the engagement of Augustinian biblical and systematic theology unlike liberation theologies. In 
contrast to modern Augustinianism such as Augustinian realism (hope), Augustinian proceduralism 
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(justice), Augustinian civic liberalism (love), and Radical Orthodoxy (love), Confucian Augustinianism 
highlights the virtue of humility and sincerity (誠) for the practice of love of God and neighbour by 
offering specific methods for cultivating self. Contrary to Confucian theology according to 
understanding of Heaven in the Confucian tradition, Confucian Augustinianism focuses on how to 
embody the Way of Heaven by cultivating virtue (德) rather than the theology of Heaven (天) or lists 
of virtues. By linking the self to family, community, nation, and transcendent God Confucian 
Augustinianism shows distinguishing ways for sanctification. Confucian Augustinianism is to seek true 
happiness by cultivating virtue and promoting inward, outward, and upward self through moral learning, 
contemplation, sacramental ritual, and music on the basis of biblical truth in a pluralistic global context. 
It can rectify the limit of Protestant individualism. Confucian Augustinianism is an own angle of Asian 
Christians on Augustinianism in the rapid growth of Christians in Asia contrary to previous Western 






This thesis is a product of four years spent as a doctoral student at New College, the University of 
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of Divinity and the Catholic Foundation of Scotland. Thanks go first to my supervisor, Rev. Prof. 
Michael Stafford Northcott, for his strict academic supervision. I will never forget about how he 
enthusiastically reshaped me as Christian ethicist. He is my true friend. His wife, Jill, did her best for 
me as my English teacher. Their efforts for me were a kind of family project. Particularly, it was great 
pleasure for me as a translator to visit to several universities and churches with him in Korea in October 
2013 such as Presbyterian University and Theological Seminary where I studied theology (BTh, MDiv) 
from 2002 to 2009.1 It is also noteworthy that he and I contributed to making a documentary film on 
the Scottish missionary John Ross in cooperation with Scottish Bible Society, Centre for the Study of 
World Christianity, St Michael’s Parish Church, Mayfield Salisbury Parish Church and CTS in 2016.2    
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say a special thanks to my supporter Young Sang Ro. When I was an undergraduate student at PUTS 
after losing my right eyesight, he introduced Michael Nothcott’s Environment and Christian Ethics and 
the value of virtue ethics to me as Professor of Christian ethics and supported me as Head of theology 
                                           
1 Michael Northcott, “Loving God and Caring for Creation,” trans. JunSoo Park, PUTS, Sungkonghoe University, 
Daeshin University, Honam Theological University and Seminary, October 2013; Michael Northcott, “Who is 
Jesus Christ for us Today?” trans. JunSoo Park, Pomo Church and PUTS, October 2013; “Sermon by Michael 
Northcott at PCTS,” YouTube video, 51:31, posted by “Jun Soo Park,” May 10, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEXU1IN-2Ns&t=2s; “Prof. Michael Northcott's Lecture at PCTS (Loving 
God and Caring for Creation),” YouTube video, 1:09:48, posted by “Seen Kim,” October 24, 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSPjYCqjnOw&t=5s; “Rev. Prof. Michael Northcott's sermon at Pomo 
Church in Korea (13th Oct 2013),” YouTube video, 53:53, posted by “Pomo TV,” October 25, 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8ixwbnV6yw; Sung Kook Lim, “Professor Michael Northcott: The Erudite 
Scholar in Environmental Ethics,” Hankuk Gidoggongbo, October 21, 2013, Assessed May 1, 2016. 
http://www.pckworld.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=61689    
2 Korean Bible wakes up Cho-sun, Directed by Jae Sun Lee (Seoul: CTS, 2016).  
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department with Soong Hong Han, Sa Moon Kang, and Yoon Bae Choi.3 Together we served as 
minister at Myungsung Presbyterian Church. When I applied for the University of Edinburgh, he was 
my referee as Dean of PUTS with President Emeritus Jong Sung Rhee (1922-2011). Ro and I were 
honoured to be invited to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland as emissaries of the 
Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK) in May 2014.4 When he was invited to a keynote speaker for 
ICPR conference, we had fruitful time in York and Manchester in June 2015. As President he invited 
me to the national conference of Korea Association of Christian Studies and Honam Theological 
University and Seminary in October 2015 as a speaker and translator with David Fergusson, Brian 
Stanley, Stewart Gillan and Elma Birrell in order to commemorate the centenary of the demise of John 
Ross (1842-1915).5 As Director at the Research Center of PCK, he appointed me as a researcher in 
                                           
3 Young Sang Ro, “Life Theology as the Foundation of Environmental Theology,” Understanding Theology 18 
(October 1999), 199; Yoon Bae Choi, Introduction to the Reformed Theology (Seoul: PUTS, 2015), 10; JunSoo 
Park, An Introduction to the Old Testament (Seoul: PUTS, 2002), 2-3; JunSoo Park, A New Covenant in Studying 
Theology (Seoul: PUTS, 2005), 3-8; JunSoo Park, ed., History of Korean Theological Thought (Seoul: PUTS, 
2007), 3.    
4  “The Church of Scotland General Assembly: Order of Proceedings,” 20, Assessed May 1, 2016. 
http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/20666/Order-Of-Proceedings-2014.pdf.  
5  David Fergusson, “Church, State, and the Secular,” trans. JunSoo Park, in the 44th Conference of Korea 
Association of Christian Studies (2015), 16-40; Round-Table Discussion with David Fergusson titled “To Future 
Ministers,” trans. JunSoo Park, in the Journal of Christian Thought (Dec 2015), 201-212; David Fergusson, 
“Scottish Reformed Theology after the Reformation,” trans. JunSoo Park, in Lecture for Commemorating the 
Centennial of the Demise of John Ross: John Knox and John Ross in Scottish Theology (Gwangju: HTUS, 2015), 
28-68; David Fergusson, ‘True Patriotism,’ trans. JunSoo Park, in Lecture for Commemorating the Centennial of 
the Demise of John Ross: John Knox and John Ross in Scottish Theology (Gwangju: HTUS, 2015), 136-148; 
Stewart Gillan’s Sermon titled “Pilgrimage toward Partnership,” trans. JunSoo Park, in Lecture for 
Commemorating the Centennial of the Demise of John Ross: John Knox and John Ross in Scottish Theology 
(Gwangju: HTUS, 2015), 159-170; Brian Stanely, “The City of All Nations: Revelation Chapter 21,” trans. JunSoo 
Park, in Lecture for Commemorating the Centennial of the Demise of John Ross: John Knox and John Ross in 
Scottish Theology (Gwangju: HTUS, 2015), 149-158; Brian Stanely, “Nationalism and Christianity: Friend or 
Foe?: Reflections from East Asian Experience in the Twentieth Century,” trans. JunSoo Park, YonSei University, 
Presbyterian University and Theological Seminary and Honam Theological University and Seminary,  October 
2015; “David Fergusson’s Lecture on Scottish Reformed Theology,” Christian News, October 20, 2015, Assessed 
May 1, 2016. http://christian.nocutnews.co.kr/show_ch.asp?LocalCD=10201030&NewsCD=3365191; “1 
Lecture on John Ross: David Fergusson (Host: YoungSang Ro),” YouTube video, 2:17:26, posted by “JunSoo 
Park,” October 29, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04OXTgorbqo&t=2191s; “2 Lecture on John Ross: 
Brian Stanley, Stewart Gillan (Host: YoungSang Ro),” YouTube video, 1:30:30, posted by “JunSoo Park,” 
October 29, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W_M83BiiN1A; “3 Lecture on John Ross: JunSoo Park 
(Host: YoungSang Ro),” YouTube video, 32:12, posted by “JunSoo Park,” October 29, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6zsa3EyNzlE; “International Conference for the 60th Anniversary of the 
Founding of HTUS, CTS News Plus,” YouTube video, 0:49, posted by “CTS Christian TV,” November 1, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R_elROyQ2bc; Stewart Gillan, “View from the Manse,” Crosswind: The 
Journal of St Michael’s Parish Church 18:4 (Winter 2015), 3-4.   
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in-law Man Gap Shin and Jong Lim Kim.     
It is a great privilege for me to do a PhD in Scotland, the birthplace of the Presbyterian church, as a 
minister of the PCK. Thanks to partnership between the Church of Scotland and the PCK I became an 
Assistant Minister (minister in association) at St Michael’s Parish Church of Scotland in Linlithgow in 
2014 after serving as Co-operative Minister at Mayfield Salisbury Parish Church which has a link to 
John Ross.7 The Kirk session provided a historic manse to my family close to Linlithgow Palace. Most 
of my thesis has been written there, with the support of colleagues and 100 elders, or at the Torrance 
Room at New College. Here I was extremely happy with my wife Bora and my three sons, Daniel, Ezra, 
and Timothy. Just as Augustine lost his son, Adeodatus, after eventually finding true happiness by 
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thesis to my dearest first-born twin son Ezra (9. 10. 2015 – 20. 11. 2015) in Heaven. 
 





                                           
6 http://rcpck.org  
7 JunSoo Park, “An Introduction to Our New Minister in Affiliation,” Crosswind: The Journal of St Michael’s 
Parish Church 17:2 (Summer 2014), 5; JunSoo Park, “Christian Hope in Korea,” Crosswind: The Journal of St 
Michael’s Parish Church 17:4 (Winter 2014), 12-13; JunSoo Park, “True Happiness,” Crosswind: The Journal of 
St Michael’s Parish Church 18:1 (Spring 2015), 30; JunSoo Park, “Happier Together?” Crosswind: The Journal 
of St Michael’s Parish Church 19:2 (Summer 2016), 8-9; JunSoo Park, “What Makes Scotland and Korea Great?” 
Crosswind: The Journal of St Michael’s Parish Church 19:4 (Winter 2016), 21; “[CBSTVNEWS] Eunpha and St 
Michael's Partnership,” YouTube video, 1:26, posted by “Jun Soo Park,” October 30, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MqQ7dJvurw; “Partnership between Eunpha Church and St Michael’s 
Church,” YouTube video, 1:46:40, posted by “Jung Hoon Lee,” November 8, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zPDJIRBsWWk&feature=youtu.be; Bob Ross and JunSoo Park, “From 
South Korea to Scotland,” Crosswind: The Journal of St Michael’s Parish Church 19:3 (Autumn 2016), 12-13; 
“01 Moderater YoungNam Chai's Sermon St Michael's Parish Church (Rev JunSoo Park),” YouTube video, 18:16, 
posted by “JunSoo Park,” August 4, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9suV5PB9D6k&t=170s. 
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Abbreviations of Augustine’s Writings  
 
In addition to the following, all abbreviations in this thesis are taken from: Allan d. Fitzgerald, Augustine 
through the Ages (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009). I have referred to 
Augustine’s writings by abbreviated Latin in the notes. The following list is by chronological order in 
Augustine’s works.  
 
Abbreviations Latin Titles English Titles Date 
c. Acad.  Contra Academicos Against the Skeptics  386 
b. vita.  De beata vita  On the Happy Life  386 
ord.  De ordine  On Order  386 
sol. Soliloquia The Soliloquies  386/7 
imm. an.  De immortalitate animae  On the Immortality of the Soul  386/7 
mus. De musica  On Music  387/391 
mor.  De moribus ecclesiae 
catholicae et de moribus 
Manichaeorum  
On the Catholic and the 
Manichaean Ways of Life  
387/389 
quant. De animae quantitate  On the Greatness of the Soul  388/9 
Gn. adv. Man.  De Genesis adversus 
Manichaeos  
On Genesis, Against the Man  388/9 
lib. arb.  De libero arbitrio  On Free Will  388-395 
div. qu. De diversis questionibus 




mag.  De magistro  The Teacher  389 
vera rel.  De vera religione  On True Religion  389/391 
util. cred.  De utilitate credendi  On the Advantage of Believing  391 
duab. an. De duabus animabus contra 
Manichaeos 
On the Two Souls, Against the 
Manichees  
392/3 
f. et symb.  De fide et symbolo   On Faith and the Creed  393 
Gn. litt. imp.  De Genesi ad littaram, 
imperfectus liber 
On the literal interpretation of 
Genesis, an Unfinished Book  
393/4 
s. Dom. mon.  De sermone Domini in monte On the Sermon on the Mount 393/4 
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ex. Gal.  Epistulae ad Galatas expositio  Explanation: Epistle to the 
Galatians  
394/5 
ep. Rm. inch.  Epistulae ad Romanos 
expositio inchoata  
Explanation: Epistle to the 
Romans 
394/5 
cont. De continentia On Continence  395 
mend. De mendacio  On Lying  395 
Simpl.  Ad Simplicianum  To Simplicianus 396 
agon. De agone christiano  On the Christian Struggle  396 
doc. Chr.  De doctrina Christiana On the Christian Doctrine  396-426 
en. Ps.  Enarrationes in Psalmos Expositions on the Psalms  396-420 
conf.  Confessiones  Confessions  397-401 
c. Faust.  Contra Faustum Manichaeum  Against Faustus the Manichee 397-8 
nat. b.  De natura boni  On the Nature of the Good  399 
Trin.  De trinitate  On the Trinity  399-419 
f. invis.  De fide rerum invisibilium  On Faith in the Unseen  400 
op. mon.  De opere monachorum  On the Works of Monks  400 
cat. rud.  De catechizandis rudibus  On catechizing Beginners  400 
bapt. De baptismo  On Baptism against the 
Donatists  
400 
b. conjug.  De bono coniugale  On the Good of Marriage  401 
virg.  De sancta virginate  On Holy Virginity  401 
Gn. Litt De Genesi ad litteram  On the Literal Interpretation of 
Genesis  
401-415 
Jo. ev. tr.  In Johannis evangelium 
tractatus 
Tractates on the Gospel of John  406-430 
ep. Jo.  Tractatus in epistulam Ioannis 
ad Parthos 
Tractates on the First Epistle of 
John  
406-430 
exc. urb.  De excidio urbis Romae  On the Sack of the City of Rome  410 
un. bapt.  De unico baptism contra 
Petilianum  
Concerning the One Baptism, 
Against Petilian  
411 
pecc. mer.  De peccatorum meritis et 
remissione et de baptism 
parvulorum  
On the Merits and Forgiveness 
of Sins and on infant Baptism  
412 
f. et op.  De fide et operibus  On faith and Works  412/13 
spir. et litt.  De spiritu et littera On the Spirit and the Letter 412 
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civ. Dei.  De civitate Dei  City of God  413-27 
nat. et gr.  De natura et gratia  On Nature and Grace  414/15 
b. vid.  De bono viduitatis On the Good of Widowhood  414 
gr. et pecc. or. De gratia Christi et de peccato 
originali  
On the Grace of Christ and 
Original Sin  
418 
pat. De patientia  On Patience  418 
nupt. et conc.  De nuptiis et concupiscentia  On Marriage and 
Concupiscence  
419/20 
adul. conjug.  De coniugiis adulterinis  On Adulterous Marriage  419/20 
an. et or.  De anima et eius origine On the Soul and its Origin  419-421 
cura mort.  De cura pro mortuis gerenda On the Care of the Dead 420-422 
c. Jul.  Contra Julianum  Against Julian  421 
ench.  Enchiridion ad Laurentium de 
fide spe et caritate 
A handbook on Faith, Hope, and 
Love 
421-422 
gr. et lib. arb.  De gratia et libero arbitrio  On Grace and Free Choice 426/27 
retr. Retractationes   Retractions 426/27 
haer.  De haeresibus  On Heresies  428/29 
c. Jul. imp.  Contra secundam Juliani: 
responsionem opus 
imperfectum 
Incomplete Work Against Julian  429-430 
ep.  Epistulae Letters 386-429 
s. Sermones Sermons 393-430 




Chronological Table: Confucius, Mencius, and Augustine in History8 
 
c. Before 2070 BCE Legendary ages of the Sage-Kings such as Yao, Shun, and Yu  
c. 2070-1600 BCE Legendary Xi Dynasty – Jie, the last king, a condemned tyrant   
c. 1600-1045 BCE Shang or Yin Dynasty – Tang, the founding father of Zhou, the last king, 
a condemned tyrant    
c. 1046-771 BCE Western Zhou – succeeding the Shang, the Zhou people adopted and then 
modified Shang practices in ancestor worship, patrilineal succession, bone 
divination, and social stratification. ‘Ritual revolution’ took place in 9th 
century.  
770-256 BCE Eastern Zhou – the Zhou court is significantly weakened and China 
becomes a land of contending small states run by hegemons who nominally 
pledge loyalty to the Zhou court but are guided by self-interest and 
opportunism to increase their territory. It is also a period of great 
intellectual activity known for the ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’, a name 
for the numerous political, social, and cosmological theories that 
proliferated during this period. 
770-476 BCE Spring and Autumn Period, a further division of the Eastern Zhou period; 
the name derives from The Spring and Autumn Annals, a chronicle of 
events in the state of Lu sometimes ascribed to Confucius. 
 
551 ca. BCE – birth of Confucius at Mount Ni, located southeast of 
Qufu in Lu state (in present-day Shandong province) 
549 ca. BCE – when Confucius is three years old, his father dies. 
535 ca. BCE – Confucius’ mother dies when he is the age of 16 or 17 
(other sources give this date as 527 BCE, when he was 23 or 24 years 
old). 
533 ca. BCE – at the age of 19, Confucius marries a woman from the 
Qiguan family of the Song state. Around this time, he gained 
employment as manager of the state granary 
532 ca. BCE – birth of Confucius’ son who is named Li after Duke 
Zhao of Lu sent a carp as a gift. Around this time Confucius was 
promoted to state husbandry manager. 
522 ca. BCE – around this time Confucius starts a private school and 
began to teach. 
518 ca. BCE – Confucius accepts Meng Yizi and Nangong Jinshu as 
disciples; Jinshu arranges for Confucius to travel to Luoyang, the 
Zhou capital, where he is attributed as meeting Laozi. 
514 ca. BCE – after conflict breaks out in Lu state, Confucius is forced 
to relocate briefly to the state of Qi. 
516 ca. BCE – Confucius returns to Lu. 
                                           
8  Joachim Gentz, Understanding Chinese Religions (Edinburgh: Dunedin, 2013), ix; Xinzhong Yao, An 
Introduction to Confucianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), xiv-xvi; Peter Brown, Augustine 




501 ca. BCE – Confucius became the chief magistrate of Zhongdu, 
present-day Wenshang county in Shandong Province. 
500 ca. BCE – Confucius becomes minister of justice and 
distinguishes himself at the conference between Lu and Qi at Jiagu. 
497 ca. BCE – Confucius leaves the state of Lu and heads east to Wei 
state, beginning his sojourns in several states to promote his ideas. 
484 ca. BCE – Confucius returned to his hometown, Qufu, in the state 
of Lu and focused on teaching and studying the Rites of Zhou. 
479 ca. BCE – death of Confucius at the age of 72 or 73. 
475–221 BCE Warring States Period, a further layer of periodisation within the Eastern 
Zhou Dynasty marked by large-scale intense warfare made possible by 
administrative reforms designed to maximize individual states’ ability to 
raise armies. During this period, Mencius and Xunzi lived.  
372 ca. BCE – Mencius was born.  
324 ca. BCE – Mencius moved from Ch’i. 
319 ca. BCE – Mencius returned back from Liang.  
319-312 ca. BCE – Mencius became a scholar at the Jixia Academy.   
312 ca. BCE – Mencius Moved to Tsou.  
289 ca. BCE – Mencius died. 
221-207 BCE Qin Dynasty – burning of books and the killing of Confucian scholars  
206 BCE-220 CE Han Dynasty – Confucianism became the state orthodoxy Classics 
annotated Grand Academy established Old Text School; Confucianism was 
introduced to Vietnam, Korea. Indian Buddhism was introduced to China 
and interacted with Confucianism.   
220-420 Wei-Jin Dynasties – Daoist Religion incorporated Confucian ethics.  
386-581 Southern and Northern Dynasties – Buddhism flourished and debates 
between Confucianism and Buddhism intensified.  
581-907 Sui-Tang Dynasties – Confucianism gradually regained its prestige; civil 
service examination system established; Nestorians came to China (635); 
Korean Silla Kingdom established Confucian Studies.   
354-373 Augustine’s Early Life 
354 – Augustine was born on 13 November in Thagaste in the 
province of Numidia in North Africa (today Souk Ahras in Algeria). 
He was the son of a pagan father, Patricius, and a Berber Christian 
mother, Monica. The family, which included two brothers and a sister, 
was respectable but somewhat impoverished. 
354-365 – the infancy and early schooling of Augustine in the local 
school. 
366 – Augustine's education continued at Madaura, a centre of 
education in Roman North Africa twenty miles south of Thagaste, 
where he was sent to study rhetoric at age twelve. 
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370 — Augustine had to return home for a year while Patricius saved 
money for his further education. A year of idleness led the adolescent 
student into acts of dissipation and sexual adventure.  
371 — Augustine went to Carthage for first time to study. 
372 — Augustine’s father died, baptised a Christian on his deathbed. 
He took a concubine.  
373 — Reading of Hortensius. Augustine's unnamed lover bore him 
a son, Adeodatus, ‘God-given.’  
374-383 Augustine’s Teaching Career  
374 — Augustine returned home to Thagaste to teach grammar, the 
underlying foundation for the study of rhetoric. Monica, appalled at 
his alliance with the heretical Manichees, at first refused to allow him 
to enter her house. She prayed unceasingly for his conversion to the 
Catholic Church. 
376 — Augustine returned to Carthage following the death of a dear 
friend in Thagaste.  
383 — Augustine sailed for Rome to teach rhetoric.  
384-390 Augustine’s Conversion  
384 — Augustine moved to Milan and took up study of the 
Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus (205-270 CE). Appointed 
Professor of Rhetoric in Milan. He decided to become a catechumen 
in the Catholic Church of Milan after being impressed by the sermons 
of Bishop Ambrose.  
385 — Monica arrived in Milan.  
386 — Conversion (end of August) and going to Cassiciacum 
(September) 
387 — Returned to Milan (early March), Baptism, Vision of Ostia, 
Death of Monica  
390 — Death of Adeodatus and Nebridius  
391-430 Bishop of Hippo  
391 — Arrived in Hippo to found monastery and ordained priest.  
394 — Augustine began combating Donatists for next eight years.  
395 — Augustine was consecrated as successor to Bishop Valerius.  
396 — Bishop Valerius died and Augustine succeeded him as Bishop 
of Hippo. He remained in this office until his own death in 430. 
410 – Conflict with Pelagius.  
418 —The Council of Carthage, with over two hundred bishops under 
Augustine's leadership, pronounced Pelagianism heretical. 
430 — Death and burial of Augustine on 28 August.  
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Chapter One: Why Confucian-Augustinian Formation of Moral Self? 
 
Purpose of This Study 
 
In this thesis, I will compare the works of Confucius and Mencius with Saint Augustine. My purpose in 
so doing is to show Confucian Augustinianism as a new theological angle on Confucian-Christian ethics 
and modern Augustinianism such as Augustinian realism, Augustinian proceduralism, Augustinian civic 
liberalism, and Radical Orthodoxy by discovering analogies and differences in their respective 
understandings of character formation, and the development of moral virtues which lead to happiness.  
There are excellent reasons for conducting such a comparative cross-cultural study of Confucius, 
Mencius, and Augustine. Above all, they not only highly influenced Chinese and Western culture 
respectively but also are of mutual influence in East Asia. It is persuasive that Confucius, Mencius, and 
Augustine have been regarded as key sources of ethics in the cultures of East and West given that their 
ethical thoughts have greatly influenced Confucianism and Western Christianity. Zhao demonstrates as 
follows: 
  
Confucianism is the mainstream of Chinese culture and Christianity is the cornerstone of 
Western culture. Chinese culture cannot be understood without understanding Confucianism, 
and nor can the Western spirit be interpreted without interpreting the spirit of Christianity.9  
 
Confucianism is an ethical religious tradition that has shaped the culture of China for 2,500 years, 
following which its influence subsequently spread to Korea, Japan and Vietnam.10 Particularly, in the 
                                           
9 Yanxia Zhao, Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study of Xunzi and Paul 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2007), 7.  
10 Zhao, Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity, 8. 
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process of Confucianism’s development Mencius has played a distinctive role in that ‘while Confucius 
laid the solid groundwork for Confucianism, Mencius clearly defined the principles, penetrated into 
their meanings more profoundly, and built a more comprehensive system.’11 Furthermore, the thinking 
of Confucius and Mencius has been regarded as orthodox in China, Korea, and Japan. Although still 
not directly visible in the social consciousness of modern Koreans and Japanese, it still profoundly 
shapes primary family life experiences. Thus, while the position of Confucianism in modern Chinese 
society has been challenged greatly since the ‘Cultural Revolution’, its influence is still profound, 
especially since the recovery of Chinese traditional culture from the end of the 1980s.12 Therefore, the 
study of Confucianism, for Chinese Studies, has not only historical significance, but also modern 
relevance. Furthermore, Confucianism is a living tradition in a pluralistic global context in that the 
Confucian tradition becomes a heritage for the whole of humankind by the globalization of 
Confucianism in the appearance of ‘Boston Confucianism’ represented by Robert Neville and John 
Berthrong. Confucianism is no longer a tradition restricted to the ‘Sinitic’, ‘East Asian’, or ‘oriental’ 
world as the sole possession of the ethnic Chinese.13 
The relationship of Christianity and Western culture is a very close one and Christianity is now a 
major influence in Asian cultures, both within mainland China, and even more so in nations such as 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan which have significant influence from Confucianism.14 In the West 
before the Enlightenment everything including science and philosophy was the ‘maid’ and ‘servant’ of 
Christian practice. Although the status of human rationality and reason greatly increased as a result of 
the Enlightenment, the ingrained influence of Christianity on Western society remains very strong.15 It 
is noteworthy that Augustine has had a profound influence in the process of Christianity’s development 
within Western civilization. For many centuries, from the Middle Ages to the present, as Drober depicts, 
                                           
11 Carsun Chang, “The Significance of Mencius,” Philosophy East and West 8, no. 1/2 (1958), 37.  
12 Zhao, Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity, 8. 
13 Pan-Chiu Lai, “Chinese Culture and the Development of Chinese Christian Theology,” Studies in World 
Christianity 7, no. 2 (2001), 234.  
14 Zhao, Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity, 8. 
15 Zhao, Father and Son in Confucianism and Christianity, 8. 
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Augustine has remained the most prominent and most widely studied author in western Christianity, 
second only to biblical writers such as Paul.16 The roots of this extraordinary phenomenon go back to 
Augustine’s own lifetime, and are in part due to the fact that he did not produce the most immense 
literary corpus of all western Christianity for solely academic purposes.17 Already, a good number of 
his contemporaries considered him to be both the most accomplished theologian and the most 
trustworthy pastor of their times. 18  These appreciations of Augustine’s person and works have 
continued unabated for the last 1600 years. Considering the rapid growth of urban Chinese intellectuals 
converting to Protestantism formed by the Neoplatonic worldview of Augustine,19 Confucian and 
Augustinian reasoning is necessary in the context of the Chinese church to engage religious dialogues 
and tackle public issues.20   
According to Biggar, ‘recent Christian ethics has tended to present us with a choice between two 
options: either a conservative biblical and theological seriousness, which is shy of attending too closely 
to public policy; or liberal engagement with public policy, which is theologically thin and bland.’21 In 
contemporary American theological thought, there are two prominent schools: postliberalism and 
revisionism.22 The term ‘postliberalsim’ has been widely linked with the works of George Lindbeck, 
Ronald Thiemann, and various other representatives of the Yale School. Strongly influenced by 
nonfoundationalist thinkers such as Quine, Sellars, Geertz, and Wittgenstein, postliberals accept the 
position that we are largely determined by particular cultural-linguistic societies. The result of this kind 
of nonfoundationalism is the rejection of universals of any kind. In contrast, revisionist theology, widely 
                                           
16 Hubertus R. Drober, “Studying Augustine: an overview of recent research,” in Augustine and His Critics: 
Essays in Honor of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London: Routledge, 2000), 18. 
17 Drober, “Studying Augustine,” 18. 
18 Drober, “Studying Augustine,” 19. 
19  Alexander Chow, Theosis, Sino-Christian Theology and the Second Chinese Enlightenment (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 170; Alexander Chow, “The East Asian Rediscovery of Sin,” Studies in World 
Christianity 19, no. 2 (2013), 137.   
20 Alexander Chow, “Calvinist Public Theology in Urban China Today,” International Journal of Public Theology 
8 (2014), 158.  
21 Nigel Biggar, Behaving in Public: How to do Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2011), xvii. 




associated with David Tracy and various other thinkers of the Chicago school, suggests all theological 
validity claims must have public attestation on the basis of Habermasian terms in their desire to justify 
theology in the educational marketplace, to establish the discipline as a legitimate academic and 
therefore public enterprise. Revisionism speaks of intertextuality, of a mutually critical correlation 
between Christian theology and other disciplines. Considering these extremes, Confucian and 
Augustinian reasoning could offer a middle way in the dimension of acquiring virtue rather than Heaven. 
Huang shows three models of Confucian theology according to understanding of Heaven in the 
Confucian tradition. In the Confucian classics Book of Documents, Books of Poetry, and Analects, 
Heaven is regarded as something transcendent of the world, similar to our Christian God. For Neo-
Confucians, Heaven is the wonderful life-giving activity transcending the world within the world. For 
contemporary Confucians such as Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan, and Tu Weiming, Heaven is something 
‘immanently transcendent’, the ultimate reality immanent in the world to transcend the world. 23 
Contrary to Confucian theology on the understanding of Heaven, this intertextual reading having rich 
traditions, as Sebastian Kim demonstrates, offers theological implications in public spheres as an 
important part of indigenisation and doing theology in a multi-religious society.24  
Furthermore, classical Confucians and Augustine have become more and more significant more in 
that their virtue ethics could be a radical alternative to that of the Aristotelian and Thomistic 
paradigms. 25  The revival of virtue ethics was prompted by Anscombe’s article ‘Modern Moral 
Philosophy’ in 1958.26 In this article, she claims virtue can be a major alternative to utilitarian and 
Kantian ethics.27  She points out that ‘anyone who has read Aristotle’s Ethics and has also read modern 
moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between them,’28 She presents Aristotle 
                                           
23 Yong Huang, “Confucian Theology: Three Models,” Religion Compass 1, no. 4 (2007), 455.   
24 Sebastian Kim, Theology in the Public Sphere: Public Theology as a Catalyst for Open Debate (London: SCM 
Press, 2011), 50.   
25 Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism, 33.  
26 Roger Crisp and Michael A. Slote, Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 3.  
27 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Virtue Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 44. 
28 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 26. 
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as the role model of virtue ethics. This revival was further advanced by Alasdair MacIntyre who regards 
Thomistic virtue ethics as ideal.29 The most significant point is that they proposed Aristotelian and 
Thomistic ethics as an ideal alternative to utilitarian and deontological theories. However, Aristotelian 
and Thomistic paradigms in the discussion of virtue ethics have been expanded into Chinese philosophy, 
particularly Confucianism, by mainstream philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum, Alasdair MacIntyre, 
and David Wong.30 Moral instruction and ethical persuasion employed by Confucius and Mencius are 
even said to be able to provide a radical alternative to the Aristotelian and Thomistic paradigms.31 The 
significance of moral formation of self, which is neglected in mainstream Kantian and Utilitarian ethics 
has been growing in the re-emergence of virtue ethics since Anscombe.32  
Confucian Augustinianism could be a new type of Augustinianism as a middle way between the 
types of modern Augustinian liberalism and Radical Orthodoxy. According to Eric Gregory, there are 
four types in relation to modern Augustinian liberalism in the twentieth century.33 The first type of 
modern Augustinianism is ‘Augustinian realism.’34 Augustinian realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and 
Robert Markus reconstructed Augustine’s controversial doctrine of original sin and his dramatic 
narrative about two cities in order to temper the enthusiasm of democratic optimism and to support 
something like the secular order of liberalism. Given that Augustine’s two cities exist in this present 
world mixed together,35 Augustinianism tends to contrast secular with eternal rather than with sacred. 
Between World War I and the end of the Cold War, Augustinian realism was closely allied with another 
kind of realism indebted to Machiavelli and Weber. Its principal spokesperson in American politics was 
                                           
29 Yuli Liu, The Unity of Rule and Virtue: A Critique of a Supposed Parallel between Confucian Ethics and Virtue 
Ethics (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), 11.  
30 David S. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court, 
1996), 2.  
31 Xinzhong Yao, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study of Jen and Agape (Brighton: Sussex 
Academic Press, 1996), 33.  
32  Anh Tuan Nuyen, ‘Can Morality Be Taught? Aquinas and Mencius on Moral Education,’ in Aquinas, 
Education and the East, ed. Thomas Brian Mooney and Mark Nowacki (New York: Springer, 2013), 107. 
33 Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love: An Augustinian Ethic of Democratic Citizenship (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2008), 1-2.   
34 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 10-11.  
35 civ. Dei. 2.1.  
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the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. In Niebuhr’s version of politics, the central fact of human 
nature this side of the Eschaton is sin, and it is the purpose of government, not to eliminate sin, but to 
constrain or ameliorate its bad effects by passing laws. The background of Augustinian realism is a 
rough world threatened by fascism and Marxism and the failure of responses to these ideologies. Liberal 
democracy is the least bad form of government because it recognizes government’s limited, sin-
constraining role. In defending it, we need a realistic understanding of human nature and a willingness 
to use force and the threat of force in the interest of maintaining order and approximating justice. 
Sentimental attempts to drive a social ethic from the gospel commandment of love are dangerous. 
Augustinian realists offer a limited conception of politics as restraining evil, a conception that often 
travels with a troubling form of moral consequentialism. The second type of modern Augustinianism is 
‘Augustinian proceduralism’ which emerges in positive response to the massive influence of John Rawls’ 
theory of ‘justice as fairness’ in 1970s and 1980s.36 With the Niebuhrian emphasis on sin this stresses 
the significance of fairness as a political virtue for a liberal society marked by conditions of pluralism. 
Augustinian proceduralists allow more positive political ideals, but themselves offer a minimalist 
conception of justice which privatizes important virtues such as friendship and compassion. The third 
type of modern Augustinianism is ‘Augustinian civic liberalism’ emerged in 1990s by Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, Timothy P. Jackson, Rowan Williams, and Oliver O’Donovan on the roots of Paul Tillich, 
Martin Luther King Jr, Paul Ramsey, and Gustavo Gutierrez.37 Augustinian civic liberalism emphasises 
love and civic responsibility.38 Love of God and neighbour can play a central role in an Augustinian 
social vision. Instead of offering a new type of Augustinianism, Gregory just defends Augustinian civic 
liberalism by constituting a response both to critics of Augustine who defend liberal democracy (such 
as Hannah Arendt, Paul Ramsey, Martha Nussbaum, Robert M. Adams, and Timothy P. Jackson) and to 
fans of Augustine who attack liberal democracy (such as Alisdair MacIntyre, Stanley Hauerwas, Robert 
Kraynak, and John Milbank).39 Civic liberalism is a virtue-oriented liberalism that aims to avoid 
                                           
36 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 12.  
37 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 12.  
38 civ. Dei. 19.24.  
39 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 2. 
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individualistic and rationalistic assumptions about human nature as well as romantic or totalitarian 
conceptions of political community.40 This relies on a virtue-oriented rather than merely sin-oriented 
Augustinian politics.41 Civic liberalism corresponds to liberal perfectionism in contemporary political 
philosophy. In political theory, liberal perfectionists include Joseph Raz, Vinit Haksar, Thomas Hurka, 
George Sher, and John Finnis. Civic liberals and liberal perfectionists allow ideal conceptions of human 
flourishing into the full light of the public square, conceptions that already shape practical deliberations 
of public decision-making and normatively evaluate the effects of liberal justice.42 The fourth type of 
modern Augustinianism is antiliberal theology known as ‘Radical Orthodoxy,’ which was launched by 
Cambridge theologians John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward in 1999.43 It can be 
called Augustinian Orthodoxy in that it highlights the use of a reading of St Augustine with the insights 
of postmodernism. John Milbank is the central figure associated with Radical Orthodoxy that emerged 
out of Anglican social thought (especially Christian socialism) as an intellectual, cultural, and 
ecumenical movement in the late 1980s. Radical Orthodoxy seeks to transcend liberal Protestant 
theology, conservative politics of free market capitalism, and liberal politics of welfare bureaucracy.44 
Returning to Neoplatonic and Augustinian texts, Radical Orthodoxy criticises modern secularism and 
Kantian account of metaphysics by demonstrating the insufficiency of any account of reality that 
excluded religion or theology. Culture, participation, gift, liturgy, erotic desire and the body are key 
themes.45 Radical Orthodoxy considers theology the queen of the sciences. Milbank places love at the 
centre of his political Augustinianism whereas Stanley Hauerwas emphasises patience.46 Each type of 
modern Augustinianism stresses a distinct virtue: realists emphasise hope, proceduralists highlight 
justice, and civic liberals stress love.47     
                                           
40 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 10.  
41 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 14.  
42 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 10. 
43 John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, “Introduction: Suspending the Material: The Turn of 
Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, ed. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham 
Ward (London: Routledge, 1999), 2.  
44 Gregory, Politics and the Order of Love, 125.  
45 David Grumett, “Radical Orthodoxy,” The Expository Times 122, no. 6 (2011), 261.  
46 John Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (Eugene: Cascade Book, 2009).  
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In particular, comparative study on the formation of moral self in Confucius, Mencius and Augustine 
has never been produced since previous research on their formation of moral self respectively has 
remained fragmented. For example, in Mencius and Aquinas Yearley offers Mencius and Aquinas’ 
theories of virtue, but he has nothing to say on their views on the acquisition of virtue by forming moral 
self.48 In terms of Augustine’s formation of moral self, in Putting on Virtue, Herdt deals with virtue’s 
acquisition only within the Christian tradition. This indicates that it is high time that research on 
Confucius, Mencius and Augustine’s formation of moral self be undertaken in the dimension of 
comparative ethics since comparative efforts can ‘lead to deeper understanding of the compared 




In this thesis I deal with the formation of the virtuous self as described in the major texts of Confucius, 
Mencius and Augustine. The thesis is divided into five chapters. In this introductory chapter I outline 
the project, and position it in the scholarly literature on comparative virtue ethics as well as the 
formation of moral self of Confucius, Mencius, and Augustine. And then I describe inter-textual 
reasoning as the research methods according to the hermeneutics of Gadamer. From chapters two to 
chapter four, I compare Confucius and Mencius’ xue (學), si (思), and li (禮) including yue (樂) with 
Augustine’s moral learning, contemplation, sacrament, and music. In the concluding chapter, I show 
Confucian Augustinianism as a new theological perspective on Confucian-Christian ethics and 
Augustinianism in the light of this research. 
 
                                           
48 Nuyen, ‘Can Morality Be Taught? Aquinas and Mencius on Moral Education,’ 107. 
49 Nuyen, ‘Can Morality Be Taught? Aquinas and Mencius on Moral Education,’ 107. 
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Scholarship on Confucian-Christian Dialogues 
 
In this thesis, I compare the theoretical descriptions of the formation of the moral self, and the 
acquisition of the virtues, and virtuous practices, in Confucius, Mencius and Augustine. Although no 
systematic study directly on the topic of the comparison between classical Confucians and Augustine’s 
teachings on the formation of moral self is available, some relevant research has already been 
undertaken by both Chinese and Western scholars. Their works can be categorised into three types: the 
first is Ricci’s missiological apologetics and a conceptual bridge, the second contribution can be found 
in Ching’s theological approach and New-Confucianism, and the last is Yearley’s academic approach 
and its influences.    
 
Ricci’s Missiological Apologetics and a Conceptual Bridge 
In terms of the comparison of Confucianism and Christianity there are three kinds of approaches: 
missiological apologetics, theological, and academic. The first approach was exemplified by the Jesuit 
missionary to China, Matteo Ricci. Although many missionaries have historically attempted to 
introduce different forms of Christianity to China, Roman Catholic missionaries such as Ricci who 
entered China, and engaged Confucianism in the sixteenth century, are regarded as a significant starting 
point of comparing between Confucian and Christian thoughts.50 In a long fresco of a monument built 
by the Chinese government at the beginning of the 21st century in order to celebrate individuals who 
have made significant contributions to the progress of civilisation during the several thousand years of 
                                           
50 ‘The history of these comparisons, whether seen from the Chinese or the Western sides, often tells us more 
about the people doing the comparisons than about the civilizations being compared, however. Both the foreign 
and the familiar civilization can resemble chameleons: they assume a protective coloration to meet the threats 
posed by a strange and potentially hostile environment. For example, the West often has fluctuated between 
excessive praise of China and excessive condemnation of it. Enlightenment thinkers often saw in China the 
rational, areligious society that they hoped to create in the West, while nineteenth century missionaries often saw 
in China a backward and heathen society that they hoped to cure by introducing Western ideas and religion.’ Lee 
H. Yearley, “A Comparison between Classical Chinese Thought and Thomistic Christian Thought,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 51, no. 3 (1983), 427.  
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Chinese history only two Westerners are represented: Marco Polo (1254-1324) and Matteo Ricci (1552-
1610). Ricci is mentioned in the fresco as ‘the promoter of cultural exchanges.’51 Ricci is rightly 
considered the earliest known European to have discovered Confucianism.  But long before Jesuits 
could have dreamt of going to China, other Christian missionaries from the West had preceded them. 
As ‘Nestorian Monument’ in Chinese and Syriac in 781 shows, Nestorians monks from the west had 
found their way to Ch’ang-an, capital of the T’ang dynasty from the seventh century, but these few 
travelers could not exert much influence on Chinese culture or society due to Buddhism that had already 
experienced several centuries of integration in Chinese culture.52 In the thirteenth century, furthermore, 
the Franciscan friars came to Mongol China, but they not only lived there for a shorter period than the 
Nestorians, but also did not pay much attention to Confucianism as a Chinese religion or philosophy.53 
The lay Roman Catholic Marco Polo, who stirred Europe with accounts of his experiences in Mongol 
China, described the Chinese as pagans.54 Europe, hence, did not seem to know of Confucianism until 
the seventeenth century, until the reports and writings of the Jesuit missionaries. The Jesuits commended 
cultural accommodation as the missionary method for attempting to introduce Christianity to China. 
Hence Ricci as ‘the founder of Western sinology’ translated extensive parts of Confucius’ Four Books 
into Latin. Ricci also developed the first system for Romanising Chinese, and he tested the effectiveness 
of his work as teaching materials on newly arrived European Jesuits.55 He served as a bridge between 
two different cultures on the basis of the Confucian classics.  
The Jesuit mission to China in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represented the first 
significant intellectual encounter between Chinese thought and religion and Western Christianity.56 In 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Protestant missionaries, in part because of their extensive 
                                           
51 Jean-Paul Wiest, “Matteo Ricci: Pioneer of Chinese-Western Dialogue and Cultural Exchanges,” International 
Bulletin of Missionary Research 36, no. 1 (2012), 17.  
52 Michael Loewe, “Imperial China’s Reactions to the Catholic Missions,” Numen 35, no. 2 (1988), 179.  
53  Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity: A Comparative Study (Tokyo: Kodansha International in 
cooperation with the Institute of Oriental Religions, 1977), 13.  
54 Ching, Confucianism and Christianity, 13. 
55 Wiest, “Matteo Ricci,” 18. 
56 Loewe, “Imperial China's Reactions to the Catholic Missions,” 181.  
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charitable works such as hospitals and schools, and in part because of the extent of European colonial 
and trade interventions in mainland China, brought an even more forceful impact to bear on the majority 
of the Chinese population than had been felt in the earlier stages.57 Yet, Protestant missionaries as non-
conformists did not produce more fruitful works than Ricci in the aspect of East-West cultural exchange. 
Ricci was respectful of Chinese culture, many of those who came after were not, and especially not the 
British.58 Arguably this was because of the toxic effects of European and especially British trade 
practices in China and the Opium Wars of of 1839-1842 with England and 1858-1860 with France. 
Even though the Opium Wars opened China’s physical door to the West by gunboats and diplomatic 
pressure, the Chinese mind could not be opened by such methods.59 The various treaty arrangements 
led to religious conflict. As the consequence of the treaties after 1860, the French state, as protector of 
foreign priests and Chinese Catholics, became frequently involved in so-called ‘missionary cases’ 
(jiao’an 敎案) which was used in relation to anti-Christian agitation during the last four decades of the 
nineteenth century. For example, a popular movement labelled ‘Boxer’ managed an incursion near the 
provincial capital of Chengdu, notably Jintang, and included a brief penetration of Chengdu itself which 
resulted in the figure of 1,500 to 2,000 for the number of Catholics killed or missing in Sichuan in 
1902.60 While it can be argued that anti-missionary conflict was to some extent part of the growing 
resistance by the Chinese people to the increasing pressures exerted by the foreign powers, it should 
also be recognised that anti-Christian violence tended to be intimately linked to existing tensions within 
and among local systems.61 Hundreds of major jiao’an were solved only after involvement of the 
foreign legations.   
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Scholars have asked why Ricci adopted cultural accommodation in his organisation of the Jesuit 
mission to China. One theory is that before arriving in China, Ricci stayed at Goa, the capital of the 
Portuguese Indies, until the spring of 1582. There he observed the ineffectiveness of Portugese mission 
by military force. At that time Western missionaries believed in the superiority of European culture and 
attempted to impose their own cultural patterns. This attitude, unfortunately, endured among many until 
the middle of the twentieth century. During the sixteenth century, however, a few individual 
missionaries, most notably Bartolomé de Las Casas in South America, and Jesuit missionaries, 
including Ricci, in China and Japan, did acknowledge the richness of local cultures.62 Impressed by the 
achievements in Japanese and Chinese literature, politics, and philosophy, Jesuit missionaries decided 
to make this culture the foundation of their missionary project. Valignano masterminded this new 
approach, which was based on the concept of a multi-polar world whose center was no longer Europe. 
Ricci and many of the early China Jesuits adopted pioneer Valignano’s new model for the church’s 
mission in Asia.63 Thus, Ricci determined to win the respect of Chinese scholars and officials in 
intellectual terms in two ways. He set out to acquire a familiarity with those aspects of Chinese culture 
in which they had been professionally trained, so that he could bring references to traditional Chinese 
literature to bear in his arguments. At the same time he strove to impress his Chinese friends with the 
achievements of the western intellect. Roland Allen argues that the accommodation of Christian culture 
to local cultures was the original missionary method of the Apostle Paul in his mission to the Gentiles. 
Paul attempted to accommodate the truth of Christianity to Hellenistic thinking in the cultural center of 
the Mediterranean world (Acts 17:16-34). 64  Ricci’s approach to non-Christians on this account 
resembled that of the early Christian church. He went to China to spread the Catholic religion, but he 
carefully avoided the pitfalls of cultural confrontation.65 Instead, he followed a policy of cultural 
accommodation in an effort to reconcile two disparate systems of faith and thought. Ricci was, as Wiest 
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argues, ‘re-engaging with the theological tradition of the Greek Fathers, such as Clement of Alexandria, 
who brought the heritage of Homer and Plato to the service of Christian thought.’66  
While Ricci adopted Confucianism as a contact point with Christianity, he was less accommodating, 
though not wholly resistant, to Buddhism and Daoism. In late Ming society and government, Buddhism 
and Daoism penetrated deeply into the political as well as the everyday life of Ming people.67 By the 
end of the fifteenth century, the total number of Buddhist and Daoist priests exceeded half a million, 
and there were more than a thousand Buddhist monasteries in Beijing, usually sponsored by eunuchs 
and court officials. Even Buddhism received some patronage by the Ming imperial court, and individual 
monks were able to exercise influence in court politics. Daoist priests were also put into high official 
positions in the government and were allied with the eunuchs. Daoism, which originated with the works 
of Master Lao-tze in the six century BCE, put heavy emphasis on physical health and developed 
techniques for healing, meditation, increased fertility, and the seeking of longevity. In this religious 
background of late Ming, Ricci made the first efforts of missionary accommodation by dressing as a 
Buddhist bonze and using a vocabulary borrowed from Buddhism to teach the Christian Gospel, 
arriving at Macao, a Portuguese colony located on the southeast coast of China.68 However, after Ricci 
was instructed by his Superior, Father Valignano, to receive language training, he soon gave up that 
outlook for two reasons. First, he realised that the Chinese treated them not as Christian missionaries 
but as monks from one of the Buddhist sects. Second, he discovered that government officials and 
prominent people looked down upon them because religious leaders were not a well-respected class in 
China.69 From his perspective, the dominant value system was not Buddhism, but Confucianism. 
Besides, he devoted long years to the study of Chinese and of Confucian classics, and became persuaded 
that there was more compatibility between Christianity and Confucianism, particularly the early 
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teachings of Confucius himself, with reverence for a supreme being and sublime moral exhortations.70 
The more Ricci studied the classical Chinese texts, the more he understood from Confucian teachings 
that, in ancient times, the Chinese were devoted worshippers of the Lord of Heaven, the equivalent of 
the Creator God in Christianity.71 Therefore, he had to distinguish clearly for his readers what was right 
and wrong regarding the doctrine about God, the human body and soul, heaven and hell, and how 
Christian teachings differed from Buddhist and Daoist thought. Ricci regarded Buddhism and Daoism 
as false religions that led people astray from the true God. Ricci was determined to point out the errors 
of their teachings so that the Chinese would return to the true ancient religion. He realised that the most 
effective means of propagating his ideas among learned Chinese was through writing.  
Ricci published The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義) in Beijing in 
1603. It is regarded as the first significant work on the history and theology of Chinese Christianity by 
a Catholic scholar, and in it Ricci uses a Chinese way of thinking to introduce Christianity to Chinese 
intellectuals (rather like Schleiermacher attempted in the eighteenth century in commending 
Christianity to German romantics in his Speeches on Religion).72 He began the True Meaning of the 
Lord of Heaven with an intelligent analogy that captures the essence of Confucian philosophy, which 
also explains why God exists and why there can only be one true God. Throughout the book, quotations 
from Confucian classics are used as support and commentary for Ricci's presentation of the Christian 
doctrines. Ricci draws heavily upon Chinese literary and historical allusions, showing himself a 
sympathetic scholar of ancient and current Chinese texts, and able to use Chinese ways of argumentation. 
Ricci was aware of the tie between the Chinese religious system and its bureaucratic political structure 
based on the Confucian concept of the Mandate of Heaven and the five relationships. By making this 
analogy between the earthly ruler and the Ruler of heaven and earth, Ricci established common ground 
between Christianity and Confucian values. 73  As with Augustine’s early works such as Contra 
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Academicos and Confucius’ Analects, the discourse takes the form of a dialogue. In order to show that 
most Chinese did not realise they had followed the erroneous doctrines of Buddhism and Daoism, and 
had departed from the true meaning of the ancient religious beliefs of Confucianism, some parts of The 
True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven focus on an anti-Buddhist and anti-Daoist polemic. Ricci refuted 
Lao-tzu's teaching of ‘nothingness’ as the Way/Eternal principle and Buddha’s teaching on ‘voidness’ 
as the means to enlightenment. He argued that God is not an abstract principle or merely a cosmic force 
but a personal God who exhibits virtues, goodness, and character.74 In particular, Ricci spent several 
sections of the text refuting what he argued were the false doctrines of Buddhism such as soul 
reincarnation, fasting and good works, and the concepts of heaven and hell. Arguing against the 
hierarchical understanding of soul, Ricci attacked the reincarnation doctrine. He argued that, since 
different creatures possess different souls that are not interchangeable, reincarnation is an impossible 
idea. The human soul is not extinguished and different from the souls of birds and beasts. Ricci then 
gave three more reasons why the idea of reincarnation was deceitful and superstitious: no one is able to 
remember their former lives; there is no evidence of soul transfer; and human abuse of animals shows 
that animals could not possibly be a human in a former life.75  
Ricci used the original Confucian texts of Confucius and Mencius to refute the wrong beliefs in 
Buddhism and Daoism rather than Confucian writings in subsequent centuries.76 Under the rapid spread 
of Daoism and the new doctrines of Buddhism in the beginning of the Sui (581-618) and Táng Dynasties 
(618-907), Confucian Learning lost its supremacy. 77  To overcome contemporary challenges, new 
generations of Confucian scholars produced Neo-Confucianism. In terms of the intensity of reform, the 
scholars of the Song-Ming Dynasties attempted to make more radical modifications in the classical 
Confucian teachings, whereas Tang Confucians such as Han Yu (768-824) took human nature as his 
starting point and attempted to establish the orthodox transmission of the Confucian tradition.78 Neo-
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Confucianism was formed in an effort to systematically answer the questions raised by Buddhism and 
Daoism, so that it gave rise to ‘fundamental transformation of Confucian doctrines which thereby 
enabled Neo-Confucians to construct a comprehensive and complicated doctrinal system containing an 
evolutionary cosmology, a humanistic ethics and a rationalistic epistemology.’79 For instance, Zhu Xi 
and Wang Yang-ming’s thoughts show how Buddhism and Daoism influenced to Neo-Confucianism. 
In order to compete with the ever-growing popular Buddhist and Daoist thought, Zhu Xi (1130-1200) 
incorporated the Buddhist idea of ‘human nature’ into Confucian ethics and developed a new 
interpretative framework for Confucianism that dominated the Chinese intellectual circle for more than 
four centuries.80 Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), the most influential Neo-Confucian scholar in the 
Ming Dynasty, incorporated the Buddhist and Daoist concepts of the ‘heavenly principle’ and ‘true self’ 
into his interpretation of Confucianism and suggested that when one clears away one’s selfish desires, 
one will be able to attain the realisation of perfect goodness, which is the ultimate revelation of the 
Absolute in self.81 Hence, Ricci regards the doctrines of Zhu Xi and Wang Yang-ming as a corrupted 
form of ancient Confucianism.82 Given that ancient Confucianism is a sociopolitical ethics, Neo-
Confucianism is different from it. Thus, Ricci upheld the ancient teaching of Confucius and Mencius 
rather than Neo-Confucianism influenced by Buddhism and Daoism.83  
In this context, Ricci focused on virtue as a contact point between Confucianism and Christianity. 
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He affirmed the humanistic elements of Confucian teachings and employed the ethical aspects of 
Christianity to establish common points of contact in the dimension of virtue. 84  His cultural 
accommodation strategy made the comparison possible. Ricci’s first Chinese publications were 
primarily ethical teachings through which he hoped to appeal to both the literati class and the common 
people. One of his works on ethics produced in the Chinese language was the Twenty-Five Tracts, which 
contain teachings on how to cultivate virtue and wisely use time, and a discussion pertaining to natural 
philosophy.85 He deals with how the Lord of Heaven talked about them by adopting the vocabulary of 
treasured Confucian virtues and expounding a Christian understanding of those virtues. For instance, in 
the True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, he attempts to interpret Confucius’ benevolence (ren 仁) as 
God’s love of Christianity; ‘Benevolence is not only loving for the Lord of Heaven but also loving for 
people.’86 This indicates that thought of ancient Confucianism is included to that of Christianity.87 His 
missiological apologetics seems to be less balanced than modern attempts to compare China and the 
West.88 However, his work is still valuable in that Ricci provided support and evidence with regard to 
the possibility of comparing Confucian culture and Christianity.89 As a result of his introduction on 
Confucianism to Europe, even Leibniz proposed that ‘it would appear almost necessary that Chinese 
missionaries should be sent to us to teach us the use and practice of natural religion, just as we send 
missionaries to them to teach them revealed religion’ with enthusiastic desire for Europe and China to 
learn from each other in the period of Enlightenment. 90  This shows that a comparative study of 
Confucianism and Christianity not only is possible but also fruitful in improving dialogue as to shared 
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Ching’s Theological Approach and New-Confucianism 
The second approach to dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity is Julia Ching’s theological 
one. Theological approach needs to be understood in the context of the New-Confucianism movement 
of the twentieth century. In contrast to the popularity of Confucianism in Europe in the period of the 
Enlightenment, Confucianism in China has fallen into a state of crisis as the influence of Western culture 
has gradually penetrated every corner of modern Chinese society from the first half of the nineteen 
century.92 Even as the Communist People’s Republic of China removed Confucianism from both the 
government and social custom, Confucianism seemed to disappear from Chinese society.93 In spite of 
such persecutions, a movement in China for the revival of Confucianism called ‘New Confucianism’ or 
‘the Third Epoch of Confucian Humanism’ took place ‘in the 1920s and 1930s when scholars tried to 
identify the unique value of Confucianism in the wake of the systematic introduction of modern Western 
culture into China’ and the revival was hugely promoted in the 1970s and 1980s by industrial success 
in nations based on Confucian culture.94 Along with the growth of New-Confucianism some works on 
comparison between Confucianism and Christianity have been produced by Chinese Christian scholars 
such as Zhao Ziehen, Xu Baoqian, and Wu Leichuan. They argue that Christianity can be developed 
into a practicable religion within a Chinese cultural context through greater sensitivity to Confucian 
teaching practices. New-Confucian scholars such as Mou Zongsan produced an intensive discussion of 
the relationship between Confucianism and Christianity. 95  Mou Zongsan (1909-95), the second 
generation of New Confucianism, not only pointed out that a renewed Confucianism ought to include a 
place for democratic theory, the development of ecumenical and modern scientific learning, but also 
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defended the religious nature of the Confucian Way (rudao 儒道). Mou hypothesized that if 
Confucianism is a religion, it ‘should perfect the duties of the proper way of everyday life.’96 He 
presents the moral cultivation of the five cardinal virtues, social rituals, and pedagogies for ‘the proper 
conduct of daily life’ as the case for the Confucian Way. According to Zhao, Christian studies and 
comparative studies between Confucianism and Christianity have been made mainly outside mainland 
China such as Taiwan and Hong Kong while it is still a new theme for research in mainland China. It is 
noteworthy that there is a limited number of comparative studies between Confucianism and 
Christianity even though conflicts between Chinese and Western culture evoke greater necessity for 
comparative work between these two cultures.97 In this context, Ching’s Confucianism and Christianity 
offers relevant insights in comparing Confucius and Mencius with Augustine. In terms of method, above 
all, Ching’s approach is significantly ‘theological’ in comparing the two traditions Her work is ‘a study 
of Confucianism in the light of certain perspectives borrowed from Christianity’ through ‘theological 
horizon.’98 According to Yearley, there are two ways to examine religions on a single continuum: 
theological and academic.99 He pays attention to ‘the questions they ask’ as the most revealing way to 
distinguish theologians and academicians. For him, a theologian is the one who raise questions in ‘a 
traditional religious community’ while the academician is the one whose question arise in the ‘university 
community.’ 100  He thinks that they are distinguishable even though those two communities do 
intertwine in complex.101  
In accordance with his classification, Ching’s questions and answers are obviously theological: 
‘Have we the same God? The assumption so far has been, Yes, Yahweh is the God of Israel, and also 
the universal God, just as the Lord-on-High represents the God of the Shang house, becoming by 
extension the God of all. Yahweh is a personal God, full of power and mercy, just as the Lord-on-High 
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is father and mother of the people.’102 In terms of God, Ching relatively focuses on similarities rather 
than differences in order to show contact points between Confucianism and Christianity. Ching offers 
‘historical encounters’ between the two religions through Matteo Ricci as the first step to contribute to 
the theological self-understanding of Christians by making Confucianism better known and 
understood.103 Hoping to provide structures for a religious dialogue, Ching describes her task as ‘an 
examination of the internal structure of Confucian thought in view of suggesting ways by which each 
of the two traditions might be better understood in light of the other.’104 Ching regards Confucianism 
as being more compatible with Christianity than Buddhism because of its shared ethical concern.105 
She seeks to define the concern by comparing the two traditions under topical headings which represent 
the focal points of discourse about human experience. Given that she regards Christianity and 
Confucianism as religious traditions grounded in the New Testament teachings and classical text-the 
so-called Five Classics and Four Books respectively,106 the problem arises of how these traditions can 
be historically linked. For this task, she argues that Christianity and Confucianism can only engage in 
a dialogue about man.107 She ultimately focuses on a comparison of two kinds of ‘humanism.’108 More 
specifically, Ching shows the possibility of comparing between Mencius and Augustine in the problem 
of evil.109 Mencius and Augustine commonly deal with the problem of evil, but their approaches for 
solving evil are different.110 Mencius regards the cause of evil as the formation of bad habits while 
Augustine sees the doctrine of sin as offence against God.111 Along with the problem of evil, Ching 
offers Confucian benevolence as a significant contact point with Christianity. She argues Confucian ren 
can be parallel with the Christian virtue of love or charity (agape) since it has been translated as ‘human-
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heartedness, benevolence, love.’112 Although she acknowledges the differences between them in that 
Christian teaching of charity is related to ‘God’s love for man’ and the Confucian teaching of ren is 
based on ‘human nature itself’, she further emphasised love as ‘a universal virtue.’113 She presents that 
Confucian rumination on benevolence can provide insight in understanding further the Christian God 
of Love. Confucians need a more articulate theory of human fallibility and Christians a more profound 
inquiry into human goodness.114  
 
Yearley’s Academic Approach and Its Influences 
The third approach to dialogue between Confucianism and Christianity is Yearley’s academic one. 
According to Anscombe, the cause of the decline of virtue ethics in modern western philosophy resulted 
as a consequence of the dominance of Christianity influenced by legalistic notions of Torah since the 
concepts of being bound, permitted, or excused became deeply embedded in our language and thought 
for many centuries.115 According to her argument, philosophical interest in virtue and the virtues can 
be traced back to Aristotle in ancient Greece and rule-based moral theories became dominant after 
ancient Rome by a more legalistic way of thinking about morality based on Christianity.116 However, 
Anscombe’s critique of Christianity is not reasonable at least in comparative studies on Confucianism 
and Christianity. Rather those who adopted missiological apologetics or a theological approach in 
comparing with Confucianism maintained a continued interest in virtue ethics to utilize it as a contact 
point bridging both religions, while western philosophers have tended to neglect it.117 If there are some 
differences between previous comparative studies and modern comparative studies in accordance with 
the revival of virtue ethics in the aspect of philosophy, different approaches on virtue ethics just exist. 
At least, virtue ethics has been continuously dealt with as an important theme in comparative studies on 
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both religions.  
In contrast to those who adopted missiological apologetics or a theological approach, modern 
comparative religious ethicists try to be neutral in comparing Confucianism and Christianity. Yearley 
calls such ethicists ‘academicians’ who are closer to the ‘disinterested inquirer’, distinguishing them 
from theologians who are closer to the ‘cunning apologist’. 118  Such an academic approach as 
comparative religion in the West traces its origins to Max Müller formed in the context of the aftermath 
of colonialism and evolutionism in the nineteenth century.119 His call for a 'science of religion' led to 
the view that religion could be investigated under the critical, historical, and comparative criteria 
provided by science. As a result, religion was treated with the same intellectual scrutiny as were other 
cultural and natural phenomena. Its new scientific theory was used by liberal theology as a powerful 
polemic for placing Christianity at the top of the evolutionary ladder.120 Furthermore, after the First 
World War, the decline of evolution theory and rise of phenomenology of religion adopting the 
Husserlian principle of neutrality in questions of value (epoche) accelerated the academic approach in 
studying cultural history and the uniqueness of religious traditions. In epoche the comparativist could 
describe the material without the value judgments of the previous generation.121 Comparative religion 
is different from comparative theology since faith is a necessary factor in the latter and not in the former, 
but the fields are not entirely separated in that the comparative theologian also needs to be an academic 
scholar in the context of a religious study.122    
In Mencius and Aquinas, Yearley as an academician shows ‘striking differences’ between Mencius 
and Aquinas, even though he analyses their virtue theories and the concept of courage as their common 
ground. He acknowledges that they have some resemblances, but these are rather insignificant due to 
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thin resemblances.123 At first, he points out there are general differences between Mencius and Aquinas; 
e.g., propriety (li), fate (ming), and attention (ssu) are lacking in Aquinas; revelation, church, or 
sacraments are not found in Mencius.124 In particular, he makes an emphasis on the differences of 
cultural context between Mencius and Aquinas such as world view and family.125 Furthermore, he 
describes how different the ideas of virtue of Mencius and Aquinas are.126 For Aquinas, the acquired 
cardinal virtues are practical wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation; they differ from the theological 
virtues of faith, hope and charity. For Mencius, the list is considerably different, as it includes propriety 
(li), intelligent awareness (chih), righteousness (yi), and benevolence (jen). He attempts to show the 
difference of benevolence between Mencius and Aquinas by distinguishing Aquinas’ beneficence 
(beneficentia) and benevolence (benevolentia).127 In terms of benevolence, missionary Ricci, who 
adopted Thomism as his theology, regards it as a concept of bridging between Confucianism and 
Christianity. In contrast, Yearley as an academician focuses on finding dissimilarities rather than 
resemblances even in comparing the concept of love.  
Yearley’s method has been influential for contemporary comparative scholars. Yao takes a central 
concept, ren, from the thought of the greatest Chinese who ever lived, Confucius, and then goes on to 
a careful comparison between ren and a correspondingly central concept in Christianity, agape. Both 
ren and agape may be broadly translated as ‘love’, but love takes many forms. He explores in detail the 
nuances of ren and agape. This indicates Yao focuses on the list of virtues in virtue theories. His method 
is the same as that of Yearley in that he is more interested in showing differences rather than 
similarities. 128  For instance, Yao shows ‘humanism’ and ‘theism’ as the central difference by 
expounding the doctrine of Confucius and Jesus.129  
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Stalnaker focuses on how to attain virtue by examining personal formation of both thinkers. He is 
interested in finding similarities in that he adopts a method similar to that of Neville’s comparative 
categories, here termed ‘bridge concepts,’ that serve as the basic cross-cultural tools for making the 
comparison.130 In terms of methodology, furthermore, he criticises the understanding of Yearley’s 
‘secondary theories’ that ‘may hinder the analysis of human flourishing offered by sophisticated 
religious thinkers such as Xunzi and Augustine.’131 Stalnaker argues, on the contrary, such theories that 
can offer a ‘weak holism’ are essential and constitutive of that analysis. 132  Stalnaker presents 
Augustine’s spiritual exercises such as liberal arts, Bible study, fasting, and prayer,133 but he loses sight 
of the importance of epistemology as the starting point of the formation of moral self in Augustine’s 
earlier writings after his conversion.  
Norden also attempts a comparison in accordance with Yearley’s method. Norden focuses on how 
to overcome evil, like Stalnaker who links it with human nature, but he explains the problem of evil in 
relation to world view. For Augustine, everything in existence is created and preserved by God and 
Created entities share in God’s being and perfection, but in differing degrees and none matches God’s 
reality or perfection. 134  The world view of Confucians like Mencius is, like that of Augustine, 
‘hierarchical’. However, Norden points out ‘this hierarchy is not expressed in terms of degrees of being, 
nor does Mencius recognise any radical division in reality between the material and the immaterial 
realms.’135 Mencius’s world view is described as organism. Cosmologically, the highest place in the 
hierarchy is occupied by Heaven. Heaven sometimes seems to have some anthropomorphic 
characteristics, but Mencius does not talk about Heaven in the way one talks to the personal God of the 
Old and New Testaments.136 For Norden, differences of Augustine and Mencius on world view are 
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only used as a good illustration of the sort of logical incompatibility and untranslatability that MacIntyre 
discusses.137 More important, Norden shows through the differences between them they can help each 
other in solving their problems. Two competing traditions can explain narratives of one another and 
attempt to present through these narratives how the other tradition’s problems are insoluble from within 
that tradition, but can be both diagnosed and circumvented from within the first tradition.138 He takes 
note that they attempt to give an explanation for human wrongdoing.139 He claims that Mencius cannot 
explain why Augustine so acted by using the resources of his own philosophical psychology while 




Intertextual Reasoning  
Any comparative ethical study faces fundamental challenges due to its essential characters. 
Comparative religious ethics brings together ethical traditions that have developed in relative isolation 
from one another and that are defined quite broadly along cultural and regional lines. This indicates 
scholars in comparative ethical study ought to be able to cover the vast range of texts and their 
intellectual and historical contexts. Even religions that are major sources for comparative ethical study 
are essentially divergent rather than convergent, so that there seems to be little room for communication 
between religions.141 Naturally, one who is skeptical of comparative religious ethics might raise a 
question about how a practitioner can bring distant ethical statements into interrelation and conversation. 
In order to solve these problems, methods about how to bridge two different traditions in a comparative 
ethical study are significantly important.   
                                           
137 Norden, “Mencius and Augustine on Evil,” 335. 
138 Norden, “Mencius and Augustine on Evil,” 315. 
139 Norden, “Mencius and Augustine on Evil,” 335. 
140 Norden, “Mencius and Augustine on Evil,” 335. 
141 Yao, Confucianism and Christianity, 1.  
43 
 
In this thesis, intertextual reasoning is used as a main research method for comparing works of 
Confucius and Mencius with Augustine. Intertextual reasoning is not entirely separated from 
missiological, theological, and academic approaches. Intertextual reasoning is missiological in that its 
approach, as Matteo Ricci shows, offers a conceptual bridge through virtue. According to Fingarette, 
for Confucius ritual propriety, humaneness, reciprocity, loyalty, learning, music, familial social 
relationships, and obligations are constantly recurring themes in the Analects. 142  However, for 
Confucius all of these themes are not the main frame of cultivating virtue. As Confucius shows that 
‘self-cultivation begins with studying the Book of Poetry, is established by ritual propriety, and is 
perfected by music’,143 the main frames of cultivating virtue are moral learning, ritual propriety, and 
music. Along with these three methods, Mencius stresses self-reflection in acquiring virtue according 
to his understanding of human nature. Confucius and Mencius’ xue (學), si (思), li (禮), and yue (樂) 
offer a framework for comparison with Augustine’s moral learning, contemplation, sacrament, and 
music for acquiring virtue. Intertextual reasoning also adopts a theological approach in that it is, as 
Clooney argues, ‘constructive theology’ on the basis of faith and theological grounds in an interreligious 
context of theology.144 According to David Tracy, ‘on strictly theological grounds, the fact of religious 
pluralism should enter all theological assessment and self-analysis in any tradition at the very beginning 
of its task.’145 Tracy illuminates four major processes in a comparative theology: ‘reinterpreting central 
religious symbols in a religiously pluralistic world; providing theological interpretation with new 
foundations comprised of both tradition and contemporary pluralism; addressing questions of religious 
pluralism on explicitly theological grounds; and finally, in light of these, reviewing tradition by a 
hermeneutics of suspicion and critique and by a hermeneutics of retrieval.’146 Intertextual reasoning 
also seeks academic approach in that comparative theologians need to be an academic scholars 
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proficient in the study of religion when they are engaged in the study of a religious tradition.147 Given 
that Confucianism and Christianity have developed in relative isolation from one another, the problem 
about how Confucius and Mencius (fifth and fourth century BCE), and Augustine (354-430), a medieval 
Christian, can be bridged must be fundamentally faced. The ethics of ancient Confucians and Augustine 
did not take place in a vacuum, so it is necessary to take into account all kinds of context such as social, 
political, cultural, and theoretical backgrounds in ancient China and Rome that affect Confucius, 
Mencius, and Augustine respectively.148 The focus of this comparison, however, is on what each set of 
ethics actually says, that is, on the ideas and arguments in ethical texts of each side for the sake of 
avoiding bold and ill supported comparative generalisations.149 In one word, the essential method 
employed is textual analysis, by which I will turn to the original texts of Confucius, Mencius, and 
Augustine in order to analyse their direct and indirect meanings and implications.150  
In this thesis, Confucius and Mencius’ xue (學), si (思), and li (禮) including yue (樂) and 
Augustine’s moral learning, contemplation, sacrament and music will be compared respectively as 
methods for acquiring virtue. These are conceptual bridges in comparing them. Yet, in order to operate 
the conceptual bridge properly, a couple of distinct problems should be solved: untranslatability and 
incommensurability. In a conceptual framework, untranslatability and incommensurability may both be 
present between the claims or theses of two competing traditions. Here the difficulty is not with 
understanding the claims of another culture but with judging their truth or falsity. Two radically different 
conceptual schemes have different standards of rationality; they license different inferences and take 
different kinds of beliefs as obvious or unassailable. Thus, if we do manage to translate a sentence S 
from language A into language B, S may turn out to be obviously false in A and obviously true in B. 
There is no third, ‘neutral’ standpoint from which we can adjudicate such differences.151 When cultures 
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and their respective conceptual schemes differ radically, it is often the case that a given sentence of the 
language of one culture cannot be translated straightforwardly into a sentence of the language of the 
other.152 Concepts and expressions found in one language presuppose a matrix of beliefs or social 
practices of the culture which have no counterpart in the other.153  
This is inextricably linked with the matter of neutrality. Many scholars point out the limit of 
neutrality in intertextual reading. Clooney points out its limit in that faith is a necessary in comparative 
theology unlike comparative religion.154 Sugirtharajah also critiques the problem of neutrality. From 
the vantage point of ‘postcolonial criticism’, Sugirtharajah classifies three different modes of relating 
the Bible to Asian culture and religion in colonial history: ‘orientalist mode’ advocating the promotion 
and revival of the native texts, ‘Anglicist mode’ replacing the indigenous texts by integrating the 
colonized into the culture of the colonizer, and ‘nativistic mode’ attempting to recover the vernacular 
forms as a corrective measure. For him, postcolonial reading is ‘an emancipatory reading of the texts’.155 
For Archie C. C. Lee the purpose of cross-textual reading is to realise an iconoclastic role for the Bible 
in order to shape a Christian identity in a multi-scriptural context.156 Pointing out the limit of objective 
reading of the Bible, Yeo presents ‘intersubjective reading’.157 Pieris criticises three categories such as 
exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism in the academic magisterium in the West since these categories 
do not make sense in Asia where there is a common struggle against poverty and destitution of the 
masses. 158  Hence, many adherents of metacosmic religions (Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and 
Christians) have learned to re-interpret their beliefs according to some of the liberative elements in the 
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cosmic religiosity of their co-believers who belong to the poorer classes.159 In this context, Pieris shows 
new categories such as syncretism, synthesis, and symbiosis.160 According to him, syncretism is a 
haphazard mixing of religions. That does not exist among the poor, but is attributed to them by observers. 
Synthesis is the creation of a tertium quid out of two or more religions, destroying the identity of each 
component religion. For him, Christian uniqueness reflects both the process and product of a symbiosis. 
It indicates one's conversion to the common heritage of all religions (beatitudes) and also a conversion 
to the specificity of one's own religion as dictated by other religionists. It can be regarded as 
interreligious dialogue.  
In Truth and Method, Gadamer argues the idea of a perfect translation is entirely illusory due to 
‘prejudice’ that is a soil where our judgment is grown.161 Gadamer insists the translator must show his 
colours owing to the limitation of perfect translation.162 As he shows that ‘every translator is an 
interpreter,’163 translation is a process of ‘re-creation of text’ as follows:  
  
Let us again start by considering the extreme case of translation from a foreign language. Here 
no one can doubt that the translation of a text, however much the translator may have dwelt 
with and empathised with his author, cannot be simply a re-awakening of the original process 
in the writer’s mind; rather, it is necessarily a re-creation of the text guided by the way the 
translator understands what it says.164  
 
It is natural for a translator to be often painfully aware of his inevitable distance from the original.165 
For Gadamer, translating as interpretation which requires a laborious process of understanding is not 
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mere reconstruction but ‘fusion of horizons.’166 Gadamer states: 
 
In this sense understanding is certainly not concerned with ‘understanding historically’-i.e., 
reconstructing the way the text came into being. Rather, one intends to understand the text itself. 
But this means that the interpreter’s own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text’s 
meaning. In this the interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that 
he maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that one brings into play and 
puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own what the text says. I have described this 
above as a ‘fusion of horizons.’167 
 
Fundamentally, Gadamer’s ‘fusion of horizons’ is the matter of language; ‘All understanding is 
interpretation, and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a language that allows the object to 
come into words and yet is at the same time the interpreter’s own language.’168 Thus, he makes an 
emphasis on ‘the reciprocal relationship that exists between interpreter and text’ in bridging the gulf 
between languages.169 For him, translating a foreign language is an ‘extreme case of hermeneutical 
difficulty.’170 In terms of ‘fusion of horizons’, for instance, the classical Chinese term tian (天) in 
Augustine and Mencius is a representative example as follows:    
 
Consider the Classical Chinese term tian 天, which is standardly rendered as ‘Heaven’ in 
English, and as caelum in Latin. However, tian often refers to a sort of higher power, which is 
responsible for implanting an ethical sense in humans, and for managing some of the things that 
we might describe as ‘fate.’ On this basis, it might seem more appropriate to translate tian as 
‘God’ or Deus. However, many of the characteristics that are central to Augustine’s conception 
of God are either absent or significantly less prominent in Mencius’s conception of tian. For 
example, Mencius would never have conceived of tian as ‘eternal’ in the precise way that 
Augustine conceives of God as eternal (that is, as existing outside of time). Furthermore, 
Mencius’s tian seems less personal than Augustine’s God. One cannot imagine Mencius crying 
out to tian in the manner that Augustine (or Job) cries out to God. Clearly, there is no possibility 
of translation as “same-saying” between Augustine’s Latin and Mencius’s Chinese.171 
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It might seem that there could not be untranslatability between the languages of Augustine and Mencius, 
given that Augustine wrote in Latin, and the book of Mencius has been translated into Latin. Clearly, 
the classical Chinese term tian might seem like God or Deus. Yet, Mencius’s tian seems less ‘eternal’ 
and ‘personal’ in comparison with Augustine’s concept of God. It indicates, as Gadamer argues, perfect 
translation between Augustine’s Latin and Mencius’s Chinese is impossible but ‘fusion of horizons’ as 
a process of interpretation is possible. 
In terms of translation, MacIntyre’s understanding is similar to that of Gadamer. In Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality?, MacIntyre also holds that not all languages are intertranslatable; ‘those situations 
in which the task of translation is from the language of one community whose language-in-use is 
expressive of and presupposes a particular system of well-defined beliefs into the different language of 
another such community with beliefs which in some key areas are strongly incompatible with those of 
the first community.’ 172  However, in understanding MacIntyre’s claim about translatability, it is 
important to keep in mind both what he means by ‘translation’ and the relationship he sees between 
language and beliefs. MacIntyre is not denying that it is possible for a speaker of any given natural 
language to learn any other natural language. Nor is MacIntyre denying that it is possible to modify an 
existing language so that it comes to have expressive resources that had previously only existed in some 
other language. In fact, MacIntyre writes:  
 
when Greek philosophy came to be written in Latin, those who continued the Greek tradition 
of philosophical enquiry had to be able to recognise … the previous singularly 
unphilosophical character of Latin, thus acknowledging the extraordinary achievement of 
those who like Cicero both translated from Greek and neologized Latin, so that it acquired 
new resources.173  
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MacIntyre illustrates the difference between being able to understand a tradition and being able to 
translate all its claims into the language of another tradition by pointing to the possibility of ‘bilinguals’ 
- people who, for example, might have been raised within one community and its tradition, and then 
through migration or conquest, become a member of another community and its different tradition. Such 
bilinguals might very well understand each tradition, and such understanding might include knowledge 
of those parts of each that cannot be translated into the language of the other. Such bilinguals would not 
encounter the sort of radical incommensurability constituted by incomprehensibility, but they may be 
unable to resolve conflicts of belief between the traditions, instead having to relativize the claims of 
each in some such form as ‘seems true to this particular community’ or ‘seems justified to this particular 
community.’ 
Particularly, there could be a problem of translation in translating the Analects, Mean, Great 
Learning, and Book of Mencius, since these works have been translated into English by many scholars. 
As Yao states that ‘translation of the Confucian classics often reflects a personal involvement in re-
experiencing the philosophy behind the texts,’174 different translators have different understandings of 
the Confucian philosophy, and therefore their translations are different. In order to present the 
Confucian tradition in the best way, he emphasises that ‘we cannot possibly adopt single translations 
exclusively.’175 In treating the Analects, Mean, Great Learning, and Book of Mencius, I will make 
selective use of the translations rendered respectively by James Legge, Raymond Dawson, D.C. Lau, 
and Irene Bloom with occasional changes according to my own understanding and judgment. The 
references to the original sources and to their English translators are given in the footnotes when 
necessary and also in the bibliography. More importantly, I compare Confucius and Mencius’ xue (學), 
si (思), and li (禮) including yue (樂) with Augustine’s moral learning, contemplation, sacrament and 
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music by presenting their similarities within differences and differences within similarities chapter by 
chapter, and then in conclusion I offer Confucian Augustinianism as a new theological perspective on 
Confucian-Christian ethics in the light of this research. 
 
Continuity between Augustine’s Early and Later Works   
For this task, Augustine’s early works on the formation of moral self are intensively expounded. It is 
because such works make possible a dialogue with ancient Confucians. As Drober shows that ‘the most 
recent and comprehensive bibliography on Augustine contains the titles of some 20,000 of a total of 
about 50,000 estimated publications worldwide, and the annual bibliography published in the Revue des 
études Augustiniennes adds some three to five hundred items to this number each year,’176 There is a 
great deal of bibliography on Augustine’s thinking, based on his many books and treatises. It may be 
that too much is made of his two most famous books such as Confessions and City of God even though 
there are many other works as follows: 
 
Confessions and City of God are, therefore, by no means only accidentally the most studied 
of all the numerous works of Augustine, comprising some 15 per cent of all publications 
concerning Augustine. In second place, but trailing by a long distance, follow the Sermons 
and the Letters, adding another 7 per cent between them. Following next are De trinitate, De 
doctrina Christiana, and his biblical commentaries on John and the Psalms, together sharing 
a further 8 per cent of scholarly literature devoted to Augustine. This statistic reveals a 
fundamental feature of all Augustinian scholarship: it is by no means evenly distributed.177   
 
Drober points out that most of research on Augustine concentrates on his later works. The shortage of 
research on Augustine’s earlier works written before 390s may weaken the possibility of comparative 
enterprise since his later works do not make any room for pagan virtue. It is noteworthy that research 
on Augustine’s formation of moral self has been largely neglected at least since the Reformation, for 
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the intellectual concern provoked by his doctrine of predestination led to intensive critical scrutiny of 
his late, anti-Pelagian writings.178 In his early works, Augustine’s method of cultural accommodation 
is similar to that of Ricci in that he brought Platonism to support Christian thought to criticise 
Manichaeism and skepticism in his works from 386 to 396.179 With regard to this matter, Brown 
demonstrates differences between early and later Augustine, focusing on his interpretation of St Paul.180 
According to Brown, early Augustine interpreted Paul as a Platonist with an emphasis of ‘spiritual 
ascent.’ However, Harrison objects that Augustine changed his thinking after reading St Paul’s epistles 
in the 390s.  
 
In the last chapter we suggested that if one is to speak of a revolution in Augustine’s thought 
then one should look for it in 386, at the moment of his conversion, and not in the 390s when 
his thought is held by many scholars to have undergone a landslide, as a result of reading St 
Paul, which resulted in the destruction of the positive optimism of the early works and the 
construction from the rubble of an uncompromising doctrine of original sin, of mankind’s 
inability to know, will, or do good without grace, and of the predestination of the elect.181  
 
Although Augustine acknowledges in his later works, that he placed too much emphasis on reason in 
his early works,182 Augustine did not insist humankind can ‘know, will, or do good without grace’ in 
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his early writing. In later works he makes an emphasis on progressing only through Jesus Christ. For 
instance, when it comes to virtues in early Augustine’s works, he shows the love of God as a supreme 
virtue in the context of Plato’s cardinal virtues.183 In this context, contrary to previous trends, I will 
primarily expound Augustine’s earlier works related to the formation of moral self. By offering a great 
deal of ideas on the formation of moral self such as the inner teacher, divine illumination, mimesis of 
Christ, monastic community, friendship, contemplative life, baptism, marriage, and music as a liberal 
discipline, Augustine’s early works can provide conceptual bridges for comparing with that of 
Confucius and Mencius.   
 
  
                                           
183 mor. 15. 25. ‘that temperance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved; fortitude is love readily 
bearing all things for the sake of the loved object; justice is love serving only the loved object, and therefore ruling 
rightly; prudence is love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders it and what helps it. The object of this 
love is not anything, but only God, the chief good, the highest wisdom, the perfect harmony.’ 
53 
 




Confucius, Mencius and Augustine all discuss at some length the role of moral education in the 
formation of the moral or virtuous self. For them, moral learning is internal, communitarian, and 
transcendental. In this chapter I first explicate Confucius’ account of moral learning (xue 學). This 
includes the matter of how self-cultivation is connected with becoming the man of virtue to bring about 
benevolent government, the matter of how practice is involved with Heaven and filial piety, the matter 
of sex, poverty, and happiness in moral learning, and the role of tradition and imitation. Then I move to 
Mencius’ account of moral learning. This deals with how self-cultivation contributes to benevolent 
government in connection with will, how human unity is formed in relation to filial piety and schooling, 
the influence of environment and asceticism in moral learning, and how Heaven is related to imitation 
and tradition. And then I proceed to show Augustine’s account of moral learning. This is expounded in 
the dimension of divine illumination and friendship.     
 
Confucius’ Moral Learning  
 
Self-Cultivation, Man of Virtue, and Benevolent Government 
Confucius and Mencius’ self-cultivation theories were formed in the context of political crisis. The 
Zhou (周) Dynasty is largely divided into the Western Zhou (西周, 1027-771 BCE) and the Eastern 
Zhou (東周, 770-256 BCE), which is again divided into the Spring and Autumn period (春秋, 770-481 
BCE) and the Warring States period (戰國, 480-221 BCE). Confucius (孔子, ca. 551-479 BCE) lived 
in the Spring and Autumn period and then Mencius (孟子, ca. 372-289 BCE) and Xunzi (荀子, ca. 323-
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238 BCE) lived in the Warring States period.184 Just as after the death of Socrates, his school of thought 
was further developed by Plato and Aristotle, thus becoming the orthodoxy of western philosophy, the 
school of Confucius was developed by Mencius and Xunzi, and became the orthodoxy of Chinese 
philosophy. Confucius as founder of the Ru (儒) School of Chinese thought laid emphasis on virtue (德) 
as a solution to the situation in Analects (論語), Great Leaning (大學), and Doctrine of the Mean (中庸) 
which were collected by his followers. He states that ‘exalting virtue consists of making loyalty and 
good faith into one’s main principles and moving towards tightness,’ he deals with how to exalt virtue 
and clear up confusions.185 He firmly believed that the Way (道) could make a contribution to solving 
such disorderly chaos.186 As he lamented that people are not interested in virtue in his time,187 he points 
out the necessity of moral education for cultivating virtue since ‘when the man of high station is well 
instructed, he loves men; when the man of low station is well instructed, he is easily ruled.’188 Thus, he 
insists that it is not necessary to distinguish classes in teaching.189  
 
When the Master went to Wei, Ran You drove his carriage. The Master observed, ‘How 
numerous are the people!’ You said, ‘Since they are thus numerous, what more shall be done 
for them?’ ‘Enrich them,’ was the reply. ‘And when they have been enriched, what more shall 
be done?’ The Master said, ‘Instruct them.’190  
 
For Confucius the formation of moral self is an important aspect in nurturing ordinary people as well 
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as in achieving economic sufficiency. For him it is defined as cultivating the Way which is in accordance 
with human nature conferred by Heaven.191 He opposes the death penalty. Regarding four abominations, 
Confucius states:  
 
To put the people to death without having instructed them - this is called ruthlessness. To 
require from them, suddenly, the full tale of work, without having given them warning - this 
is called harshness. To issue orders as if without urgency, at first, and, when the time comes, 
to insist on them with severity - this is called oppressiveness. And, generally, in the giving of 
pay or rewards to men, to do it in a stingy way - this is called acting the part of a mere 
official.192  
 
If so, who can rightly govern and teach people? Confucius thinks the one who rectify one’s own self 
can participate in government and instruct others. 193  In other words, truly virtuous ministers can 
properly govern and teach others. To rectify one’s own self refers to cultivating one’s own character. In 
terms of rectifying (正), he urges ministers to take the initiative in being virtuous since people will 
follow their character; ‘Ji Kang asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, to govern means 
to rectify. If you lead the people with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?’194 … ‘The Master 
said: If one’s character is rectified, then things will get done without orders being issued; but if one’s 
character is not rectified, then although orders are issued they are not followed.’195 More specifically, 
rectifying indicates the superior is fond of ‘ritual propriety’ (禮), ‘righteousness’ (義), ‘good faith’ 
(信).196 Confucius stresses the influence of virtuous men to inferiors, he likens them to wind and grass 
respectively.  
 
Ji Kang asked Confucius about government, saying, ‘What do you say to killing the 
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unprincipled for the good of the principled?’ Confucius replied, ‘Sir, in carrying on your 
government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, 
and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between 
the wind and the grass. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it.’197 
 
In terms of politics, this indicates that Confucius seeks benevolent government (仁政) rather than 
government depending on punishment since possession of all under heaven belongs not to a skillful 
man at war but to the man of virtue. When Nangong Kuo put a question to Confucius about differences 
between Yi and Ao who were skillful at archery (but neither managed to die a natural death) and Yu and 
Ji who personally sowed the crops but gained possession of all under the kingdom, Confucius regards 
Kuo as the man of virtue.198 Who is the man of virtue? For Confucius, the man of virtue is the complete 
man (成人). Confucius shows ways for becoming a complete man through self-cultivation in relation 
to understanding, being free from desires, courage, ritual propriety, music, and truthfulness as follows:   
 
Suppose a man with the knowledge of Zang Wu Zhong, the freedom from covetousness of 
Gong Chuo, the bravery of Zhuang of Bian, and the varied talents of Ran Qiu; add to these 
the accomplishments of the rules of ritual propriety and music - such a one might be reckoned 
a complete man.199  
 
He defines a complete man as one who thinks of righteousness when given the opportunity of gain and 
is prepared to give up his life when faced with danger as well as not forgetting an old agreement.200 For 
Confucius the formation of moral self is the matter of self-cultivation to become the man of virtue 
(君子). He states that ‘what the superior man seeks, is in himself. What the mean man seeks, is in 
others.’201 This indicates being the man of virtue is the matter of self-cultivation (修己), through which 
                                           
197 Analects, 12.19. 季康子問政於孔子曰：「如殺無道，以就有道，何如？」孔子對曰：「子為政，焉
用殺？子欲善，而民善矣。君子之德風，小人之德草。草上之風，必偃。」 
198 Analects, 14.5. 南宮适問於孔子曰：「羿善射，奡盪舟，俱不得其死然；禹稷躬稼，而有天下。」夫
子不答，南宮适出。子曰：「君子哉若人！尚德哉若人！」 
199 Analects, 14.12. Translation adapted from Legge. 子路問成人。子曰：「若臧武仲之知，公綽之不欲，
卞莊子之勇，冉求之藝，文之以禮樂，亦可以為成人矣。」 
200 Cf. Analects, 14.12. 曰：「今之成人者何必然？見利思義，見危授命，久要不忘平生之言，亦可以為
成人矣。」 
201 Analects, 15.21. 子曰：「君子求諸己，小人求諸人。」 
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the man of virtue can show reverence and tranquility to others; ‘Zi Lu asked what constituted the man 
of virtue. The Master said, The cultivation of himself in reverence. … He cultivates himself so as to 
bring tranquility to others. … He cultivates himself so as to bring tranquility to all the people. Self-
cultivation so as to bring tranquility to the hundred surnames - even Yao and Shun were still solicitous 
about this.’202 
  
Practice, Heaven, and Filial Piety 
What are the specific methods for self-cultivation in Confucius? Confucius states that people are close 
to one another by nature and they diverge as a result of repeated practice.203 Confucius offers practice 
(習) in relation to human nature (性). Confucius did not, as Zi Gong said, clearly express an opinion on 
human nature and the way of Heaven.204 Seen in the light of later discussions by Mencius, Xunzi, and 
others about whether human nature is originally good or bad, Confucius seems not to be specific about 
what human nature is. However, Confucius partly shows some evidences that human nature is good. At 
first, he explains the possibility of virtue in human nature in relation to heaven; ‘Heaven produced the 
virtue that is in me.’205 What is Heaven for Confucius? He states that he began studying at fifteen and 
then he eventually understood the decrees of Heaven as follows:  
 
At fifteen, I set my heart on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, 
I knew the decrees of Heaven. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of 
truth. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was 
right.206  
 
                                           
202 Analects, 14.42. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. 子路問君子。子曰：「脩己以敬。」曰：
「如斯而已乎？」曰：「脩己以安人。」曰：「如斯而已乎？」曰：「脩己以安百姓。脩己以安百姓，
堯舜其猶病諸！」 
203 Analects, 17.2. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「性相近也，習相遠也。」 
204  Analects, 5.13. As translated in Legge. “The Master's personal displays of his principles and ordinary 
descriptions of them may be heard. His discourses about human nature, and the way of Heaven, cannot be heard.” 
子貢曰：「夫子之文章，可得而聞也；夫子之言性與天道，不可得而聞也。」 
205 Analects, 7.23. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「天生德於予，桓魋其如予何？」 




This indicates for Confucius Heaven is an essential object of study because studying Heaven is 
inextricably linked to being the man of virtue; ‘If one does not understand fate, one has no means of 
becoming the man of virtue. Without an acquaintance with the rules of ritual propriety, it is impossible 
for the character to be established. Without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know 
people.’207 For example, Confucius praises Yao because by imitating Heaven he could institute elegant 
regulations:  
 
Great indeed was Yao as a ruler! How majestic was he! It is only Heaven that may be deemed 
great, but only Yao modelled himself upon it. How vast was his virtue! The people could find 
no name for it. How majestic was he in the works which he accomplished! How glorious in 
the elegant regulations which he instituted!208  
 
Confucius regards the man of virtue as the one who is in awe of the decree of Heaven as well as great 
men and the words of sages.209 What is Heaven? This is a significantly controversial issue. According 
to Fung, Heaven in ancient Confucianism can be classified into five different meanings: ‘physical’, 
‘anthropomorphic’, ‘fatalistic’, ‘naturalistic’, and ‘ethical’ Heaven. For Confucius Heaven is 
‘anthropomorphic’ whereas for Mencius Heaven is ‘fatalistic’ and for Xunzi Heaven is ‘naturalistic’.210 
Confucius indicates his sincere respect for Heaven which remained for him a responsive over-all 
authority.211 Following Confucius, Mencius elaborates a theory which affirms benevolence as the 
universal nature of man and traced its ultimate source to Heaven.212 Thus, man’s heart is a microcosm 
of Heaven through which a union with Heaven is made not only possible but also necessary. Unlike 
Mencius, Xunzi treats human nature as evil and highlights ritual propriety as the way of maintaining an 
                                           
207 Analects, 20.3. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. 子曰：「不知命，無以為君子也。不知禮，
無以立也。不知言，無以知人也。」 
208 Analects, 8.19. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. 子曰：「大哉，堯之為君也！巍巍乎！唯
天為大，唯堯則之。蕩蕩乎！民無能名焉。巍巍乎！其有成功也；煥乎，其有文章！」 
209 Analects, 16.8. 孔子曰：「君子有三畏：畏天命，畏大人，畏聖人之言。小人不知天命而不畏也，狎
大人，侮聖人之言。」 
210 Yu-lan Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy: The Period of the Philosophers, trans. Derk Bodde (Peiping: 
H. Vetch, 1937), p. 31. 
211 Pei-Jung Fu, “The Concept of ‘T’ien’ in Ancient China: With Special Emphasis on Confucianism,” (Ph.D. 
diss., Yale University, 1984), 133.   
212 Fu, “The Concept of ‘T’ien’ in Ancient China,” 151. 
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orderly society. For Xunzi, Heaven, in combination with Earth, indicates the natural world. 213 
Confucius’ understanding of Heaven as an anthropomorphic Shang Ti (上帝) is similar to the religious 
belief of a large part of the common people of China, and had probably existed since early times. For 
example, in the Shih Ching, Shu Ching, Tso Chuan and Kuo Yü Heaven (天) and God (帝) are frequently 
mentioned. Among them, many indicate an anthropomorphic Shang Ti, ‘a name which literally 
translated means Supreme Emperor, seems to have been the highest and supreme authority, who 
presided over an elaborate hierarchy of spirits (神), who were secondary to him and paid him 
allegiance.’214  
Confucius emphasises that ritual propriety (禮) can be possible in support of benevolence. This 
indicates that ritual propriety can be conducted when human nature is good as follows: 
   
Zi Xia asked, saying, What is the meaning of the passage – The pretty dimples of her artful 
smile! The well-defined black and white of her eye! The plain ground for the colours? The 
Master said, The business of laying on the colours follows (the preparation of) the plain 
ground. Ceremonies then are a subsequent thing? The Master said, It is Shang who can bring 
out my meaning. Now I can begin to talk about the odes with him.215  
 
From the perspective of Fung, for Confucius Heaven may have a right to bestow virtue to humans. Like 
Fung, Guo Moruo and H.G. Creel claim that Shang Di was originally the high god of the Shang people. 
Such a hypothesis has been widely accepted and is often repeated.216 However, Graham claims that for 
Confucius Heaven seems to take part in functions of fate and nature as well as those of deity. According 
to him, Confucius focuses on its alignment with moral goodness, its dependence on human agents to 
actualize its will, and the variable, unpredictable nature of its associations with mortal actors. 217 
Furthermore, the matter of Heaven is, as Allen argues, related to the discussion of Sang Di (上帝) which 
                                           
213 Fu, “The Concept of ‘T’ien’ in Ancient China,” 167.  
214 Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, 31.  
215 Analects, 3.8. As translated in Legge. 子夏問曰：「『巧笑倩兮，美目盼兮，素以為絢兮。』何謂也？」
子曰：「繪事後素。」曰：「禮後乎？」子曰：「起予者商也！始可與言詩已矣。」 
216 Sarah Allan, “On the Identity of Shang Di 上帝 and the Origin of the Concept of a Celestial mandate (Tian 
Ming 天命),” Early China 31 (2007), 1. 
217 A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle: Open Court, 1989).  
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is called the most powerful spirit in the oracle bone inscriptions of the Shang Dynasty (B. C. ca. 1600-
1050) and is variously translated in English as ‘high lord, lord on high, high god, supreme thearchy, and 
even God.’218 Allan pays attention to the fact that Shang Di is closely connected to Heaven and the 
terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the transmitted textual tradition from the Western Zhou 
(ca. 1050-771 BCE) on. She raises a question on why Sang Di should be translated into God given that 
Tian (天) literally means ‘sky’ even though Tian is conventionally translated as ‘heaven’ when it is 
associated with spiritual power. She points out that the matter of translations of God and heaven derives 
from reconceptualization of this relationship into a familiar Judeo-Christian one.219 Contrary to Fung, 
Allan suggests that ‘Shang Di was originally the spirit of the pole star. As such, it was the one celestial 
body which was higher than the ten suns, with whom the Shang ancestors were identified. Tian-the sky-
was the location of the Shang Di and the other ancestral spirits. Thus, it was a wider term that came to 
serve as a euphemism for Shang Di or, more broadly, for Shang Di and all the celestial phenomena and 
spirits who were under his aegis.’220  
In particular, it is noticeable that Confucius links study (學) to practice (習); ‘to learn something and 
at times to practise it - surely that is a pleasure?’221 This shows that practice must be linked to learning 
in the context of self-cultivation. For him, the purpose of moral learning is not for obtaining reputation 
but for cultivating self; ‘In ancient times, men learned with a view to their own improvement. Nowadays, 
men learn with a view to the approbation of others.’222 For Confucius, study is the essential part of self-
cultivation. He believed that study and the cultivation of virtue were aspects of the same process. Hence, 
he states that ‘if one loves humaneness but does not love learning, the consequence of this is folly; if 
                                           
218 Allan, “On the Identity of Shang Di 上帝 and the Origin of the Concept of a Celestial mandate (Tian Ming 
天命),” 1. 
219 Allan, “On the Identity of Shang Di 上帝 and the Origin of the Concept of a Celestial mandate (Tian Ming 
天命),” 1.  
220 Allan, “On the Identity of Shang Di 上帝 and the Origin of the Concept of a Celestial mandate (Tian Ming 
天命),” 2. cf. Analects, 2.1. As translated in Legge. ‘The Master said, "He who exercises government by means 
of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and all the stars turn towards it.’ 子
曰：「為政以德，譬如北辰，居其所而眾星共之。」 
221 Analects, 1.1. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：學而時習之，不亦說乎？ 
222 Analects, 14.24. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「古之學者為己，今之學者為人。」 
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one loves understanding but does not love learning, the consequence of this is unorthodoxy; if one loves 
good faith but does not love learning, the consequence of this is damaging behaviour; if one loves 
Straightforwardness but does not love learning, the consequence of this is rudeness; if one loves courage 
but does not love learning, the consequence of this is rebelliousness; if one loves strength but does not 
love learning, the consequence of this is violence.’223  
Confucius insists on the importance of order in study. He places emphasis on practicing ‘filial piety’ 
(孝) and ‘fraternal submission’ (弟) as the roots of humaneness prior to studying literature since if the 
roots are firmly planted, the Way grows.224 He submits that ‘a youth, when at home, should be filial, 
and, abroad, respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to 
all, and cultivate the friendship of the good. When he has time and opportunity, after the performance 
of these things, he should employ them in polite studies (文).’225 For him, the man of virtue is the one 
who concerns himself with the root (本). After studying literature, he shows how to preserve what he 
studied; ‘If the scholar is not grave (重), he will not call forth any veneration, and his learning will not 
be solid. Hold faithfulness (忠) and sincerity (信) as first principles, has no friends who are not up to 
his own standard. When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them.’226  
 
Sex, Poverty, and Happiness  
As Confucius confessed that ‘in a community of ten households there will certainly be someone as loyal 
and trustworthy as I am, but not someone so fond of learning as I am,’ his aspiration for moral learning 
was intense.227 Hence, he was always concerned about the failure to cultivate virtue, the failure to put 
                                           
223 Analects, 17.7. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「由也，女聞六言六蔽矣乎？」對曰：「未也。」「居！
吾語女。好仁不好學，其蔽也愚；好知不好學，其蔽也蕩；好信不好學，其蔽也賊；好直不好學，其蔽
也絞；好勇不好學，其蔽也亂；好剛不好學，其蔽也狂。」 
224 Analects, 1.2. 君子務本，本立而道生。孝弟也者，其為仁之本與！ 
225 Analects, 1.6. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「弟子入則孝，出則弟，謹而信，汎愛眾，而親仁。行有
餘力，則以學文。」 
226 Analects, 1.8. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「君子不重則不威，學則不固。主忠信，無友不如己者，
過則勿憚改。」 
227 Analects, 5.28. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「十室之邑，必有忠信如丘者焉，不如丘之好學也。」 
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into practice what he has learnt, hearing what is right and being unable to move towards it, being unable 
to change what is not good.228 What makes him worry about failing to cultivate virtue? Confucius 
laments that it is difficult to find the one who loves virtue as much as he loves sex,229 and hence one of 
the challenging obstacles for study is the matter of sex particularly in youth: 
 
There are three things which the man of virtue guards against: in the time of his youth, when 
his vital powers have not yet settled down, he is on his guard in matters of sex; when he reaches 
the prime of life and his vital powers have just attained consistency, he is on his guard in 
matters of contention; and when he becomes old and his vital powers have declined, he is on 
his guard in matters of acquisition.230 
 
This indicates, as Bell argues, that the elderly have greater capacity for moral judgement in that they 
are less enslaved by sexual desire.231 As sexual desire decreases with age, there may be less conflict 
between the desire for sex and the desire to do good. The improvement of moral judgement with age 
derives from the fact that elderly do not typically experience conflict between sexual desire and the 
desire to do good to the same extent as younger people even though this is not to imply that the desire 
for sex is entirely extinguished for elderly people. It is easier to control and subordinate to moral 
principles compared to male adolescents. Hence, at seventy years old, Confucius notes that he can give 
free reign to his heart’s desires, meaning that there is less of a conflict between what he wants to do and 
what he should do.232 That is why Confucius places emphasis on paying attention to sexual desire in 
learning virtue in youth.  
In addition, he emphasises overcoming the matter of poverty in pursuing moral learning as well as 
sexual desire. For example, he demonstrates that the reasons why he acquired many abilities in menial 
                                           
228 Analects, 7.3. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「德之不脩，學之不講，聞義不能徙，不善不能改，是
吾憂也。」 
229 Analects, 9.18. As translated in Legge. ‘I have not seen one who loves virtue as he loves sex.’ 子曰：「吾未
見好德如好色者也。」 
230 Analects, 16.7. Translation adapted from Dawson. 孔子曰：「君子有三戒：少之時，血氣未定，戒之在
色；及其壯也，血氣方剛，戒之在鬭；及其老也，血氣既衰，戒之在得。」 
231 Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008), 153.  
232 Bell, China’s New Confucianism, 153.  
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matters resulted from humble circumstances in his early years and having no official employment when 
he became older.233 This indicates that poverty could not hinder his love for study. For him, in other 
words, study is not the matter of environment but will (志); ‘The prosecution of learning may be 
compared to what may happen in raising a mound. If there want but one basket of earth to complete the 
work, and I stop, the stopping is my own work. It may be compared to throwing down the earth on the 
level ground. Though but one basketful is thrown at a time, the advancing with it is my own going 
forward.’234 As Confucius claims that the forces of a large state may be robbed of their commander, 
but the will of an ordinary man cannot be taken from him,235 he shows the importance of will. That is 
why the man of virtue who unites the love of study with sincere faith can hold firm to death in pursuit 
of the Way.236 Even about the relation between will and the Way, he claims that ‘Man can enlarge the 
Way, but it is not true that the Way enlarges man.’237 Such understanding of poverty is linked to his 
understanding of the man of virtue (君子) as the scholar or public servant (士) ‘whose mind is set on 
truth, but who is ashamed of bad clothes and bad food, is not at all fit to be consulted.’238 The man of 
virtue is concerned about the Way and is not concerned about poverty because hunger is a possible 
outcome when one ploughs while official salary is a possible outcome when one studies. The object of 
the man of virtue is not food but the Way (道).239 In other words, for Confucius ‘the man of virtue is 
the one who does not seek to satisfy his appetite to the full when he eats and avoid comfort when he is 
at home. He is diligent in deed and cautious in his speech, and he associates with possessors of the Way 
                                           
233 Analects, 9.6,7. 大宰問於子貢曰：「夫子聖者與？何其多能也？」子貢曰：「固天縱之將聖，又多能
也。」子聞之，曰：「大宰知我乎！吾少也賤，故多能鄙事。君子多乎哉？不多也。」 牢曰：「子云，
『吾不試，故藝』。」   
234 Analects, 9. 19. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「譬如為山，未成一簣，止，吾止也；譬如平地，雖覆
一簣，進，吾往也。」 
235 Analects, 9. 26 子曰：「三軍可奪帥也，匹夫不可奪志也。」 
236 Analects, 8.13. 子曰：「篤信好學，守死善道。 
237 Analects, 15.29. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「人能弘道，非道弘人。」 
238 Analects, 4.9. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. Legge translates shi (士) as ‘scholar’ while 
Dawson translates it as ‘public servant’. 子曰：「士志於道，而恥惡衣惡食者，未足與議也。」  




and is put right by them. He may simply be said to love to learn.’240 To be sure, given that Confucius 
said that ‘to avoid resentment when one is poor is difficult, but to avoid arrogance when one is rich is 
easy,’241 even for the man of virtue poverty must be difficult. Nevertheless, he stresses that ‘the scholar 
who cherishes the love of comfort is not fit to be deemed a scholar’242 since the man of virtue reaches 
out for what is above by thinking of virtue but the small man reaches out for what is below by thinking 
of comfort.243 As a result, the man of virtue  remains firm in the face of suffering, but if the small man 
suffers, he is carried away on a flood of excess.244 It is because he thinks true happiness does not depend 
on wealth; ‘Even in the midst of eating coarse rice and drinking water and using a bent arm for a pillow 
happiness (樂) is surely to be found; riches and honours acquired by unrighteous means are to me like 
the floating clouds.’245 In this perspective, Confucius praises Bo Yi and Shu Qi who died of hunger at 
the foot of the Shou Yang Mountain, criticising the Duke Jing of Qi who had a thousand teams, each of 
four horses but did not have a single virtue.246 Hence, like them Confucius himself wanted to be 
assessed by people as follows; ‘he is the sort of person who gets so worked up that he forgets to eat, is 
so happy that he forgets anxieties, and is not aware that old age will come.’247 Considering he states 
that ‘those who understand a thing are not equal to those who are fond of it, and those who are fond of 
it are not equal to those who delight in it,’248 he truly delighted in study beyond loving it. Hence, he 
said that he may die in the evening without regret if he hears the Way in the morning.249  
 
                                           
240 Analects, 1.14. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. 子曰：「君子食無求飽，居無求安，敏於
事而慎於言，就有道而正焉，可謂好學也已。」  
241 Analects, 14.10. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「貧而無怨難，富而無驕易。」  
242 Analects, 14.2. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「士而懷居，不足以為士矣。」  
243  Analects, 4.11. 子曰：「君子懷德，小人懷土；君子懷刑，小人懷惠。」 ; Analects, 14.23. 子曰：
「君子上達，小人下達。」    
244 Analects, 15.2. 子曰：「君子固窮，小人窮斯濫矣。」 
245 Analects, 7. 16. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「飯疏食飲水，曲肱而枕之，樂亦在其中矣。不義而富
且貴，於我如浮雲。」 
246 Analects, 16.12. 齊景公有馬千駟，死之日，民無德而稱焉。伯夷叔齊餓于首陽之下，民到于今稱之
。其斯之謂與？ 
247 Analects, 7. 19. As translated in Legge. 葉公問孔子於子路，子路不對。子曰：「女奚不曰，其為人也，
發憤忘食，樂以忘憂，不知老之將至云爾。」 
248 Analects, 6.20. 子曰：「知之者不如好之者，好之者不如樂之者。」 
249 Analects, 4.8. 子曰：「朝聞道，夕死可矣。」 
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Tradition, Imitation, and Friend   
In terms of the object of moral learning, Confucius commends tradition instead of exploring 
extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, spiritual beings, and death.250 For example, when Zilu 
asked about serving ghosts, spirits, the dead, Confucius replied that it is meaningless curiosity if one 
does not understand life and is not capable of serving men.251 According to Fingarette Confucius is not just 
a traditionalist. He regards Confucius as visionary in that Confucian vision is not merely a political vision, but 
philosophical and religious one.252 For Confucius, such topics were not his object of moral learning. 
Confucius clearly identified his identity as the bearer of tradition; ‘I transmit but do not create. Being 
fond of the truth, I am an admirer of antiquity. I venture to be compared with our old Peng.’253 The 
confidence of his identity bestowed by Heaven was exposed in the face the of threat of death by the 
people of Kuang. When Confucius was intimidated there, he states that ‘When King Wen died, was 
culture not still here? If Heaven had intended to put an end to this culture, later mortals would not have 
been able to share in it. If Heaven is not yet putting an end to this culture, what have the people of 
Kuang got to do with me?’254 This shows that he considered himself a transmitter of tradition. To be 
sure, Confucius himself is said to have lost both of his parents in his youth. However, one may suppose 
that he could early on understand well enough the legacies of the antiquity of both his own distinguished 
lineage as well as that of the venerable state which his ancestors of the previous several generations had 
come to serve with some distinction.255  
Why did Confucius emphasise the study of tradition? The answer is inextricably linked to his 
understanding of how to acquire knowledge. Confucius states: 
                                           
250 Analects, 7.21. 子不語怪，力，亂，神。 
251 Analects, 11.12. As translated in Dawson. ‘Zilu asked about serving ghosts and spirits. The Master said: ‘If 
one is not yet capable of serving men, how can one serve ghosts?’ He ventured to ask about the dead, and the 
Master said: ‘If one does not yet understand life, how does one understand death?’ 季路問事鬼神。子曰：「未
能事人，焉能事鬼？」敢問死。曰：「未知生，焉知死？」 
252 Fingarette, Confucius, 69.  
253 Analects, 7.1. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「述而不作，信而好古，竊比於我老彭。」 
254 Analects, 9.5. As translated in Dawson. 子畏於匡。曰：「文王既沒，文不在茲乎？天之將喪斯文也，
後死者不得與於斯文也；天之未喪斯文也，匡人其如予何？」 
255 Scott Bradley Cook, “Unity and Diversity in the Musical Thought of Warring States China,” (Ph.D. diss., 




Those who are born with the possession of knowledge come first. Those who know things 
from study come next. Those who study things although they find them difficult come next to 
them. Those who do not study because they find things difficult, that is to say the common 
people, come last.256  
 
This seems to value innate knowledge. However, given that he states that ‘I am not one who was born 
in the possession of knowledge but one who is fond of antiquity, and earnest in seeking it there,’257 he 
virtually stressed the importance of knowing things from study rather than having knowledge at birth; 
‘There may be those who act without knowing why. I do not do so. Hearing much and selecting what is 
good and following it; seeing much and keeping it in memory - this is the second style of knowledge.’258 
When there was an ordinary person putting a question to him, he tried to look at both sides of the 
question and go into it thoroughly rather than pretending to have knowledge.259  
Confucius offered the Zhou dynasty as the ideal model of tradition for study; ‘Zhou had the 
advantage of viewing the two past dynasties, so how splendid is his culture! I follow Zhou.’260 It is 
because he considered the virtue of Zhou perfect virtue, particularly, highly admiring the duke of 
Zhou.261   
 
Shun had five ministers, and the empire was well governed. King Wu said, ‘I have ten able 
ministers.’ Confucius said, ‘Is not the saying that talents are difficult to find, true? Only when 
the dynasties of Tang and Yu met, were they more abundant than in this of Zhou, yet there 
was a woman among them. The able ministers were no more than nine men. King Wen 
possessed two of the three parts of the empire, and with those he served the dynasty of Yin. 
The virtue of the house of Zhou may be said to have reached the highest point indeed.’262 
                                           
256 Analects, 16.9. Translation adapted from Dawson. 孔子曰：「生而知之者，上也；學而知之者，次也；
困而學之，又其次也；困而不學，民斯為下矣。」 
257 Analects, 7.20. 子曰：「我非生而知之者，好古，敏以求之者也。」 
258 Analects, 7.28. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「蓋有不知而作之者，我無是也。多聞擇其善者而從之，
多見而識之，知之次也。」 
259 Analects, 9.8. 子曰：「吾有知乎哉？無知也。有鄙夫問於我，空空如也，我叩其兩端而竭焉。」 
260  Analects, 3.14. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「周監於二代，郁郁乎文哉！吾從周。」  cf. Joel J. 
Kupperman, “Tradition and Community in the Formation of Character and Self,” in Confucian Ethics: A 
Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community, ed. Kwong-Loi Shun and David B. Wong (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 115.  
261 Analects, 7.5. 子曰：「甚矣吾衰也！久矣吾不復夢見周公。」 





What kinds of materials did Confucius suggest for acquiring moral knowledge in study? Regarding this 
question, Yan Hui shows as follows:  
 
Yan Hui, in admiration of the Master’s doctrines, sighed and said, “I looked up to them, and 
they seemed to become more high; I tried to penetrate them, and they seemed to become more 
firm; I looked at them before me, and suddenly they seemed to be behind. By orderly method 
our Master skillfully leads people on step by step. He broadens my knowledge with literatures 
(文) and restrains me with ritual propriety (禮). When I wish to give over the study of his 
doctrines, I cannot do so, and having exerted all my ability, there seems something to stand 
right up before me; but though I wish to follow and lay hold of it, I really find no way to do 
so.”263 
 
Confucius enlarged Yan’s knowledge with classical writings as well as restraining him with ritual 
propriety. The fact that literature, ethics, loyalty, and truthfulness were four things which the Master 
taught indicates he was highly concerned about virtue, not bookishness,264 since his goal was to create 
the man of virtue. Hence, he states that ‘set your heart on the Way, base yourself on virtue, rely on 
benevolence, and take your relaxation in the arts (藝).’265 The arts as subjects conducted in the Zhou 
dynasty that Confucius greatly admired refer to ‘Six Disciplines’ (六藝) such as ritual propriety (禮), 
music (樂), archery (射), chariot-riding (御), calligraphy (書), and computation (數). As he never 
refused instruction to anyone who brought a simple present of dried meat for entering his school,266 he 
taught large numbers of students by using the Six Disciplines with class distinctions which brought 
about widespread use of moral education in China.  
In particular, Confucius highlighted the value of studying the Book of Poetry (詩經) due to its 
multiple usefulness as follows:    
                                           
其可謂至德也已矣。」 
263 Analects, 9.11. Translation adapted from Legge. 顏淵喟然歎曰：「仰之彌高，鑽之彌堅；瞻之在前，忽
焉在後。夫子循循然善誘人，博我以文，約我以禮。欲罷不能，既竭吾才，如有所立卓爾。雖欲從之，
末由也已。」 
264 Analects, 7.25. 子以四教：文，行，忠，信。 
265 Analects, 7.6. Translation adapted from Legge. 子曰：「志於道，據於德，依於仁，游於藝。」 




My disciples, why do you not study the Book of Poetry? The Odes serve to stimulate the mind. 
They may be used for purposes of self-contemplation. They teach the art of sociability. They 
show how to regulate feelings of resentment. You use them at home to serve one’s father, and 
one uses them in distant places to serve one’s ruler. From them we become largely acquainted 
with the names of birds, beasts, plants, and tree.267 
 
The Book of Poetry not only helps one to be stimulated, to observe, to be sociable, to express grievances, 
and to practise filial piety and loyalty, but also gains much knowledge about environment. This results 
from the nature of the Book of Poetry; ‘In the Book of Poetry are three hundred pieces, but the design 
of them all may be embraced in one sentence - Having no depraved thoughts.’268 Even the Book of 
Poetry led Confucius to use the standard pronunciation.269 Therefore, he taught the Book of Poetry to 
his son prior to the rules of ritual propriety as follows:  
 
Chen Kang asked Bo Yu, saying, “Have you heard any lessons from your father different from 
what we have all heard?" Bo Yu replied, "No. He was standing alone once, when I passed 
below the hall with hasty steps, and said to me, 'Have you learned the Book of Poetry?' On my 
replying 'Not yet,' he added, 'If you do not learn the Book of Poetry, you will not be fit to 
converse with.' I retired and studied the Book of Poetry. Another day, he was in the same way 
standing alone, when I passed by below the hall with hasty steps, and said to me, 'Have you 
learned the rules of ritual propriety?' On my replying 'Not yet,' he added, 'If you do not learn 
the rules of Propriety, your character cannot be established.' I then retired, and learned the 
rules of Propriety. I have heard only these two things from him." Chen Kang retired, and, quite 
delighted, said, "I asked one thing, and I have got three things. I have heard about the Book of 
Poetry. I have heard about the rules of ritual propriety. I have also heard that the superior man 
maintains a distant reserve towards his son.”270 
 
This indicates the Book of Poetry played an important role in educating Confucius’ son. Why did 
Confucius stress the Book of Poetry in relation to ritual propriety? In other words, what did Confucius 
                                           
267 Analects, 17.9. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「小子！何莫學夫詩？詩，可以興，可以觀，可以群，可
以怨。邇之事父，遠之事君。多識於鳥獸草木之名。」  cf. Michael Northcott, The Environment and 
Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 254.  
268 Analects, 2.2. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「詩三百，一言以蔽之，曰『思無邪』。」 
269 Analects, 7.18. 子所雅言，詩、書、執禮，皆雅言也。 






ultimately teach through the Book of Poetry? For Confucius, loyalty (忠) and reciprocity (恕) are an all-
pervading unity in his doctrine.271  
What is Confucius’ idea about how to study? At first, he presents it by defining the nature of study; 
‘Even if one studies as if it will not be attained, one is still afraid of failing to reach it.’272 This indicates 
the importance of continuously reviewing what one studied; ‘If a man keeps cherishing his old 
knowledge, so as continually to be acquiring new, he may be a teacher of others.’273 In terms of how to 
study, Confucius offers his disciple Yan Hui as an excellent example. When Confucius was asked by 
the Duke Ai about which of the disciples loved to study, he replied that Yan Hui is the one who loved 
to study as well as not transferring his anger on those who did not deserve it and not repeating a fault.274 
Even Zi Gong thought that he cannot be compared to Hui in that he hears one point and knows all about 
a subject.275 For Confucius, Hui is the one who did not flag when Confucius was speaking to him, His 
mind did not stray from benevolence for as long as three months contrary to the rest of them who 
attained it only occasionally.276 Furthermore, Confucius rated highly Hui’s ability of self-study with 
cleverness; ‘I have talked with Hui for a whole day, and he has not made any objection to anything I 
said - as if he were stupid. He has retired, and I have examined his conduct when away from me, and 
found him able to illustrate my teachings. Hui! - He is not stupid.’277 Above all, Confucius praised how 
he was honed by hardships; ‘Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hui! He lived in a squalid alley with 
a tiny bowlful of rice to eat and a ladleful of water to drink. Other men would not endure such hardships, 
but Hui did not let his happiness be affected. Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hui!’278 In other words, 
                                           
271 Analects, 4.15. 子曰：「參乎！吾道一以貫之。」曾子曰：「唯。」子出。門人問曰：「何謂也？」
曾子曰：「夫子之道，忠恕而已矣。」 
272 Analects, 8.17. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「學如不及，猶恐失之。」 
273 Analects, 2.11. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「溫故而知新，可以為師矣。」 
274 Analects, 6.3. 哀公問：「弟子孰為好學？」孔子對曰：「有顏回者好學，不遷怒，不貳過。 
275 Analects, 5.9. 子謂子貢曰：「女與回也孰愈？」對曰：「賜也何敢望回。回也聞一以知十，賜也聞
一以知二。」子曰：「弗如也！吾與女弗如也。」 
276 Analects, 6.3. 不幸短命死矣！今也則亡，未聞好學者也。」 
277 Analects, 2.9. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「吾與回言終日，不違如愚。退而省其私，亦足以發。回
也，不愚。」 




Hui was the man of virtue.   
With regard to the method of study, more specifically, Confucius also emphasises the importance of 
finding a good teacher and imitating his words and deeds since it is one of the best ways to learn the 
practice of virtue; ‘The mechanic, who wishes to do his work well, must first sharpen his tools. When 
you are living in any state, take service with the most worthy among its great officers, and make friends 
of the most virtuous among its scholars.’279 When Zi Zhang enquired about the way of the good man 
(善人), Confucius clearly replied that if he does not tread in the footsteps of others, he cannot enter the 
chamber of the sage.280 Hence, he states that ‘When we see men of worth, we should think of equaling 
them; when we see men of a contrary character, we should turn inwards and examine ourselves.’281 If 
so, where can we find such teachers? Confucius shows that ‘When I walk along with two others, they 
may serve me as my teachers. I will select their good qualities and follow them, their bad qualities and 
avoid them.’282 Namely, such teachers can be easily found around us. For him, a source of such teachers 
is friends (友); ‘Regard loyalty (忠) and sincerity (信) as your main concern. Do not make friends of 
those who are not up to your own standard. When you have faults, do not shrink from correcting it.’283 
Which types of friends are commendable for Confucius? He outlines both the advantageous and 
injurious types of friendship. According to him, beneficial friends are those who are upright, and sincere, 
while harmful friends are those who are ingratiating good at seeming pliant.284 This indicates that we 
may meet harmful friends as well as beneficial ones. How to cope with that? Confucius advises that 
‘Loyally provide your friend with information and guide him skillfully. If you find him impracticable, 
stop. Do not disgrace yourself.’285  
                                           
279 Analects, 15.10. As translated in Legge. 子貢問為仁。子曰：「工欲善其事，必先利其器。居是邦也，
事其大夫之賢者，友其士之仁者。」 
280 Analects, 11.20. As translated in Legge. 子張問善人之道。子曰：「不踐跡，亦不入於室。」 
281 Analects, 4.17. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「見賢思齊焉，見不賢而內自省也。」 
282 Analects, 7.22. 子曰：「三人行，必有我師焉。擇其善者而從之，其不善者而改之。」 
283 Analects, 9.25. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. 子曰：「主忠信，毋友不如己者，過則勿
憚改。」 
284 Analects, 16.4. 孔子曰：「益者三友，損者三友。友直，友諒，友多聞，益矣。友便辟，友善柔，友
便佞，損矣。」 
285 Analects, 12.23. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. 子貢問友。子曰：「忠告而善道之，不可
71 
 
For Confucius, moral learning is not limited to the individual dimension. Moral learning as the 
method of self-cultivation finds its true end in the political dimension, given that the man of perfect 
virtue pursues this not only for himself but also for others:  
 
Zi Gong said, ‘Suppose the case of a man extensively conferring benefits on the people, and 
able to assist all, what would you say of him? Might he be called humane?’ The Master said: 
‘Why only humane? He would undoubtedly be a sage. Didn’t even Yao and Shun have to take 
pains over this? Now the humane man, wishing himself to be established, sees that others are 
established, and wishing himself to be successful, sees that others are successful. To be able 
to take one’s own familiar feelings as a guide may definitely be called the method of 
humaneness.’286 
 
Confucius regards the one who benefits people far and wide, and is capable of bringing salvation to the 
multitude, as a sage. The reason why he called such man a sage is that he knew how hard it is to practise 
what he studied. Confucius stated that ‘in terms of studying literatures I am comparable with others, but 
as to myself being a man of virtue in practice, I have never yet managed to achieve that.’287 Even he 
argued that ‘though a man may be able to recite the three hundred odes, but if he is given a post in 
government and cannot successfully carry out his governmental charge, and if he is sent to far places 
and cannot react to the circumstances as he finds them, then even if he has learnt to recite many of them, 
of what use is this to him?’288 In spite of the difficulty of practicing what one studied, he enthusiastically 
wished what he studied can be contributed to government; ‘Zi Gong said, There is a beautiful gem here. 
Should I lay it up in a case and keep it? or should I seek a good price and sell it? The Master said, Sell 
it! Sell it! But I would wait for one to offer the price.’289 For Confucius, such desire seems to be natural 
                                           
則止，無自辱焉。」 
286 Analects, 6.30. Translation adapted from Dawson and Legge. 子貢曰：「如有博施於民而能濟眾，何如？
可謂仁乎？」子曰：「何事於仁，必也聖乎！堯舜其猶病諸！夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲達而達人。
能近取譬，可謂仁之方也已。」   
287 Analects, 7.33. Translation adapted from Dawson. 子曰：「文，莫吾猶人也。躬行君子，則吾未之有得
。」 
288 Analects, 13.5. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「誦詩三百，授之以政，不達；使於四方，不能專對；雖
多，亦奚以為？」 




since he struggled to ‘find a man who has studied for three years without coming to be good.’290 To be 
sure, this does not indicate his scholarship is just fixed to achieve high social positions. He stressed, the 
determined scholar and the man of virtue even sacrifice their lives to preserve perfect virtue without 
seeking to live at the expense of injuring their virtue.291 As a practical example for this, he urged to 
‘recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness.’292 
This section shows that Confucius’ moral learning is realistic in that he focused on acquiring virtue 
as a solution for solving political chaos. For him, Heaven is an object of moral learning because it 
produces virtue in relation to human nature. Practising ‘filial piety’ (孝) and ‘fraternal submission’ (弟) 
is to cultivate moral self. Contrary to Augustine who emphasises grace for forgiving sins, Confucius 





                                           
290 Analects, 8.12. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「三年學，不至於穀，不易得也。」 
291 Analects, 15.9. 子曰：「志士仁人，無求生以害仁，有殺身以成仁。」; Analects, 17.13. 子曰：「鄉
原，德之賊也。」 




Mencius’ Moral Learning  
 
Self-Cultivation, Benevolent Government, and Will  
As Mencius claims that ‘the Empire has its basis in the state, the state in the family, and the family in 
one’s self,’293 the starting point of his formation of moral self is based on self-cultivation. He warns 
that if a man does not practise the Way, he will not have his way even with his own wife and children.294 
Beyond the dimension of family, for him the best way to bring orders to the Empire is that the man of 
virtue cultivates his character. It is because he thought the trouble with people is what they require from 
others is great, while the burden they lay upon themselves is light. His moral education is significantly 
political.295 Hence, he stresses the man of virtue secures good words and principles as specific methods 
for ruling the Empire; ‘Words which are simple, while their meaning is far-reaching, are good words. 
Principles which, as held, are compendious, while their application is extensive, are good principles. 
The words of the man of virtue enshrine great principles.’296 In this context, he offers self-cultivation 
as a prerequisite for moral education for others; ‘anciently, men of virtue and talents by means of their 
own enlightenment made others enlightened. Nowadays, it is tried, while they are themselves in 
                                           
293 Mencius, 4A5. trans. D. C. Lau (London: Penguin Books, 2004). 孟子曰：「人有恆言，皆曰『天下國家』
。天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。」cf. Great Learning, 8.1.  
294 Mencius, 7B9. 孟子曰：「身不行道，不行於妻子；使人不以道，不能行於妻子。」 
295 Graham shows differences between Confucius and Mencius in the concept of benevolence (仁) and ritual 
propriety (禮); ‘The greatest is still jen, but the word has narrowed and clarified in meaning. Confucius had 
inherited it as a word like English ‘noble’ covering everything distinctive of the man of breeding; seeking the 
unifying principle behind it he found pure benevolence, the disinterested concern for others, but for him this was 
not yet the whole sense of the word. By the time of Mencius, however, jen is directly translatable by ‘benevolence’. 
Another difference is that we no longer have the impression with Mencius that all moral concepts depend for their 
meaning on the context of ceremony. Li ‘ceremony’ is now the inward sense of good manners, and stands beside 
jen in a set of four cardinal virtues inside the heart, the benevolent and the right, ceremony and wisdom (jen yi li 
chih 仁義禮智).’ Particularly, jen can be translated to benevolence is noticeable, given Graham shows the 
importance of benevolent government as well as human nature in Mencius’ thought. He presents ‘unlike Confucius, 
who sees the reform of government in terms of a judicious selection between the rituals of the Hsia, Shang, and 
Chou, Mencius wants political and economic measures.’ However, Graham does not show how benevolent 
government can be related to human nature endowed by Heaven in moral education. Graham, Disputers of the 
Tao, 113.  





darkness, and by means of that darkness, to make others enlightened.’297 He regards those who rectify 
others by rectifying themselves as the great men.298  
Mencius explains his moral education in the relation between a king and his people. According to 
the modes of labour, he argues that the methods of moral education need to be differentiated. Mencius 
states:  
 
Then, is it the government of the kingdom which alone can be carried on along with the 
practice of husbandry? Great men have their proper business, and little men have their proper 
business. … Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. Those who 
labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed by 
others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are 
supported by them. This is a principle universally recognised.299  
 
Mencius shows the government of the kingdom is carried by those who labour with their minds in order 
to rule those who labour with their strength. For Mencius, those who labour with their minds are kings 
and government officials, and those who labour with their strength are people. Hence, his moral 
education paid great attention to the matter of how to make kings virtuous; ‘He who, using force, makes 
a pretence to benevolence is the leader of the princes. A leader of the princes requires a large kingdom. 
He who, using virtue, practices benevolence is the sovereign of the kingdom. To become the sovereign 
of the kingdom, a prince need not wait for a large kingdom.’300 Mencius argues when one subdues men 
by virtue, in their hearts' core they are pleased, and sincerely submit, as was the case with the seventy 
disciples in their submission to Confucius. When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him 
in heart.301 Mencius stresses the rise and fall of states are determined by benevolence in support of 
                                           
297 Mencius, 7B20. Translation adapted from Legge. 孟子曰：「賢者以其昭昭，使人昭昭；今以其昬昬，
使人昭昭。」 
298 Mencius, 7A19. 「有大人者，正己而物正者也。」 
299 Mencius, 3A4. As translated in Legge.「然則治天下獨可耕且為與？有大人之事，有小人之事。且一人
之身，而百工之所為備。如必自為而後用之，是率天下而路也。故曰：或勞心，或勞力；勞心者治人，
勞力者治於人；治於人者食人，治人者食於人：天下之通義也。」 
300 Mencius, 2A3. Translation adapted from Lau and Legge. 孟子曰：以力假仁者霸，霸必有大國，以德行
仁者王，王不待大。 




evidences of his previous three dynasties as follows:   
 
the Three Dynasties won the Empire through benevolence and lost it through cruelty. This is 
true of the rise and fall, survival and collapse, of states as well. If the sovereign be not 
benevolent, be cannot preserve the throne from passing from him. If the Head of a State be 
not benevolent, he cannot preserve his rule. If a high noble or great officer be not benevolent, 
he cannot preserve his ancestral temple. If a scholar or common man be not benevolent, be 
cannot preserve his four limbs. Now they hate death and ruin, and yet delight in being not 
benevolent - this is like hating to be drunk, and yet being strong to drink wine!302 
 
Given that Mencius stresses the importance of benevolence in government, this passage above shows 
the importance of human will, just as Confucius shows calamity and happiness in all cases are 
determined by men's own seeking as follows:  
 
A man must first despise himself, and then others will despise him. A family must first destroy 
itself, and then others will destroy it. A State must first smite itself, and then others will smite 
it. This is illustrated in the passage of the Tai Jia, When Heaven sends down calamities, it is 
still possible to escape them. When we occasion the calamities ourselves, it is not possible 
any longer to live.303   
 
Mencius demonstrates that there is no difference between killing with a knife and killing with misrule.  
He stresses the king, as the parent of his people, ought to take care of his people.       
 
King Hui of Liang said, 'I wish quietly to receive your instructions.' Mencius replied, 'Is there 
any difference between killing a man with a stick and with a sword?' The king said, 'There is 
no difference!' ‘Is there any difference between killing him with a knife and killing him with 
misrule?’ 'There is no difference,' was the reply. Mencius then said, 'In your kitchen there is 
fat meat; in your stables there are fat horses. But your people have the look of hunger, and on 
the wilds there are those who have died of famine. This is leading on beasts to devour men. 
Beasts devour one another, and men hate them for doing so. When a prince, being the parent 
of his people, administers his government so as to be chargeable with leading on beasts to 
devour men, where is his parental relation to the people?304  
                                           
302 Mencius, 4A3. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「三代之得天下也以仁，其失天下也以不仁。國之所以
廢興存亡者亦然。天子不仁，不保四海；諸侯不仁，不保社稷；卿大夫不仁，不保宗廟；士庶人不仁，
不保四體。今惡死亡而樂不仁，是猶惡醉而強酒。」 
303 Mencius, 4A8. As translated in Legge. 夫人必自侮，然後人侮之；家必自毀，而後人毀之；國必自伐，
而後人伐之。《太甲》曰：『天作孽，猶可違；自作孽，不可活。』此之謂也。 
304 Mencius, 1A4. As translated in Legge. 梁惠王曰：「寡人願安承教。」 孟子對曰：「殺人以梃與刃，





As the Book of History states that ‘Heaven having produced the inferior people, made for them rulers 
and teachers, with the purpose that they should be helpful to God,’305 Mencius thinks that the purpose 
of a ruler is to protect his people in supporting God. Mencius insists that ‘the people are the most 
important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the 
lightest.’306 In this context, he claims that a king without benevolence and righteousness could be 
expelled and killed by his people;307 ‘He who outrages the benevolence proper to his nature, is called 
a robber; he who outrages righteousness, is called a ruffian. The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow. 
I have heard of the cutting off of the fellow Zhou, but I have not heard of the putting a sovereign to 
death, in his case.’308 Mencius notes that this principle might be applied to officers in evidence of Tseng 
Tzu’s saying that ‘what you mete out will be paid back to you.’309 When the king puts in practice a 
benevolent government, his people will love him and all above them, and will die for their officers. In 
addition, Mencius thinks that when a king is virtuous that is morally educational for the people; ‘'If the 
sovereign be benevolent, all will be benevolent. If the sovereign be righteous, all will be righteous.’310  
Therefore, for Mencius, a king who seeks to practise a benevolent government is a prerequisite for 
preserving his Empire and has significant advantages. Mencius shows if a king puts in place a 
benevolent government, no power will be able to prevent his becoming sovereign since the flowing 
progress of virtue, as Confucius said, is more rapid than the transmission of royal orders by stages and 
couriers.311 For Mencius, a benevolent king is one who is not fond of killing and the king can settle the 
                                           
食人。惡在其為民父母也？ 
305 Mencius, 1B3. As translated in Legge. 《書》曰：『天降下民，作之君，作之師。惟曰其助上帝，寵之 
306 Mencius, 7B14. 孟子曰：「民為貴，社稷次之，君為輕。 
307 Mencius, 1B6. 孟子謂齊宣王曰：「王之臣有託其妻子於其友，而之楚遊者。比其反也，則凍餒其妻
子，則如之何？」王曰：「棄之。」曰：「士師不能治士，則如之何？」王曰：「已之。」曰：「四境
之內不治，則如之何？」王顧左右而言他。 
308 Mencius, 1B8. As translated in Legge. 曰：「賊仁者謂之賊，賊義者謂之殘，殘賊之人謂之一夫。聞誅
一夫紂矣，未聞弒君也。」   
309 Mencius, 1B12. 孟子對曰：「凶年饑歲，君之民老弱轉乎溝壑，壯者散而之四方者，幾千人矣；而
君之倉廩實，府庫充，有司莫以告，是上慢而殘下也。曾子曰：『戒之戒之！出乎爾者，反乎爾者也。』
夫民今而後得反之也。君無尤焉。君行仁政，斯民親其上、死其長矣。」 
310 Mencius, 4B5. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「君仁莫不仁，君義莫不義。」 
311 Mencius, 2A3. 行仁政而王，莫之能禦也。孔子曰：『德之流行，速於置郵而傳命。』 
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Empire by uniting it because all the people of the nation will unanimously give it to him.312 He explains 
the advantage of benevolent government to King Hsiang of Liang as follows: 
 
Does your Majesty understand the way of the growing grain? During the seventh and eighth 
months, when drought prevails, the plants become dry. Then the clouds collect densely in the 
heavens, they send down torrents of rain, and the grain erects itself, as if by a shoot. When it 
does so, who can keep it back? Now among the shepherds of men throughout the nation, there 
is not one who does not find pleasure in killing men. If there were one who did not find 
pleasure in killing men, all the people in the nation would look towards him with outstretched 
necks. Such being indeed the case, the people would flock to him, as water flows downwards 
with a rush, which no one can repress.313 
 
Mencius expects that people will naturally flock to the benevolent king if benevolent government is 
carried like rain in a drought. It is Heaven’s desire.314 According to him, when right government 
prevails in the kingdom, princes of little virtue are submissive to those of great, and those of little worth 
to those of great. When bad government prevails in the kingdom, princes of small power are submissive 
to those of great, and the weak to the strong. He stresses that they who accord with Heaven are preserved, 
and they who rebel against Heaven perish. Mencius states:  
 
There is an appointment for everything. A man should receive submissively what may be 
correctly ascribed thereto. Therefore, he who has the true idea of what is Heaven's 
appointment will not stand beneath a precipitous wall. Death sustained in the discharge of 
one's duties may correctly be ascribed to the appointment of Heaven. Death under handcuffs 
and fetters cannot correctly be so ascribed.315  
 
In this context, Mencius warns that ‘if men of virtue and ability be not confided in, a State will become 
empty and void. Without the rules of propriety and distinctions of right, the high and the low will be 
                                           
312 Mencius, 1A6. 卒然問曰：『天下惡乎定？』吾對曰：『定于一。』 『孰能與之？』對曰：『天下
莫不與也。』 
313 Mencius, 1A6. As translated in Legge.『王知夫苗乎？七八月之間旱，則苗槁矣。天油然作雲，沛然下
雨，則苗浡然興之矣。其如是，孰能禦之？今夫天下之人牧，未有不嗜殺人者也，如有不嗜殺人者，則
天下之民皆引領而望之矣。誠如是也，民歸之，由水之就下，沛然誰能禦之？』 
314 Mencius, 4A7. 孟子曰：天下有道，小德役大德，小賢役大賢；天下無道，小役大，弱役強。斯二者
天也。順天者存，逆天者亡。 
315 Mencius, 7A2. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「莫非命也，順受其正。是故知命者，不立乎巖牆之下
。盡其道而死者，正命也。桎梏死者，非正命也。」   
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thrown into confusion. Without the great principles of government and their various business, there will 
not be wealth sufficient for the expenditure.’316 The man of virtue serves his prince contemplates simply 
the leading him in the right path, and directing his mind to benevolence.317 Therefore, Mencius strongly 
advises King Hsiang of Liang that he should institute a government whose action shall be benevolent 
This will cause all the officers in the kingdom to wish to stand in his court, and all the farmers to wish 
to plough in his fields, and all the merchants, both travelling and stationary, to wish to store their goods 
in his market-places, and all travelling strangers to wish to make their tours on his roads, and all 
throughout the kingdom who feel aggrieved by their rulers to wish to come and complain to him.318  
 
Human Unity, Filial Piety, and Moral Education  
In time of war, for Mencius human unity by benevolent government is the most powerful weapon rather 
than Earth’s advantageous terrain and Heaven’s favourable weather.    
 
Heaven’s favourable weather is less important than Earth’s advantageous terrain, and Earth’s 
advantageous terrain is less important than human unity. There is a city, with an inner wall of 
three li in circumference, and an outer wall of seven. The enemies surround and attack it, but 
they are not able to take it. Now, to surround and attack it, there must have been vouchsafed 
to them by Heaven the opportunity of time, and in such case their not taking it is because 
opportunities of time vouchsafed by Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded 
by the Earth. There is a city, whose walls are distinguished for their height, and whose moats 
are distinguished for their depth, where the arms of its defenders, offensive and defensive, are 
distinguished for their strength and sharpness, and the stores of rice and other grain are very 
large. Yet it is obliged to be given up and abandoned. This is because advantages of situation 
afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union arising from the accord of Men. ... When the 
being assisted by many reaches its highest point, the whole kingdom becomes obedient to the 
prince. When one to whom the whole kingdom is prepared to be obedient, attacks those from 
whom their own relations revolt, what must be the result? Therefore, the true ruler will prefer 
not to fight; but if he does fight, he must overcome.319 
                                           
316 Mencius, 7B12. Translation adapted from Legge. 孟子曰：「不信仁賢，則國空虛。無禮義，則上下亂
。無政事，則財用不足。」 
317 Mencius, 6B8, 君子之事君也，務引其君以當道，志於仁而已。 
318 Mencius, 1A7, 蓋亦反其本矣。今王發政施仁，使天下仕者皆欲立於王之朝，耕者皆欲耕於王之野，
商賈皆欲藏於王之市，行旅皆欲出於王之塗，天下之欲疾其君者皆欲赴愬於王。其若是，孰能禦之？ 







     
For Mencius, the major source of power for overcoming war is not military but human unity formed by 
benevolent government. Mencius explained to King Hui of Liang why a benevolent government can 
overcome powerful countries in the military dimension like Qin and Chu in relation to moral education 
of filial piety and self-cultivation.320 According to him, if the king delivers benevolent government to 
the people, being sparing in the use of punishments and fines, and making the taxes and levies light, so 
causing that the fields to be ploughed deep, and the weeding of them carefully attended to, and that the 
strong-bodied, during their days of leisure, shall cultivate their filial piety, fraternal respectfulness, 
sincerity, and truthfulness, serving thereby, at home, their fathers and elder brothers, and, abroad, their 
elders and superiors, the king will then have a people who can be employed, with sticks which they 
have prepared, to oppose the strong armour and sharp weapons of the troops of Qin and Chu. It is 
because the rulers of those States rob their people of their time that they cannot plough and weed their 
fields to support their parents. Their parents suffer from cold and hunger. Brothers, wives, and children 
are separated and scattered abroad. Mencius points out those rulers drive their people into pit-falls, or 
drown them. According to him, ‘a man can have no greater crimes than to disown his parents and 
relatives, and the relations of sovereign and minister, superiors and inferiors.’321 As he considers the 
richest fruit of benevolence to be the service of one's parents, the essence of benevolence is filial piety.322 
Hence, he argues if only everyone loved his parents and treated his elders with deference, the Empire 
would be at peace.323 For him, the Way lies at hand. It is because filial affection for parents as the 
working of benevolence and respect for elders as the working of righteousness are an intuitive ability 
and knowledge possessed by men without having been acquired by learning and without the exercise 
                                           




321 Mencius, 7A34. As translated in Legge. 人莫大焉亡親戚、君臣、上下。 
322 Mencius, 4A27. 仁之實，事親是也 
323 Mencius, 4A11. 孟子曰：「道在爾而求諸遠，事在易而求之難。人人親其親、長其長而天下平。」 
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of thought.324 For him, those feelings are universal under heaven. Yet, those feelings do not guarantee 
the automatic practice of filial piety. Mencius shows that filial piety as the service of parents can be 
properly practised in support of self-cultivation since it is the root of all others as follows:   
 
Of services, which is the greatest? The service of parents is the greatest. Of charges, which is 
the greatest? The charge of one's self is the greatest. That those who do not fail to keep 
themselves are able to serve their parents is what I have heard. But I have never heard of any, 
who, having failed to keep themselves, were able notwithstanding to serve their parents. There 
are many services, but the service of parents is the root of all others. There are many charges, 
but the charge of one's self is the root of all others.325 
 
This could be applied to Mencius’ moral education between father and son. Mencius states that ‘the 
trouble with people is that they are too eager to assume the role of teacher.’326 This indicates the danger 
of moral teaching without self-cultivation. Mencius points out even the man of virtue might lose his 
temper in teaching his children, so the ancients exchanged sons, and one taught the son of another to 
avoid offending between father and son.327 This shows how important filial piety is in his formation of 
moral self. Therefore, Mencius strongly asserts that reforming economic, social, and educational 
systems should be undertaken in the perspective of filial piety.328 For Mencius the first step along the 
Kingly way is to make the people support their parents when alive or mourn of them when dead, and 
the filial and fraternal duties should be taught in schools. According to Mencius, there is taxation levied 
in cloth, in grain, and in labour. The man of virtue employs one to the full while relaxing the other two 
since if two are employed to the full, there would be death from starvation amongst the people, and if 
all three are so employed, father will be separated from son.329 Following the matter of taxation, 
                                           
324 Mencius, 7A15. 孟子曰：「人之所不學而能者，其良能也；所不慮而知者，其良知也。孩提之童，
無不知愛其親者；及其長也，無不知敬其兄也。親親，仁也；敬長，義也。無他，達之天下也。」 
325 Mencius, 4A19. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「事孰為大？事親為大；守孰為大？守身為大。不失
其身而能事其親者，吾聞之矣；失其身而能事其親者，吾未之聞也。孰不為事？事親，事之本也；孰不
為守？守身，守之本也。 
326 Mencius, 4A23. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「人之患在好為人師。」 
327 Mencius, 4A18. 公孫丑曰：「君子之不教子，何也？」 孟子曰：「勢不行也。教者必以正；以正不
行，繼之以怒；繼之以怒，則反夷矣。『夫子教我以正，夫子未出於正也。』則是父子相夷也。父子相
夷，則惡矣。古者易子而教之。父子之間不責善。責善則離，離則不祥莫大焉。」 
328 Mencius, 1A3. 
329 Mencius, 7B27. 孟子曰：「有布縷之征，粟米之征，力役之征。君子用其一，緩其二。用其二而民
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Mencius stresses the importance of establishing educational institutions in order to enhance human 
relationships as the purpose of moral education since good government does not lay hold of the people 
so much as good moral education as follows:   
 
Establish Xiang, Xu, Xue, and Xiao, all those educational institutions, for the purpose of 
education. The name Xiang indicates nourishing as its object; Xiao, indicates teaching; and 
Xu indicates archery. By the Xia dynasty the name Xiao was used; by the Yin, that of Xu; and 
by the Zhou, that of Xiang. As to the Xue, they belonged to the three dynasties, and by that 
name. The object of them all is to illustrate the human relations. When those are thus 
illustrated by superiors, kindly feeling will prevail among the inferior people below.330  
 
Mencius claims that good government is feared by the people and the people's wealth, while good moral 
education is loved by them and gets their hearts.331 So when a prince seeks by his goodness to nourish 
men, he will be able to subdue the whole kingdom since if they are well fed, warmly clad, and 
comfortably lodged, without being taught at the same time, they become almost like the beasts.332 
Hence, the sage Shun appointed Xie to be the Minister of Education, to teach the relations of humanity: 
how, between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; 
between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; 
and between friends, fidelity.333 
 
Environment and Asceticism  
Mencius, even more than Confucius, deals at length with the matter of the natural environment for 
                                           
有殍，用其三而父子離。」 
330 Mencius, 3A3. Translation adapted from Lau and Legge.「設為庠序學校以教之：庠者，養也；校者，教
也；序者，射也。夏曰校，殷曰序，周曰庠，學則三代共之，皆所以明人倫也。人倫明於上，小民親於
下。有王者起，必來取法，是為王者師也。」 
331 Mencius, 7A14. 孟子曰：「善政，不如善教之得民也。善政民畏之，善教民愛之；善政得民財，善
教得民心。」 
332 Mencius, 4B16. 孟子曰：「以善服人者，未有能服人者也；以善養人，然後能服天下。天下不心服
而王者，未之有也。」 





moral education, and not only human nature.334 Why did Mencius pay attention to improving people’s 
living conditions? Ironically, this can be explained in relation to his theory of human nature. As Kao 
Tzu said: 
 
Human nature is like water whirling round in a corner. Open a passage for it to the east, and it 
will flow to the east; open a passage for it to the west, and it will flow to the west. Human 
nature is indifferent to good and evil, just as the water is indifferent to the east and west.335 
 
Kao Tzu considers human nature neutral. In contrary to his understanding of human nature, Mencius 
asserts the tendency of human nature is good just as there is no water that does not flow downwards: 
 
It certainly is the case, said Mencius, that water does not show any preference for either east 
or west, but does it show the same indifference to high and low? Human nature is good just as 
water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is no water that does not flow 
downwards. Now in the case of water, by splashing it one can make it shoot up higher than 
one’s forehead, and by forcing it one can make it stay on a hill. How can that be the nature of 
water? It is the circumstances being what they are. That man can be made bad shows that his 
nature is no different from that of water in this respect.336  
 
According to circumstances, water could be changed to flow upwards, but it is not the nature of water. 
                                           
334 Tu offers Confucian self-cultivation as the highest purpose of human life, as opposed to the Legalist approach 
to man as an instrument of the state. Particularly, he expounds the innate moral qualities in the aspect of the 
Mencian perception of moral self-development. He acknowledges that Mencius is acutely aware of the influences 
of environment in the formation of moral self; ‘It is not difficult to show that he recognises that economic 
conditions, political situations, and social relations have a profound impact on a person’s ethical life. Furthermore, 
he insists that improvements be made in those crucial areas of the environment before realistic programs of moral 
education can be implemented.’ However, he argues, for Mencius, there is more important something than 
environment in moral education; ‘this something is neither learned nor acquired; it is a given reality, endowed by 
Heaven as the defining characteristic of being human.’ Mencius’ strategy of presenting his position on the matter 
is best shown in his exchanges with Kao Tzu who takes a naturalist position. For Mencius, four germinations such 
as humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not drilled into us from outside. These are inborn and can 
be lost, but are always recoverable if one wills to preserve it. Hence, according to Tu, Mencius insists the way of 
learning is none other than finding the lost mind. (6A11) In other words, for Mencius moral education is ultimately 
the problem of mind rather than environment. Tu proves human nature is more important than environment in 
Mencius’ moral education, but his explanation that instinctual demands such as appetites for food and sex can be 
solved by ‘a holistic way’ in order to be human is still ambiguous. Weiming Tu, Humanity and Self-Cultivation: 
Essays in Confucian Thought (Boston: Cheng & Tsui Co, 1998), 58, 59, 64, 66.  
335 Mencius, 6A2. 性猶湍水也，決諸東方則東流，決諸西方則西流。 






Likewise, that man can be made bad is because human nature is affected by circumstances, not Heaven. 
For example, Mencius shows that the children of the people are most of them good in good years 
whereas in bad years the most of them abandon themselves to evil. He stresses that the abandonment 
does not derive from ‘any difference of their natural powers conferred by Heaven that they are thus 
different’ but ‘the circumstances through which they allow their minds to be ensnared and drowned in 
evil.’337 In this context, Mencius states that ‘A man’s environment transforms his air just as the food 
he eats changes his body.’338 Therefore, Mencius explains the importance of economic environments 
in the formation of the moral self by comparing scholars and ordinary people; ‘Only scholars can have 
a constant without a certain livelihood. The people, on the other hand, will not have constant hearts if 
they have not a certain livelihood. And if they have not constant hearts, there is nothing which they will 
not do, in the way of self-abandonment, of moral deflection, of depravity, and of wild licence.’339 
Mencius explains that for ordinary people it is challenging to secure time for studying about ritual 
propriety and righteousness if they do not properly support their parents, wives, and children as follows:  
 
When they thus have been involved in crime, to follow them up and punish them - this is to 
entrap the people. How can such a thing as entrapping the people be done under the rule of a 
benevolent man? Therefore an intelligent ruler will regulate the livelihood of the people, so 
as to make sure that, for those above them, they shall have sufficient wherewith to serve their 
parents, and, for those below them, sufficient wherewith to support their wives and children; 
that in good years they shall always be abundantly satisfied, and that in bad years they shall 
escape the danger of perishing. After this he may urge them, and they will proceed to what is 
good, for in this case the people will follow after it with ease. Now, the livelihood of the 
people is so regulated, that, above, they have not sufficient wherewith to serve their parents, 
and, below, they have not sufficient wherewith to support their wives and children. 
Notwithstanding good years, their lives are continually embittered, and, in bad years, they do 
not escape perishing. In such circumstances they only try to save themselves from death, and 
are afraid they will not succeed. What time can they spare for studying about ritual propriety 
and righteousness?340  
                                           
337 Mencius, 6A7. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「富歲，子弟多賴；凶歲，子弟多暴，非天之降才爾殊
也，其所以陷溺其心者然也。 
338 Mencius, 7A36. Translation adapted from Lau. 居移氣，養移體，大哉居乎！ 
339 Mencius, 1A7. Translation adapted from Legge. 無恆產而有恆心者，惟士為能。若民，則無恆產，因無
恆心。苟無恆心，放辟，邪侈，無不為已。 







Hence, Mencius makes an emphasis on the importance of moral education for filial and fraternal duties 
on the basis on economic reformation as follows:  
 
If your Majesty wishes to effect this regulation of the livelihood of the people, why not turn 
to that which is the essential step to it? Let mulberry-trees be planted about the homesteads 
with their five mu, and persons of fifty years may be clothed with silk. In keeping fowls, pigs, 
dogs, and swine, let not their times of breeding be neglected, and persons of seventy years 
may eat flesh. Let there not be taken away the time that is proper for the cultivation of the 
farm with its hundred mu, and the family of eight mouths that is supported by it shall not 
suffer from hunger. Let careful attention be paid to education in schools, the inculcation in it 
especially of the filial and fraternal duties, and grey-haired men will not be seen upon the 
roads, carrying burdens on their backs or on their heads. It never has been that the ruler of a 
State where such results were seen, the old wearing silk and eating flesh, and the black-haired 
people suffering neither from hunger nor cold, did not attain to the royal dignity.341 
 
In other words, according to Mencius’ classification, only scholars can have a constant character without 
a certain livelihood. That which the man of virtue follows as his nature is not added to when he holds 
sway over the Empire, nor is it detracted from when he is reduced to straitened circumstances since that 
which the man of virtue follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, rightness, ritual propriety, and 
wisdom, is rooted in his heart.342 In this context, he shows he who is equipped with every virtue cannot 
be led astray even by a wicked world.343 It is because the happiness the man of virtue seeks is different 
from ordinary people: 
 
There are three things the man of virtue delights in, and being ruler over the Empire is not 
amongst them. His parents are alive and his brothers are well. This is the first delight. Above, 
he is not ashamed to face Heaven; below, he is not ashamed to face man. This is the second 
delight. He has the good fortune of having the most talented pupils in the Empire. This is the 
third delight.344  
                                           




342 Mencius, 7A21. 君子所性，雖大行不加焉，雖窮居不損焉，分定故也。君子所性，仁義禮智根於心
。其生色也，睟然見於面，盎於背，施於四體，四體不言而喻。」 
343 Mencius, 7B10, 周于德者，邪世不能亂。 





The business of scholars is, as Mencius claims, to set their mind on high principles such as benevolence 
and righteousness in order to be moral. For the scholars, to put a single innocent person to death is 
contrary to benevolence and to take what one has not a right to is contrary to righteousness.345 For the 
man of virtue, in other words, desire for eating and sex is not true happiness. In contrast, the people will 
not have constant hearts if they do not have a certain livelihood, so that they will lose their morality. 
Thus, he argues, to punish them after they have fallen foul of the law is not proper since the cause of 
crime is due to the governor’s misrule. After taking action for solving the livelihood of the people, they 
can have time for studying about propriety and righteousness and be educated about filial and fraternal 
duties in schools in order to be virtuous.346 Interestingly, Mencius also stresses the influence the 
educational environment in making a ruler virtuous. This is not an economic dimension like moral 
education for ordinary people. He shows that it is necessary for a king to be surrounded by virtuous 
people to be himself virtuous, by drawing upon the parable of learning languages. Mencius supposes 
that there is a great officer of Chu here, who wishes his son to learn the speech of Qi. He thought that it 
is not enough solely to employ a man of Qi as his tutor to the speech of Qi if there are a multitude of 
men of Chu continually shouting out about him. It is impossible for him to learn it in this environment 
even though his father beat him every day.347 Likewise, if a king is surrounded by virtuous scholars, he 
will be naturally virtuous.348  
                                           
345 Mencius, 7A33. 仁義而已矣。殺一無罪，非仁也；非其有而取之，非義也。 
346 Mencius, 7A23. 孟子曰：「易其田疇，薄其稅斂，民可使富也。食之以時，用之以禮，財不可勝用
也。民非水火不生活，昏暮叩人之門戶，求水火，無弗與者，至足矣。聖人治天下，使有菽粟如水火。
菽粟如水火，而民焉有不仁者乎？」 
347 Mencius, 3B6. As translated in Legge. 孟子謂戴不勝曰：「子欲子之王之善與？我明告子。有楚大夫於
此，欲其子之齊語也，則使齊人傅諸？使楚人傅諸？」曰：「使齊人傅之。」曰：「一齊人傅之，眾楚
人咻之，雖日撻而求其齊也，不可得矣；引而置之莊嶽之間數年，雖日撻而求其楚，亦不可得矣。」 
348 Mencius, 3B6. As translated in Legge. ‘You supposed that Xue Ju Zhou was a scholar of virtue, and you have 
got him placed in attendance on the king. Suppose that all in attendance on the king, old and young, high and low, 
were Xue Ju Zhous, whom would the king have to do evil with? And suppose that all in attendance on the king, 
old and young, high and low, are not Xue Ju Zhous, whom will the king gave to do good with? What can one Xue 






At this point, it is high time to reconsider Mencius’ anti-asceticism asserted by Norden in the context 
of relations between the environment and moral learning in Mencius’ moral education.349 Mencius 
acknowledges the king can not only obtain happiness from the natural environment350 but also might 
seek money and sex in achieving happiness:  
 
You may be fond of money, but what is it to you so long as you share this fondness with the 
people? The king said, 'I have an infirmity; I am fond of sex.' The reply was, 'Formerly, King 
Tai was fond of sex, and loved his wife. It is said in the Book of Poetry, "Gu Gong Tan Fu, 
came in the morning, galloping his horse, by the banks of the western waters, As far as the 
foot of Qi hill, along with the lady of Jiang; They came and together chose the site for their 
settlement." At that time, there were neither girls pining for a husband nor men without a wife. 
You may be fond of women, but what is it to you so long as you share this fondness with the 
people?351 
 
In this dialogue, what Mencius wants to say is that the king needs to share such pleasures with the 
people together; ‘The people will delight in the joy of him who delights in their joy, and will worry over 
the troubles of him who worries over their troubles. He who delights and worries on account of the 
Empire is certain to become a true King.’352 For example, in terms of sex, he shows ‘that male and 
female should dwell together is the greatest of human relations’ in the dimension of filial piety. The 
                                           
幼卑尊，皆非薛居州也，王誰與為善？一薛居州，獨如宋王何？」 
349 Norden presents a deeper understanding of Mencius’ self-reflection in the dimension of self-cultivation. 
Mencius acknowledges the importance of environmental factors related to people’s basic material needs. Norden 
calls it ‘passive cultivation’. However, Mencius seems more interested in the influence of environment on adults 
than he does in its influence on children in spite of the importance of environmental factors. Mencius himself, 
according to Norden, does not seem to stress the importance of childhood itself as a unique, irreplaceable 
opportunity for ensuring the growth and continued existence of our sprouts. Hence, Norden focuses on Mencius’ 
self-reflection as inner-directed of self-cultivation. Norden claims that ‘But as I noted earlier, Mengzi is not an 
ascetic: he states that the enjoyment of music, ritual hunting (1B1), wealth, and sex (1B5) are all legitimate, so 
long as they are done in an ethical manner.’ Bryan W. Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early 
Chinese philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 231. 





351 Mencius, 1B5. As translated in Legge. 王如好貨，與百姓同之，於王何有？王曰：「寡人有疾，寡人好
色。」 對曰：「昔者大王好色，愛厥妃。《詩》云：『古公亶甫，來朝走馬，率西水滸，至于岐下。
爰及姜女，聿來胥宇。』當是時也，內無怨女，外無曠夫。王如好色，與百姓同之，於王何有？」 




king ought to recognise the desire of young people for marriage by reflecting his sexual desire.353 His 
anti-asceticism can be only justified in the perspective of the relation between a king and their people. 
Ultimately, he stresses a moderate living in dealing only with life style of the king in the evidence of 
the ancient sovereigns:  
 
Descending along with the current, and forgetting to return, is what I call yielding to it. 
Pressing up against it, and forgetting to return, is what I call urging their way against it. 
Pursuing the chase without satiety is what I call being wild. Delighting in wine without satiety 
is what I call being lost. The ancient sovereigns had no pleasures to which they gave 
themselves as on the flowing stream; no doings which might be so characterised as wild and 
lost. It is for you, my prince, to pursue your course.354  
 
In particular, he warns against indulging in food and drinking in the process of learning doctrine of the 
ancients.355 In this context, he advises a true follower who loves his prince ought to restrain his prince’s 
faults since he spent his youth in learning the principle of right government.356 It is because such 
pleasures by the prince could lead to calamities to his kingdom.357 Therefore, Mencius shows that ‘a 
ruler who is endowed with talents and virtue will be gravely complaisant and economical, showing a 
respectful politeness to his ministers, and taking from the people only in accordance with regulated 
limits.’358 For Mencius, the right ruler is  complaisant and economical since the respectful do not 
despise others and the economical do not plunder others.359 Hence, he presents the best way to cultivate 
the mind is to make the desires few.360 In other words, he states that ‘Do not do what you would not do; 
                                           
353 Mencius, 5A2. 男女居室，人之大倫也。 
354 Mencius, 1B4. As translated in Legge. 從流下而忘反謂之流，從流上而忘反謂之連，從獸無厭謂之荒，
樂酒無厭謂之亡。先王無流連之樂，荒亡之行。惟君所行也。…其詩曰：『畜君何尤？』畜君者，好君
也。 
355 Mencius, 4A25. 孟子謂樂正子曰：「子之從於子敖來，徒餔啜也。我不意子學古之道，而以餔啜也
。」 
356 Mencius, 1B9. 夫人幼而學之，壯而欲行之。 
357 Mencius, 2A4. 孔子曰：『為此詩者，其知道乎！能治其國家，誰敢侮之？』今國家閒暇，及是時般
樂怠敖，是自求禍也。禍褔無不自己求之者。 
358 Mencius, 3A3. 是故賢君必恭儉禮下 ，取於民有制。 
359 Mencius, 4A16. 孟子曰：「恭者不侮人，儉者不奪人。侮奪人之君，惟恐不順焉，惡得為恭儉？恭
儉豈可以聲音笑貌為哉？」 




do not desire what you would not desire.’361  
 
Imitation, Tradition, and Heaven  
Along with educational environment, Mencius lays great emphasis on imitating sages as the object of 
moral learning as follows:    
 
A sage is the teacher of a hundred generations - this is true of Bo Yi and Hui of Liu Xia. 
Therefore when men now bear the character of Bo Yi, the corrupt become pure, and the weak 
acquire determination. When they hear the character of Hui of Liu Xia, the mean become 
generous, and the niggardly become liberal. Those two made themselves distinguished a 
hundred generations ago, and after a hundred generations, those who hear of them, are all 
aroused in this manner. Could such effects be produced by them, if they had not been sages? 
And how much more did they affect those who were in contiguity with them, and felt their 
inspiring influence!362 
 
Sages have an ability to make people virtuous. Given that Mencius hugely paid attention to the matter 
of how to make a ruler economical and benevolent, it is noticeable that Bo Yi and Hui of Liu Xia make 
people’s character pure and generous. According to Mencius, this can be only realised by sages. For 
him, sages must be the teacher of a hundred generations, so it is necessary to study them to take after 
their characters. Yet, it seems to be difficult to follow their way since their principles are lofty. 
Nevertheless, Mencius would not lower such standards to cause learners to consider them attainable, 
just as a great artificer does not, for the sake of a stupid workman, alter or do away with the marking-
line. He expects those who are able will follow such principles if he keeps standing exactly in the middle 
of the path.363 If so, how can one encounter such sages? He shows studying their poems and books as 
specific methods for becoming acquainted with sages of antiquity is one of the best ways as follows:          
 
                                           
361 Mencius, 7A17. As translated in Lau. 孟子曰：「無為其所不為，無欲其所不欲，如此而已矣。」 
362 Mencius, 7B15. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「聖人，百世之師也，伯夷、柳下惠是也。故聞伯夷
之風者，頑夫廉，懦夫有立志；聞柳下惠之風者，薄夫敦，鄙夫寬。奮乎百世之上。百世之下，聞者莫
不興起也。非聖人而能若是乎，而況於親炙之者乎？」 





Mencius said to Wan Zhang, 'The scholar whose virtue is most distinguished in a village shall 
make friends of all the virtuous scholars in the village. The scholar whose virtue is most 
distinguished throughout a State shall make friends of all the virtuous scholars of that State. 
The scholar whose virtue is most distinguished throughout the kingdom shall make friends of 
all the virtuous scholars of the kingdom. When a scholar feels that his friendship with all the 
virtuous scholars of the kingdom is not sufficient to satisfy him, he proceeds to ascend to 
consider the men of antiquity. He repeats their poems, and reads their books, and as he does 
not know what they were as men, to ascertain this, he considers their history. This is to ascend 
and make friends of the men of antiquity.'364 
 
According to Mencius, the method of imitating others’ good characters is conducted even by sages in 
order to do good works.365 For example, when any one told Zi Lu that he had a fault, he rejoiced. When 
Yu heard good words, he bowed to the speaker. The great Shun had a still greater delight in what was 
good. He regarded virtue as the common property of himself and others, giving up his own way to 
follow that of others, and delighting to learn from others how to practise what was good. The most 
important thing is that he was continually learning from others until he became emperor. The purpose 
of imitating is to practise virtue together.  
For Mencius, imitating sages means studying tradition since they are the examples of good tradition. 
He places immense emphasis on the importance of laying the foundation of the tradition since it will be 
continued by his successors and then they may attain to royal dignity.366 He points out such virtuous 
deeds do not guarantee good results. Contrary to human will in dealing with practicing benevolent 
government, Mencius focuses on the authority of Heaven who alone can grant success in reigning over 
the whole country. According to him, when a man goes forward, there is something which urges him 
on; when he halts, there is something which holds him back.367 But to advance a man or to stop his 
advance is truly beyond the power of other men. What is this power? For Mencius, this power beyond 
                                           
364 Mencius, 5B8. As translated in Legge. 孟子謂萬章曰：「一鄉之善士，斯友一鄉之善士；一國之善士，
斯友一國之善士；天下之善士，斯友天下之善士。以友天下之善士為未足，又尚論古之人。頌其詩，讀
其書，不知其人，可乎？是以論其世也。是尚友也。」 
365 Mencius, 2A8. 孟子曰：「子路，人告之以有過則喜。禹聞善言則拜。大舜有大焉，善與人同。舍己
從人，樂取於人以為善。自耕、稼、陶、漁以至為帝，無非取於人者。取諸人以為善，是與人為善者也
。故君子莫大乎與人為善。」 
366 Mencius, 1B14. 「苟為善，後世子孫必有王者矣。君子創業垂統，為可繼也。若夫成功，則天也。
君如彼何哉？彊為善而已矣。」 
367 Mencius, 1B16. 曰：「行或使之，止或尼之。行止，非人所能也。吾之不遇魯侯，天也。 
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human will is clearly Heaven. In this context, he praises Confucius whose actions were timely; ‘Bo Yi 
among the sages was the pure one; Yi Yin was the one most inclined to take office; Hui of Liu Xia was 
the accommodating one; and Confucius was the sage whose actions were timely. Confucius was the one 
who gathered together all that was good.’368 The limit of human will is explained as follows:  
 
To gather together all that is good is similar to open with bells and conclude with jade tubes. 
To open with bells is to begin in an orderly fashion; to conclude with jade tubes is to end in 
an orderly fashion. To begin in an orderly fashion pertains to wisdom while to end in an 
orderly fashion pertains to sageness. Wisdom is like skill, shall I say, while sageness is like 
strength. It is like shooting from beyond a hundred paces. It is due to your strength that the 
arrow reaches the target, but it is not due to your strength that it hits the mark.369 
 
As Mencius states that ‘it is due to your strength that the arrow reaches the target, but it is not due to 
your strength that it hits the mark,’ he points out the limit of sageness by virtue. The power of hitting 
the mark beyond human will comes from Heaven. This indicates the importance of time according to 
Heaven. Thus, Confucius would follow order by Heaven in securing office.370 If so, how can we 
recognise the order of Heaven? Does Heaven speak? According to Mencius, Heaven did not speak about 
it when Yao presented Shun to Heaven. Yet, he is convinced that Heaven accepted him since the people 
accepted Shun when Yao presented him to the people.371 Mencius asserts that the order of Heaven is 
revealed through personal conduct and conduct of affairs as follows:  
 
He caused him to preside over the sacrifices, and all the spirits were well pleased with them; 
thus Heaven accepted him. He caused him to preside over the conduct of affairs, and affairs 
were well administered, so that the people reposed under him; thus the people accepted him. 
Heaven gave the throne to him. The people gave it to him. Therefore I said, ‘The sovereign 
cannot give the throne to another. Shun assisted Yao in the government for twenty and eight 
years - this was more than man could have done, and was from Heaven. After the death of 
                                           
368 Mencius, 5B1. Translation adapted from Lau. 孟子曰：「伯夷，聖之清者也；伊尹，聖之任者也；柳下
惠，聖之和者也；孔子，聖之時者也。孔子之謂集大成。」 
369 Mencius, 5B1. Translation adapted from Lau. 集大成也者，金聲而玉振之也。金聲也者，始條理也；玉
振之也者，終條理也。始條理者，智之事也；終條理者，聖之事也。智，譬則巧也；聖，譬則力也。由
射於百步之外也，其至，爾力也；其中，非爾力也。 
370 Mencius, 5A8. 孔子曰：『有命。』孔子進以禮，退以義。Lau translates ming (命) as ‘decree’ while 
Legge as being ‘ordered by Heaven’.     




Yao, when the three years’ mourning was completed, Shun withdrew from the son of Yao to 
the south of South river. The princes of the kingdom, however, repairing to court, went not to 
the son of Yao, but they went to Shun. Litigants went not to the son of Yao, but they went to 
Shun. Singers sang not the son of Yao, but they sang Shun. Therefore I said, “Heaven gave 
him the throne.’ It was after these things that he went to the Middle Kingdom, and occupied 
the seat of the Son of Heaven. If he had, before these things, taken up his residence in the 
palace of Yao, and had applied pressure to the son of Yao, it would have been an act of 
usurpation, and not the gift of Heaven. This sentiment is expressed in the words of The Great 
Declaration: ‘Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people 
hear.’372 
 
As Heaven sees and hears through people’s eyes and ears, kings ought to pay attention to people even 
in commencing war. Mencius suggests king Wu and Wen as good examples; ‘If the people of Yan will 
be pleased with your taking possession of it, then do so. Among the ancients there was one who acted 
on this principle, namely king Wu. If the people of Yan will not be pleased with your taking possession 
of it, then do not do so. Among the ancients there was one who acted on this principle, namely king 
Wen.’373 For Mencius, securing the heart of people is a touchstone for confirming the order of Heaven. 
Therefore, he advises it is still important to try one’s best to do good. For instance, Mencius regards 
king Wen as the founder of the tradition. When he ruled over Qi, tillers of land were taxed one part in 
nine; descendants of officials received hereditary emoluments; there was inspection but no levy at 
border stations and market-places; fish-traps were open for all to use; punishment did not extend to the 
wife and children of an offender.374 In particular, when he put benevolent measures into effect, he 
always gave first consideration to old men without wives, old women without husbands, old people 
without children, and young children without fathers since these four classes are the most destitute and 
have no one to turn to for help. In these aspects, he was a truly benevolent king. Nevertheless, he did 
                                           





373 Mencius, 1B10. As translated in Legge. 孟子對曰：「取之而燕民悅，則取之。古之人有行之者，武王
是也。取之而燕民不悅，則勿取。古之人有行之者，文王是也。」 





not succeed in extending his influence over the whole Empire when he died at the age of a hundred. It 
was only after his work was carried on by king Wu and the Duke of Zhou, that influence greatly 
prevailed.375 Given that Confucius significantly respected the Duke of Zhou, king Wen’s virtuous 
achievement played a pivotal role in establishing such good tradition. 
Shun and King Wen are, as can be seen above, presented as the proper role models of a sage. Why 
did Mencius deal with them at the same level in spite of different backgrounds and timelines?  
According to Mencius, ‘Shun was an Eastern barbarian; he was born in Zhu Feng, moved to Fu Xia, 
and died in Ming Tiao. King Wen was a Western barbarian; he was born in Zhou by mount Qi and died 
in Bi Ying. Their native places were over a thousand li apart, and there were a thousand years between 
them. Yet when they had their way in the Central Kingdoms, their actions matched like the two halves 
of a tally. The standards of the two sages, one earlier and one later, were identical.’376 In other words, 
their principles are no different. In this context, he always cited Yao and Shun as his authorities as well 
as king Wen when explaining about the goodness of human nature.377 For Mencius, the purpose of 
study is to go back and set forth in brief what is essential.378 That is the Way of the former kings. Just 
as to raise a thing high, one must begin from the top of a mound or a hill and to dig to a great depth, 
one must commence in the low ground of a stream or a marsh, the wise proceed according to ‘the Way 
of the former kings’ in the exercise of government. Mencius warns that ‘when those above have no 
principles and those below have no laws, when courtiers have no faith in the way and craftsmen have 
no faith in measures, when the man of virtue offend against what is right and common people risk 
punishment, then it is good fortune indeed if a state survives.’379 He highlights the importance of 
imitating the Way of Yao and Shun as the Way of the former kings as follows:  
                                           
375 Mencius, 2A1. 且以文王之德，百年而後崩，猶未洽於天下；武王、周公繼之，然後大行。 
376 Mencius, 4B1. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「舜生於諸馮，遷於負夏，卒於鳴條，東夷之人也。文
王生於岐周，卒於畢郢，西夷之人也。地之相去也，千有餘里；世之相後也，千有餘歲。得志行乎中國，
若合符節。先聖後聖，其揆一也。」 
377 Mencius, 3A1. 孟子道性善，言必稱堯舜。 
378 Mencius, 4B15. 孟子曰：「博學而詳說之，將以反說約也。」 






The power of vision of Li Lou, and skill of hand of Gong Shu, without the compass and square, 
could not form squares and circles. The acute ear of the music-master Kuang, without the 
pitch-tubes, could not determine correctly the five notes. The Way of Yao and Shun, without 
a benevolent government, could not secure the tranquil order of the kingdom. There are now 
princes who have benevolent hearts and a reputation for benevolence, while yet the people do 
not receive any benefits from them, nor will they leave any example to future ages - all because 
they do not put into practice the Way of the ancient kings.380 
 
Why did Mencius explain the Way of Yao and Shun in relation to implementing the benevolent 
government? In order to understand it, it is necessary to examine how he defined the relation between 
benevolence and the Way. According to him, benevolence is the distinguishing characteristic of man. 
As embodied in man’s conduct, he calls it the Way. 381  For him, benevolence and the Way are 
intertwined. In this context, Mencius said a destroyer of the people would not have been tolerated in the 
times of Yao and Shun since to employ an uninstructed people in war may be said to be destroying the 
people.382 This indicates benevolence and righteousness were deeply embedded in the nature of Yao 
and Shun.383 In particular, Mencius extols Shun’s achievements in relation to human nature. According 
to him, as the waters, flowing out of their channels, inundated the Middle Kingdom in the time of Yao, 
the people had no place where they could settle themselves. In order to improve this situation, Shun 
employed Yu to repel the waters.384 By leading the flood water into the seas through cutting channels 
for it in the ground, Yu made the ground habitable. How did Yu can manage water? Mencius explains it 
as follows:  
 
All who speak about human nature have in fact only their phenomena to reason from, and the 
value of a phenomenon is in its being natural. What I dislike in your wise men is their boring 
                                           
380 Mencius, 4A1. 孟子曰：「離婁之明，公輸子之巧，不以規矩，不能成方員：師曠之聰，不以六律，
不能正五音；堯舜之道，不以仁政，不能平治天下。今有仁心仁聞而民不被其澤，不可法於後世者，不
行先王之道也。 
381 Mencius, 7B16. 孟子曰：「仁也者，人也。合而言之，道也。」 
382 Mencius, 6B8, 孟子曰：「不教民而用之，謂之殃民。殃民者，不容於堯舜之世。」 
383 Mencius, 7A30. 堯舜，性之也   






out their conclusions. If those wise men would only act as Yu did when he conveyed away the 
waters, there would be nothing to dislike in their wisdom. The manner in which Yu conveyed 
away the waters was by doing what gave him no trouble. If your wise men would also do that 
which gave them no trouble, their knowledge would also be great. There is heaven so high; 
there are the stars so distant. If we have investigated their phenomena, we may, while sitting 
in our places, go back to the solstice of a thousand years ago.385 
 
Yu solved the matter of flood by following the natural tendency of water in dealing with water. Hence, 
Mencius said floods are detested by the benevolent man since inundating waters are against the nature 
of waters.386 For Mencius, the inversion of order against the nature of things is not benevolent. Along 
with managing flood, furthermore, Mencius presents Shun as the example of filial piety. It is because 
for Shun filial piety is much more important than sex, riches, and honours as follows:  
  
The possession of beauty is what men desire, and Shun had for his wives the two daughters 
of Yao, but this was not sufficient to remove his sorrow. Riches are what men desire, and the 
kingdom was the rich property of Shun, but this was not sufficient to remove his sorrow. 
Honours are what men desire, and Shun had the dignity of being sovereign, but this was not 
sufficient to remove his sorrow. The reason why being the object of men's delight, with the 
possession of beauty, riches, and honours was not sufficient to remove his sorrow, was that it 
could be removed only by his getting his parents to be in accord with him. The desire of the 
child is towards his father and mother. When he becomes conscious of the attractions of beauty, 
his desire is towards young and beautiful women. When he comes to have a wife and children, 
his desire is towards them. When he obtains office, his desire is towards his sovereign - if he 
cannot get the regard of his sovereign, he burns within. But the man of great filial piety, to the 
end of his life, has his desire towards his parents. In Shun I have seen an example of a son 
who, even at the age of fifty, yearned for his parents.387 
 
Regardless of getting older, Shun sought to get the hearts of his parents. According to Mencius, Shun 
alone was able to look upon the fact that the Empire, being greatly delighted, was turning to him, as of 
no more consequence than trash.388 He considered that if one could not get the hearts of his parents he 
                                           
385 Mencius, 4B26. 孟子曰：「天下之言性也，則故而已矣。故者以利為本。所惡於智者，為其鑿也。
如智者若禹之行水也，則無惡於智矣。禹之行水也，行其所無事也。如智者亦行其所無事，則智亦大矣
。天之高也，星辰之遠也，苟求其故，千歲之日至，可坐而致也。」 
386  Mencius, 6B11. 孟子曰：「子過矣。禹之治水，水之道也。是故禹以四海為壑，今吾子以鄰國為壑
。水逆行，謂之洚水。洚水者，洪水也，仁人之所惡也。吾子過矣。」 




388 Mencius, 4A28. 孟子曰：「天下大悅而將歸己。視天下悅而歸己，猶草芥也。惟舜為然。不得乎親，
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could not be considered a man, and that if he could not get to an entire accord with his parents, he could 
not be considered a son. Thus, Shun did everything that was possible to serve his parents, and succeeded, 
in the end, in pleasing his father Gu Sou. When Gu Sou was brought to find that delight, the whole 
kingdom was transformed. When Gu Sou was brought to find that delight, all fathers and sons in the 
kingdom were established in their respective duties. Mencius calls this great filial piety. In other words, 
for Shun the source of changing the whole kingdom was not military power but filial piety. In spite of 
Yao and Shun’s great achievements, Mencius warns against deification of them. He explicitly states 
‘Yao and Shun were just the same as other men.’389 
In terms of imitating sages, for Mencius the most important sage is Confucius. According to Mencius, 
Bo Yi, Yi Yin, and Confucius were all sages of antiquity, but they should not be placed in the same rank.  
There never was another Confucius. Thus, Mencius states that ‘what I wish to do is to learn to be like 
Confucius.’390 Why did Mencius focus on studying Confucius? From the perspective of Mencius, the 
Way of Confucius is inextricably linked to previous sages such as Yao, Shun, Yi Yin, and Wen as follows:        
 
From Yao and Shun down to Tang were 500 years and more. As to Yu and Gao Yao, they saw 
those earliest sages, and so knew their doctrines, while Tang heard their doctrines at second 
hand but knew them well. From Tang to king Wen were 500 years and more. As to Yi Yin, and 
Lai Zhu, they saw Tang and knew his doctrines, while king Wen heard them as transmitted, 
and so knew them. From king Wen to Confucius were 500 years and more. As to Tai Gong 
Wang and San Yi Sheng, they saw Wen, and so knew his doctrines, while Confucius heard 
them as transmitted, and so knew them. From Confucius downwards until now, there are only 
100 years and somewhat more. The distance in time from the sage is so far from being remote, 
and so very near at hand was the sage’s residence. In these circumstances, is there no one to 
transmit his doctrines? Is there no one to do so?391 
                                           
不可以為人；不順乎親，不可以為子。舜盡事親之道而瞽瞍厎豫，瞽瞍厎豫而天下化，瞽瞍厎豫而天下
之為父子者定，此之謂大孝。」   
389 Mencius, 4B32. 孟子曰：「何以異於人哉？堯舜與人同耳。」 












This passage above shows there are two modes in terms of delivering the Way. Yu, Gao Yao, Yi Yin, 
Lai Zhu, Tai Gong Wang, and San Yi Sheng were handed over through personal contacts with sages, 
while Tang, Wen, and Confucius knew such doctrines by hearing what was passed down. In this context, 
Mencius states that ‘The influence of a sovereign sage terminates in the fifth generation. The influence 
of a mere sage does the same. Although I could not be a disciple of Confucius himself, I have 
endeavoured to cultivate my virtue by means of others who were.’392 Given that Mencius points out 
that there is no one to transmit Confucius’ doctrines at his time, this indicates that his doctrines were 
succeeded by Mencius. Thus, Mencius was convinced that he can only bring peace to the Empire as 
follows:  
 
That was one time, and this is another. It is a rule that a true royal sovereign should arise in 
the course of five hundred years, and that during that time there should be men illustrious in 
their generation. From the commencement of the Zhou dynasty till now, more than seven 
hundred years have elapsed. Judging numerically, the date is past. Examining the character of 
the present time, we might expect the rise of such individuals in it. But Heaven does not yet 
wish that the kingdom should enjoy tranquility and good order. If it wished this, who is there 
besides me to bring it about? How should I be otherwise than dissatisfied?393 
  
His confidence for administration derives from Confucius. According to Mencius, if Confucius were to 
become ruler over a hundred li square, he would have been capable of winning the homage of the feudal 
lords and taking possession of the Empire. 394  In order to obtain the throne, he would not have 
committed one act of unrighteousness, or put to death one innocent person. Confucius focused on 
practicing the Way. However, the reality he confronted was stern. He never completed in any State a 
residence of three years because he had a clear standard in taking office; ‘Confucius took office when 
                                           
392 Mencius, 4B22. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「君子之澤五世而斬，小人之澤五世而斬。予未得為
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he saw that the practice of his doctrines was likely; he took office when his reception was proper; he 
took office when he was supported by the State. In the case of his relation to Qi Huan, he took office, 
seeing that the practice of his doctrines was likely. With the duke Ling of Wei he took office, because 
his reception was proper. With the duke Xiao of Wei he took office, because he was maintained by the 
State.’395 From the perspective of Mencius, Confucius seems to be a sage. However, Mencius describes 
Confucius as an imperfect man like Yao and Shun:  
 
Mencius said, 'Oh! what words are these? Formerly Zi Gong asked Confucius, saying, ‘Master, 
are you a Sage?’ Confucius answered him, ‘A Sage is what I cannot rise to. I study without 
satiety, and teach without being tired.’ Zi Gong said, ‘You study without satiety - that shows 
your wisdom. You teach without being tired - that shows your benevolence. Benevolent and 
wise - Master, you are a Sage.’ Now, since Confucius would not allow himself to be regarded 
as a Sage, what words were those?'396  
 
Even Mencius himself declines to be called a sage like Confucius. For Mencius, the important aspect 
of Confucius is that he kept studying and teaching as the modes of wisdom and benevolence. 
In this section I showed that Mencius emphasises that a king needs to become the man of virtue to 
realise benevolent government where filial piety is a core value. Mencius claimed to reform economic, 
social, and educational systems for supporting filial piety. Just as Confucius highlighted the importance 
of practice, Mencius stressed continually imitating from the Way of sages such as Yao, Shun, and 
Confucius.  
  
                                           
395 Mencius, 5B4. As translated in Legge. 曰：「為之兆也。兆足以行矣，而不行，而後去，是以未嘗有所
終三年淹也。孔子有見行可之仕，有際可之仕，有公養之仕也。於季桓子，見行可之仕也；於衛靈公，
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Augustine’s Moral Learning  
 
Divine Illumination: Christ as the Interior Teacher  
Just as Confucius and Mencius treated virtue as a means for achieving happiness, Augustine deals with 
happiness and virtue throughout his writings. In his early writing De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae, he 
claims that ‘we all wish to live happily’397 as a ‘eudaemonist’398 like Greco-Roman philosophers such 
as Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics. That happiness is the product of virtue was a universal assumption 
in the ancient world where the soul cannot achieve whatever its perfection might be without virtue as 
the excellence of the soul.399 With the classical traditions Augustine accepts that human happiness is 
the result of virtue, further, that what constitutes the nature of our happiness can be understood by 
rational argument.400  According to Augustine, if we intend to live happily, we must possess our 
supreme good. It is because ‘no one is happy without the supreme good, which is discerned and acquired 
in the truth that we call wisdom.’401 He shows two conditions of this supreme good as follows: 
 
Therefore, man’s supreme good is not inferior to man. … For if happiness is the possession 
of a good than which there is none greater, and this is what we call the supreme good, how 
can a person be said to be happy who has not yet attained his supreme good? Or how can it 
be called the supreme good if there is something better that he can attain? Such being the case, 
it follows that one cannot lose it against his will, for no one can be confident of a good he 
knows can be snatched from him even though he wishes to keep and cherish it.402  
 
For Augustine, the two conditions this supreme good are that ‘nothing is better than it’ and ‘it cannot 
be lost against one’s will.’ According to him, human beings are composed of body and soul.403 He 
argues that ‘man’s supreme good is not the supreme good of the body alone, but the supreme good of 
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the soul.’404 For him, an important question is about what makes soul perfect. He deals with the 
attainment of virtue in connection with soul rather than body in that ‘virtue perfects the soul.’405 
Presenting that ‘soul must pursue something else in order that virtue may arise within itself,’ he insists 
that this something else is God rather than a wise man who can be taken from us against our will.406 
Hence, he stresses that if we reach God, we live not only well but also happily.407 For him, happiness 
is ‘the enjoyment of man’s supreme good.’408 While for Confucius and Mencius the Way (dao 道) is 
truth to lead to happiness, for Augustine God is the supreme good. One way of comparing the two is to 
indicate that both traditions envisage the moral life as a path or journey of formation shaped by the 
quest for the truth. For Augustine seeking happiness is the matter of finding God who is the ‘immaterial, 
the unchanging, all-loving good.’409 Given that for Augustine the aim of a happy life is to know God 
and its process is intellectual enquiry,410 the purpose of moral education is to assist the learner to 
develop a love of intellectual enquiry, through which man progressively enlarges his understanding of 
real existence, introducing order into the apparent chaos of human experience, and seeing the flux of 
the temporal world against a secure background of unchanging truth.411 At this point, the question of 
how man knows such divine ideas may be the most important and the most difficult problem in 
Augustine’s moral learning.412 For this task, it is necessary to look at Augustine’s early writings after 
his conversion to survey his epistemology as the starting point of the formation of his moral self. In the 
Confessions, Augustine talks about certainty in his mind in the moment of conversion as follows:  
 
I was saying these things and weeping in the most bitter contrition of my heart, when I heard 
the voice as of a boy or girl, I know not which, coming from a neighbouring house, chanting, 
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and often repeating, ‘Take up and read; take up and read’. … I grasped, opened, and in silence 
read that paragraph on which my eyes first fell—‘Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in 
chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying; but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and 
make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof.’ (Rom 13:13-14) No further would 
I read, nor did I need; for instantly, as the sentence ended—by a light, as it were, of security 
infused into my mind—all the gloom of doubt vanished away.413 
 
Why did Augustine think of the matter of certainty in connection with sexual lust after reading the verse 
in 386? This is derived from his past life in relation to skepticism.414 Moving from Thagaste to Carthago 
to learn rhetoric in 371, Augustine not only became deeply interested in philosophy as loving wisdom 
by reading Cicero’s Hortensius, but also fell in the errors of the Manichaeans. 415  His growing 
dissatisfaction with Manichaeism in Rome at the beginning of his stay in Italy, whose dogmatic dualism 
he had embraced as an eighteen-year-old in 372, made him a temporary skeptic in about 383 or 384, at 
a particularly insecure and unstable period of his life. 416  During this period, he found himself 
increasingly attracted to the skeptical position taken by the Academics, the followers of Arcesilaus and 
the New Academy, who, as he writes in his Confessions, ‘held that everything is a matter of doubt and 
asserted that we can know nothing for certain.’ 417  What Augustine knew of ancient skepticism, 
including the debate between Arcesilaus and the Stoic Zeno of Citium, he seems to have learned from 
Cicero’s Academica. A year or two later he encountered Platonism in Milan, and then he converted to 
Christianity. In the aftermath of his conversion, he wrote his earlier works such as Contra Academicos, 
De beata vita, De ordine, and Solioquia at a villa in Cassiciacum near Milan. Here Augustine stayed 
from the autumn of 386 until Lent in 387 in the company of his mother (Monica), his son (Adeodatus), 
his brother (Navigius), two cousins (Lastidianus and Rusticus), two pupils (Licentius and Trygetius), 
and a friend (Alypius). In spite of performing some manual labour, for the group the main interest of 
each day centered in study and philosophical discussions. Shaping dialogues on the model of Plato and 
Cicero, these discussions were recorded by a stenographer, and Augustine then revised the notes.418 
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Above all, it is noticeable that the first of the programmatic series of these writings is Contra 
Academicos in 386. This work is a criticism of skeptical positions and defence of the attainability of 
knowledge by laying the foundations of the theory of cognitive certainty. Even though he seems never 
to have become a skeptic himself, skepticism remained as a threat for much of his life, so that he felt he 
needed to respond to. Augustine’s Against the Academicians, which is directed at Cicero’s Academica, 
is his principal response to skeptical arguments of New Academy for defending the possibility of 
knowledge. Like Cicero’s Academic books, it is written in dialogue form where Augustine, two pupils, 
and a friend took part in philosophical discussion, enquiry, and reflection. Like Hellenistic philosophers 
such as Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism, Augustine considers the aim of moral education the 
happy life as the result of virtue. In this context, Augustine’s Against the Academicians starts from the 
matter of certainty by dealing with wisdom in connection with happiness. He claims the sage alone is 
happy since the sage alone has secure knowledge of truths like the Stoic view. In this premise, he raises 
a question about whether wisdom consists in finding truth or in seeking it. He points out that Academic 
wisdom is a skeptical strategy, and does not entail knowledge of something called wisdom.419 In 
contrast, he proves the possibility of knowledge through logical truths, pure appearance-claims, and 
mathematical truths. Hence, his principal objection to the Academics is directed at the claim attributed 
to them that one may be wise and attain happiness in the quest for truth, even if there is no possibility 
of its attainment.420 Truth is reached through authority by means of belief and through reason by means 
of understanding.421  
More importantly, Augustine’s De magistro in 389, written in dialogue form between Augustine and 
his natural son, Adeodatus, is inextricably linked to the matter of moral learning. It offers his theory of 
illumination to explain how moral knowledge is acquired by means of a philosophically improved 
Christianized version of Plato’s theory of recollection. Through Cicero, he must have been aware of it, 
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according to which learning is just the process of making manifest to ourselves this latent knowledge 
since before our birth we have knowledge of the Forms from a direct communion with them.422 In the 
process of exploring the truth, Augustine advises we can derive anything even from profane sources, 
for truth belongs to God regardless wherever truth may be found.423 For example, we do not need to 
abandon music owing to the superstition of the heathen, since we may lay hold upon spiritual things by 
investigating about harps and other instruments.424 In this context, Augustine claims that Plato is to be 
held as excelling other philosophers in moral, natural, and rational philosophies.425 In particular, logic 
as rational philosophy discriminating between the true and the false shows the excellence of Plato’s 
philosophy in that Plato ‘distinguished those things which are conceived by the mind from those which 
are perceived by the senses, neither taking away from the senses anything to which they are competent, 
nor attributing to them anything beyond their competency.’ This was contrary to Stoics and Epicureans 
who ‘ascribed to the bodily senses that expertness in disputation which they so ardently love, called by 
them dialectic, asserting that from the senses the mind conceives the notions (ἒννοιαι) of those things 
which they explicate by definition.’426 In this context, his De magistro is directed at Plato’s Meno where 
Socrates explains how virtue is acquired by introducing positive ideas such as the immortality of the 
soul and the theory of knowledge as recollection (ἀνάμνησις). For Plato, moral learning is innate and 
the soul’s recollection.427 The theory is vividly illustrated by Socrates asking a slave boy questions 
about geometry. At first the boy gives the wrong answer; when this is pointed out to him, he is puzzled, 
but by asking questions Socrates is able to help him to reach the true answer. This is intended to show 
that, as the boy was not told the answer, he could only have reached the truth by recollecting what he 
had already known but forgotten. This, as Plato concludes, is an internal process as recollection.428 In 
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this dialogue, Socrates regards himself as a midwife rather than a teacher, aiding with the birth of 
knowledge that was already there in the student. For Augustine, like Socrates and Plato, moral learning 
has an internal aspect as follows:  
 
When we deal with things that we perceive by the mind, namely by the intellect and reason, 
we’re speaking of things that we look upon immediately in the inner light of Truth, in virtue 
of which the so-called inner man is illuminated and rejoices. … He’s taught not by my words 
but by the things themselves made manifest within when God discloses them.429  
 
In moral learning, Augustine emphasises divine illumination of Truth by the inner Teacher rather than 
language by external teachers. According to him, ‘words have force only to the extent that they remind 
us to look for things.’430 In spite of the function of reminding, according to him, words as instruments 
of teaching are inadequate in that words are only a sign and things not signifying anything cannot be 
signs.431 Therefore, knowledge of words is made complete once the things are known.432 He claims 
that:  
 
We have to admit that we learn words we didn’t know only after their significance has been 
perceived, and this happens not by hearing the mere sounds uttered but by knowing the things 
signified. … when words are spoken we either know what they signify or we don’t; if we 
know, then it’s reminding rather than learning; but if we don’t know, it isn’t even reminding, 
though perhaps we recollect that we should inquire.433  
 
In this context, Augustine thinks that ‘someone who presents what I want to know to my eyes, or to any 
of my bodily senses, or even to my mind itself, does teach me something.’434 As he states that ‘we don’t 
consult a speaker who makes sounds outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind itself’ 
with regard to ‘each of the things we understand.’ He identifies Christ as the Teacher operating within 
us;435 Our real teacher is ‘He Who is said to dwell in the inner man, does teach: Christ – that is, the 
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unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God.’436 For Augustine, Christ as the interior teacher, 
who is the Word of God illuminating the human soul is our true teacher as follows:  
 
Thus, in the gospel He speaks through the flesh; and this sounded outwardly in the ears of 
men, that it might be believed and sought inwardly, and that it might be found in the eternal 
Truth, where the good and only Master teaches all His disciples. There, O Lord, I hear Your 
voice, the voice of one speaking unto me, since He speaks unto us who teaches us. But He 
that teaches us not, although He speaks, speaks not to us. Moreover, who teaches us, unless it 
be the immutable Truth? For even when we are admonished through a changeable creature, 
we are led to the Truth immutable.437  
 
By the light of Christ or the light of God mind is able to distinguish the objects of intellectual vision. 
Augustine insists that our minds have direct access to the eternal truth of reason in that the mind is 
illuminated with knowledge by the inner Teacher; ‘When the teachers have explained by means of 
words all the disciplines they profess to teach, even the disciplines of virtue and of wisdom, then those 
who are called students consider within themselves whether truths have been stated. They do so by 
looking upon the inner Truth, according to their abilities.’438 In this way no external human teacher can 
teach.439  
Particularly, Augustine’s idea of divine illumination is intensively discussed in the dimension of 
proof of the existence of God in book 2 of De libero arbitrio.440 Before proving God’s existence, he 
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deals with belief as a preliminary matter, for ‘understanding’ is impossible with it. On the basis of 
Isaiah’s saying ‘Unless you believe, you will not understand,’ he claims that at first we ought to believe 
before we desire to understand the great and divine things.441 According to him, above all, it is Jesus’ 
teaching:  
 
At first our Lord himself by his words and deeds urged those whom he had called to salvation 
to believe in him. But later, when he spoke of the gift that he was going to give to those who 
believed, he did not say, ‘This is eternal life, that they may believe,’ but ‘This is eternal life, 
that they may know you, the true God, and him whom you have sent, Jesus Christ.’ And he 
said to those who already believe, ‘Seek, and you will find.’ For something that is believed 
but not known has not yet been found, and no one becomes ready to find God unless he first 
believes what he will afterwards know.442  
 
Hence, Augustine advises we ought to ‘diligently obey the Lord’s command’ in seeking, for ‘he himself 
will show us what we seek at his urging.’443 This indicates that a sense of purpose and direction is 
prerequisite for the successful outcome of moral learning in that it cannot be carried forward on the 
basis of skepticism.444  
And then, Augustine attempts to show the role of reason by proving existence, life, and 
understanding of himself as undeniable truth, for ‘whatever understands must certainly also exist and 
be alive.’445 Just as a stone exists and an animal is alive, but a stone is alive or an animal understands, 
human beings who have all three qualities are superior to something that lacks any of them. 446 
According to him, ‘a nature that has existence but not life or understanding, like an inanimate body, is 
inferior to a nature that has both existence and life but not understanding, like the souls of animals; and 
such a thing is in turn inferior to something that has all three, like the rational mind of a human being.’447 
Life has ‘inner sense’ and ‘bodily senses’ such as sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. According to 
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Augustine, inner sense is higher than bodily senses, for it judges bodily senses.448 However, inner sense 
is not reason itself, which animals do not have.449 It is lower than reason and is present both in human 
beings and in animals.450 By reason human beings understand these things and recognise that they are 
so.451 Reason judges material objects, the bodily senses, and the inner sense.452 Thus, Augustine calls 
it ‘an agent of reason’ in that ‘it takes whatever it comes into contact with and presents that to reason so 
that reason can delimit the things that are perceived and grasp them by knowledge and not merely by 
sense.’453  
Furthermore, Augustine claims that there is anything in human nature more exalted than reason in 
the evidence of mathematics. According to him, numbers are not perceived by the bodily senses when 
each number is named on the basis of how many times it contains one: 
 
For example, if it contains one twice, it is called ‘two’, if three times, ‘three’, and if ten times, 
‘ten’. For any numbers at all, its name will be the number of times that it contains one. But 
anyone who thinks correctly will surely find that one cannot be perceived by the bodily 
senses.454  
 
This indicates that Augustine rejects the possibility of an empirical basis for mathematics.455 Observing 
that ‘this order is fixed, secure, and unchangeable for all numbers,’ he raises questions about where to 
learn that this order extends to all of them and how to see ‘this indisputable truth about number, which 
extends through infinitely many numbers.’456 Concerning these questions, Augustine shows that ‘we 
see it by an inner light of which the bodily sense knows nothing.’457 Hence, he demonstrates ‘for those 
inquirers to whom God has given the ability, whose judgment is not clouded by stubbornness, these and 
many other such examples suffice to show that the order and truth of numbers has nothing to do with 
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the senses of the body, but that it does exist, complete and immutable, and can be seen in common by 
everyone who uses reason.’458 His argument for proof of the existence of God is the matter of how to 
ascend to God by intellect which is illuminated by God.  
The notion of an interior teacher is a pivotal theme running even through his later writings such as 
De doctrina Christiana, Confessiones, and De civitate Dei.459 Nevertheless, scholars usually look first 
at early works such as De magistro to interpret Augustine’s account of learning by illumination. As a 
result, later works have been neglected in the discussion of illumination.460 Schumacher points out that 
such scholarly tendency to read Augustine’s early writings on illumination could lose ‘reference to the 
theological context he later elucidates in works like De Trinitate.’461 What is the theological context of 
illumination in De Trinitate? This matter is inextricably linked to the purpose of De Trinitate. For 
Augustine, one of main aims in writing De Trinitate is to ‘convince his readers that salvation and 
spiritual growth are connected with knowing themselves as images of the Triune God.’462 In other 
words, Augustine’s moral learning is based on his doctrine of the image of God in that human beings 
were created in the image of the Trinity according to Genesis 1.26. His moral learning theory is closely 
linked to creation.463 For Augustine, the image of God is not just an image of the one God but of the 
Trinity.464 He found the image of Trinity in the incorporeal soul around his baptism by escaping the 
Manichaean inference.465 In De Genesi ad litteram libri dudecim, Augustine writes on his account of 
the possibility of the interaction of God and the human soul in connection with creation as follows:  
 
But the light itself is something else, the light by which the soul is enlightened in order truly 
to understand and observe all things either in itself or in this light. For this light is now God 
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himself, while the soul is a creature, even though a rational and intelligent one made to his 
image.466  
  
This indicates that the aim of divine illumination is to enlighten the soul. For Augustine, as Miles defines, 
‘the soul is not primarily a separated entity for whom the problem is the formation of relationships with 
other souls, with the natural environment, and with God; Augustine's soul is primarily a partially 
centered energy, initially barely distinguishable from its cosmic, physical, and spiritual environment, 
which comes to be cumulatively distinguished and defined by the objects of its attention and 
affection.’467 Particularly, Augustine deals with the matter of memory in the perspective of the human 
soul of the three Persons in the one God in De Trinitate.468 He expounds the theological context of 
memory, understanding, and will as three aspects of the mind in the dimension of the Persons of the 
Trinity as follows:  
 
Since, then, these three, memory, understanding, will, are not three lives, but one life; nor 
three minds, but one mind; it follows certainly that neither are they three substances, but one 
substance. Since memory, which is called life, and mind, and substance, is so called in respect 
to itself; but it is called memory, relatively to something. … But they are three, in that wherein 
they are mutually referred to each other; and if they were not equal, and this not only each to 
each, but also each to all, they certainly could not mutually contain each other; for not only is 
each contained by each, but also all by each. For I remember that I have memory and 
understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and will, and remember; and I 
will that I will, and remember, and understand; and I remember together my whole memory, 
and understanding, and will. For that of my memory which I do not remember, is not in my 
memory; and nothing is so much in the memory as memory itself. Therefore I remember the 
whole memory.469 
 
Like the Persons of the Trinity which is distinguished as one God, Augustine explains the relation 
among memory, understanding, and will; ‘while all are mutually comprehended by each, and as wholes, 
each as a whole is equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as wholes; and 
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these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence.’470   
 
Friendship in Christ: Ambrose, Monica, Monastery  
Through reflection on his own experiences of education as a pupil Augustine realised the limit of 
external teachers in the methodology of moral learning. In the Confessiones, he states that he hated to 
be forced to learn in spite of having ‘no love of learning’ in his childhood.471 For him, ‘external 
compulsion alone was not a suitable motivation for a student to learn a subject for which a specific 
inclination was lacking and that there must be other factors that direct the desire to learn.’472 However, 
given that Augustine was always to be found in the company of others in the beginning of the outset of 
his life, the impacts of external teachers in his life cannot be entirely neglected. Topping argues 
Augustine’s moral education can improve individuals but not societies as follows:  
 
The first reason why education cannot advance society, which we have already seen, is that 
with the birth of Christ there is in principle no further revelation that humanity awaits. The 
second reason for this limit is, more directly, because of our lack of moral virtue, which is 
manifest in both private and public life. I take up virtue in individuals first.473  
 
In Augustine’s view, progress is limited because both our knowledge and our virtue are limited. In the 
dimension of an eschatological goal, social progress primarily in intellectual terms, secondarily in moral 
terms, and not at all in material terms. Hence, Topping insists, as Wetzel and O’Donovan argue, that 
Augustine’s pedagogy is best understood against the horizon of his evolution on the possibilities of 
human perfectibility, and in particular the limits of virtue which ‘can be encouraged but not 
guaranteed.’474 In Christianity and the Secular, Markus replies about criticism that his interpretation of 
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Augustine's view on the limits and functions of public authority comes perilously close to making 
Augustine a ‘precursor of modern secular liberalism’ and to casting the debate in terms of a ‘modern 
individualist liberalism’ by emphasising the eschatological character of Augustine's views. 475  In 
contrast with Markus, Oliver O’Donovan offers a less affirming and engaging place for the secular 
within the economy of God than Markus's interpretation does. John Howard Yoder, Stanley Hauerwas, 
and John Milbank reject the notion that the secular has positive attributes.  
For example, several mentors of various backgrounds and personalities such as Ambrose, Monica, 
and some close friends influenced him at different periods of his life. 476  The early parts of the 
Confessiones refer frequently to his need to be with others, it was part of his nature and, looking back 
on this period, Augustine was able to be realistic about its dangers but also about its graces:  
 
By means of my inner sense I coordinated my sensible impressions, and in my little thoughts 
about little things I delighted in truth. I was unwilling to be deceived, I had a lively memory, 
I was being trained in the use of words, I was comforted by friendship, and I shrank form pain, 
grovelling and ignorance.477  
 
It is noteworthy that he mentions the role of ‘friendship’ in moral learning. Friendship plays a central 
role in Augustine’s moral learning. He thought that in this world two things are essential: life and 
friendship. God created people to exist and be alive. Mere life is not enough: if a human being is to be 
a real person then there must be friendship. For him, friendship is essential in life.478 Augustine states: 
 
Particularly when I am worn out by the upsets of the world, I cast myself without reservation 
on the love of those who are especially close to me.  I know I can safely entrust my thoughts 
and considerations to those who are aflame with Christian love and have become faithful 
friends to me. For I am entrusting them not to another human, but to God in Whom they dwell 
and by Whom they are who they are.479  
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It is because all who God have desire for loving neighbor.480 Above all, friendship is inextricably 
connected with searching for truth; ‘I am delighted because I see that your mind is drawing near to it 
[wisdom] and is ablaze with the desire to attain it. From it, of course, there also flows true friendship 
that is not to be judged by temporal advantages but it to be valued as gratuitous love. For no one can be 
truly a friend unless he is first a friend of the truth, and if that is not done gratuitously it cannot be done 
at all.’481 Contrary to friends who make us perverted by their flattery, true friends correct our faults by 
seeking the truth.482 In this context, for Augustine the encounter with Bishop Ambrose of Milan through 
his preaching was significant moment:  
 
And to Milan I came, unto Ambrose the bishop, known to the whole world as among the best 
of men, Your devout servant; whose eloquent discourse did at that time strenuously dispense 
unto Your people the flour of Your wheat, the gladness of Your oil, and the sober intoxication 
of Your wine. To him was I unknowingly led by You, that by him I might knowingly be led to 
You.483  
 
Given that Ambrose was described by Augustine as ‘one of the best of men,’ ‘a devout worshipper of 
God,’ and a ‘man of God,’ his holy life profoundly impacted on Augustine. In particular, Ambrose’s 
educational background made him one of the most able bishops of this time. Prior to becoming bishop 
of Milan, he had been its governor. He had been well educated in Rome as he prepared for a career in 
civil service. He was not only familiar with the texts that orators were expected to know, but with 
philosophical and contemporary texts since he was fluent in both Greek and Latin. Scholars have noted 
in his extant sermons ample evidence of his broad reading including Greek sources such as the Platonist 
Plotinus, Eastern Christian writers, and Philo of Alexandria as well as Latin ones such as Virgil and 
Seneca.484  Hence, he understood his encounter with Ambrose as ‘a sign of divine grace’ in that 
Ambrose played an important role in helping him overcome Manichean deceptions by his teaching of 
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salvation.485 Augustine was deeply touched by Ambrose’s intellectual preaching as follows:  
 
For although I took no trouble to learn what he spoke, but only to hear how he spoke (for that 
empty care alone remained to me, despairing of a way accessible for man to You), yet, together 
with the words which I prized, there came into my mind also the things about which I was 
careless; for I could not separate them. And while I opened my heart to admit how skillfully 
he spoke, there also entered with it, but gradually, and how truly he spoke! For first, these 
things also had begun to appear to me to be defensible; and the Catholic faith, for which I had 
fancied nothing could be said against the attacks of the Manicheans, I now conceived might 
be maintained without presumption.486 
 
Augustine acknowledges that he was interested in how Ambrose speaks by assessing his ‘rhetorical 
craft’ rather than what he speaks in his initial trips to hear Ambrose’s preaching.487 ‘Despite his initial 
motives Augustine became attracted to Ambrose who was not only kind but also demonstrated that it 
was possible for someone to be both an intellectual and a Christian.’488 Furthermore, Ambrose’s 
allegorical approach changed Augustine’s attitude to the Scriptures. It is noteworthy that Augustine was 
once disappointed about expounding the Holy Scripture due to being swollen with ‘pride’489 just after 
reading Cicero’s Hortensius when nineteen years old as follows:  
 
I resolved, therefore, to direct my mind to the Holy Scriptures, that I might see what they were. 
And behold, I perceive something not comprehended by the proud, not disclosed to children, 
but lowly as you approach, sublime as you advance, and veiled in mysteries; and I was not of 
the number of those who could enter into it, or bend my neck to follow its steps. For not as 
when now I speak did I feel when I tuned towards those Scriptures, but they appeared to me 
to be unworthy to be compared with the dignity of Tully; for my inflated pride shunned their 
style, nor could the sharpness of my wit pierce their inner meaning. Yet, truly, were they such 
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as would develop in little ones; but I scorned to be a little one, and, swollen with pride, I 
looked upon myself as a great one.490 
 
Such disappointment made Augustine fall into the errors of the Manicheans.491 Augustine commenced 
to overcome the attacks of the Manicheans by hearing Ambrose’s appealing interpretation of the 
Scriptures. As a result, he began listening to Ambrose’s sermons for their content more than their 
eloquent packaging. Even though Augustine had little personal contact with Ambrose, they seemed to 
enjoy a sense of intimacy at a distance through the form or language of preaching in that the sermon 
became a quasi-dialogue although Ambrose was the only one speaking. 492  The relation between 
Ambrose and Augustine needs to be comprehended as friendship in Christ. When Ambrose stood to 
preach the Scripture, unveiling through skilled interpretation the inspiring content of their meaning in 
a form that was eloquent and even entertaining, this medium was a familiar language that Augustine the 
rhetor could connect with on a profound level.493 Augustine assimilated Ambrose’s teaching, the 
sermon served as a catalyst for Augustine’s ongoing commitment to seeking truth, a pursuit that often 
included dialogue with others.494 In this aspect, Ambrose should, as Smither claims, be credited with 
helping Augustine go from a rhetor to a preacher.495 
His mother Monica had a special friendship with Augustine. Their ‘intense bonding’ stems from 
Monica’s moral teachings.496 She was most often depicted in the Confessiones as a woman of prayer 
and tears. When Augustine fell into the errors of the Manicheans, Monica earnestly requested a bishop 
to guide him ‘shedding copious tears.’ Yet, the bishop rejected her entreaty. Instead, he said ‘Go your 
way, and God bless you, for it is not possible that the son of these tears should perish.’497 She accepted 
it as ‘a voice from heaven.’498 Even though she was uneducated and simple, she resolutely dealt with 
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Augustine becoming a Manichean by expelling him from her home as follows:   
 
And You sent Your hand from above, and drew my soul out of that profound darkness, when 
my mother, Your faithful one, wept to you on my behalf more than mothers are wont to weep 
the bodily death of their children. For she saw that I was dead by that faith and spirit which 
she had from You, and You heard her, O Lord. You heard her, and despised not her tears, when, 
pouring down, they watered the earth under her eyes in every place where she prayed; yea, 
You heard her. For whence was that dream with which You consoled her, so that she permitted 
me to live with her, and to have my meals at the same table in the house, which she had begun 
to avoid, hating and detesting the blasphemies of my error?499 
 
Though Monica’s program of moral education was informally conducted at home, her example of virtue, 
prayer, and devotion to the church ultimately contributed not only to Augustine’s conversion to faith in 
Christ but also to his philosophy of training new believers, particularly in his manual De Catechizandis 
Rudibus.500  
Along with Ambrose and Monica, friends also play a central role in Augustine’s moral learning. Not 
all friends made constructive contributions. Due to his friends Augustine used to be led in wrong 
directions in his youth. For example, in spite of Monica’s advice on not committing obscene acts, 
Augustine took pleasure in such vices not only for the enjoyment of what he did, but also for the 
applause he won by his friends in his adolescence.501 Why did he commit such crimes? According to 
his own analysis, the causes of committing sin are due to the desire of gaining and the fear of losing 
material things belong to the lowest order,502 for such things seem to be ‘attractive and have beauty, 
although they are paltry trifles in comparison with the worth of God's blessed treasures.’503 His problem 
in youth was abandoning those higher and better things to obtain the lowest order of good.504 Therefore, 
he gave in more and more to vice simply in order not to be despised by his companions. When he had 
not sinned enough among his companions, he used to pretend that he had done things he had not done 
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at all, because he ‘was afraid that innocence would be taken for cowardice and chastity for weakness.’505 
Even during Augustine’s youth, friends influenced him to steal pears from a tree. They intensified his 
desire to commit robbery through ‘a lustiness of iniquity.’506 For Augustine, such companions were not 
true friends as they led him to sinful ways: 
 
These were the companions with whom I walked the streets of Babylon. I wallowed in its 
mire as if it were made of spices and precious ointments, and to fix me all the faster in the 
very depths of sin the unseen enemy trod me underfoot and enticed me to himself, because I 
was an easy prey for his seductions.507  
 
Before conversion to Christianity, he planned to establish a common household with a group of his 
friends in the basis of friendship in order to ‘live a life of peace’ away from the crowd. According to 
him, ‘the plan was to arrange this life of leisure by pooling our possessions and using such money as 
we had between us to create a common fund. In the spirit of sincere friendship none of us would claim 
this or that as his/her own, but all would be thrown together and the whole would belong to each and to 
all.’ 508  For Augustine, friendship seemed to be one solace in human society filled with 
misunderstanding and calamities. 509  However, all their arrangements speedily collapsed, for they 
worried whether their wives would agree the plan. As a result, Augustine trod the wide, well-beaten 
tracks of the world, and thought jostled thought in his heart again.510 After his conversion to faith in 
Jesus Christ in adulthood, however, his aim of friendship was transformed. For Augustine, the world is 
no longer pure material and true reality is only comprehended when we know of the transcendent God. 
In order to seek God he invited a diverse group of friends such as Alypius, Nebridius, and Evodius to 
friendship in the monastic community.511 By bringing together such a community, he attempted to 
pursue the happy life. They became friends in Christ. For Augustine community and friendship are 
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necessary elements for moral learning.512 When Augustine retired to Cassiciacum in September 386 in 
the aftermath of his conversion, he gathered his friends to focus on spiritual understanding by entering 
upon a life of creative leisure. As he was released from the profession of rhetoric, it seemed to be 
possible:  
 
Praising you and full of joy I set out for the house in the country with all my friends and 
relations. Once we were there I began at last to serve you with my pen. The books I wrote are 
evidence of this, although the old air can still be sensed in them, as though I were still panting 
from my exertions in the school of pride. In them are recorded the discussions I held with my 




And then when he returned to Tagaste where he attempted to ‘organise his community, to found the 
personal relations within it upon a permanent code of behaviour, to be responsible for the measure of 
authority over them. As a result, the group of like-minded slow and subtle stages, to resemble a 
monastery, with Augustine as a spiritual father.’514 After arriving at Hippo he looked for somewhere to 
found a monastery ‘devoted to the reading of the Scriptures’ and invited others who were not already 
his friends.515 For him, all Christian people are friends in Christ.516 At Hippo, Augustine put his heart 
and soul into the monastery in order to foster moral learning. ‘Augustine was never to live alone in 
Hippo. As a priest, he would return from his duties to preside over the Monastery in the Garden. Later, 
when fully occupied as a bishop, he would envy the monks their regular life of prayer, reading and 
manual labour.’517 Particularly, immersion in the Scriptures would have equipped Augustine and his 
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followers more fully for an active life in the African church.518 The monastery instituted, inspired, and 
directed by Augustine became a pivotal development in the life of the church of Africa during the last 
decade of the fourth century and the first quarter of the fifth century.519 As his monastery became a 
‘seminary’ in the true sense of the word, it came to form an influential group within African church.520  
This section shows that in moral learning Augustine emphasised the development of a love of 
intellectual enquiry for God as man’s supreme good against the flux of the temporal world, contrary to 
Confucius and Mencius who stressed filial piety as the essence of the Way in achieving benevolent 




                                           
518 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 130.  
519 Pierce Beaver, “The Rise of Monasticism in the Church of Africa,” Church History 6, no 4 (1937), 350.  





In this chapter, I dealt with Confucius, Mencius, and Augustine’s moral learning in internal, 
communitarian, and transcendental aspects. In terms of Confucius’ moral learning, he stressed the study 
of virtue (德) as a means of solving political turmoil in the dimension of self-cultivation because it leads 
to benevolent government by fostering the man of virtue. For him, moral learning is beyond individual 
dimensions. He designated Heaven (天) as a significant object of moral learning since it produces virtue 
in relation to human nature. In addition, he offered Zhou dynasty as the ideal model of antiquity for an 
object of moral learning instead of exploring extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, spiritual 
beings, and death. Just as Augustine presented liberal disciplines in his moral learning, Confucius 
offered ‘Six Disciplines’ (六藝) which was arts conducted in the Zhou dynasty such as ritual propriety 
(禮), music (樂), archery (射), chariot-riding (御), calligraphy (書), and computation (數). In relation 
to ritual propriety, Confucius stressed loyalty (忠) and reciprocity (恕) in the Book of Poetry. It is 
because he thought tradition and imitating good teachers are the best methods for the practice of virtue. 
Given that for Confucius the aim of moral learning is to cultivate moral self, he asserted the importance 
of practising filial piety (孝) and fraternal submission (弟) as a method of moral learning. In aspiring to 
moral learning he laid emphasis on overcoming sexual desire and poverty through will (志).   
Like Confucius, for Mencius becoming the man of virtue is inextricably linked to establishing 
benevolent government since the purpose of a ruler is to protect his people in supporting God. 
According to Mencius, kings ought to pay attention to people even in commencing war because Heaven 
sees and hears through people’s eyes and ears. Considering political chaos raised by war in his time, for 
Mencius human unity by benevolent government is the most powerful weapon. Mencius regards filial 
piety as a core of benevolent government, so he enthusiastically insisted on reform of economic, social, 
and educational systems as a means of supporting filial piety. In other words, he thought moral learning 
of filial piety could be possible on the basis of economic and social supports for ordinary people. In 
contrast to Norden’s argument, I stressed the importance of asceticism in Mencius’ moral learning for 
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the superior. Norden’s anti-asceticism could be only justified in the relation between a king and their 
people. Ultimately, Mencius stresses moderate living in dealing only with the life style of the king as 
demonstrated by the ancient sovereigns. He suggested imitating the Way of Yao, Shun, and Confucius 
as a method of moral learning. Just as Confucius highlighted the importance of practice, Mencius 
stressed continually learning from sages. For him, the purpose of imitating sages is to practise virtue 
together.  
Like Confucius and Mencius Augustine sought happiness by securing truth. For Confucius and 
Mencius happiness depends on whether one attains the Way. For Augustine happiness is the enjoyment 
of God as man’s supreme good. The purpose of moral learning is to develop a love of intellectual 
enquiry against the flux of the temporal world. I offered divine illumination as the first step of moral 
learning to cover the matter of certainty by dealing with wisdom in connection with happiness in 
Augustine’s earlier and later writings. For Augustine, moral learning is internal. In moral learning, 
Augustine highlights divine illumination of Truth by the inner Teacher rather than language by external 
teachers. According to him, our minds have direct access to the eternal truth of reason in that the mind 
is illuminated with knowledge by the inner Teacher since by the light of Christ or the light of God mind 
is able to distinguish the objects of intellectual vision. The notion of an interior teacher is a pivotal 
theme running even through his later writings. Augustine’s moral learning is based on his doctrine of 
the image of God in that human beings were created to the image of the Trinity according to Genesis 
1.26. For Augustine, the image of God is not just an image of the one God but of the Trinity. He 
explained it in relation to memory, understanding, and will. Along with divine illumination, Augustine 
presented the value of friendship in Christ in moral learning in the dimension of community. This 
indicates that Augustine did not entirely ignore the intervention of other persons, worship, community, 
and language even though he emphasised divine illumination. Augustine’s moral learning is 
communitarian as well as internal. Not all his friends made constructive contributions to his moral 
learning. Ambrose and Monica significantly contributed to his conversion and after his conversion to 
faith in Jesus Christ in adulthood he shared friendship with Alypius, Nebridius, and Evodius in order to 
seek to God in the monastic community.  
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Just as Confucius, Mencius, Augustine’s moral learning were discussed in internal, communitarian, and 
transcendental aspects in the previous chapter, Confucius and Mencius’ self-reflection (si 思) and 
Augustine’s contemplation are also related to such dimensions. In this chapter I first explore Confucius’ 
self-reflection in relation to his moral learning. And then I investigate Mencius’ account of self-
reflection. This deals with how Mencius’ self-reflection is interconnected with Heaven and virtues such 
as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom embedded in human nature, habitual self-
reflection, and how suffering contributes to fostering the man of virtue in connection with patience. 
Finally, I expound Augustine’s account of contemplation as a binding of the mind to God by purifying 
our mind. This includes that contemplation as a step of ascension, Augustine’s contemplative 
experience at Ostia, and the Scripture as the object of contemplation by focusing on divine wisdom as 
knowledge of God.   
 
Confucius’ Self-Reflection  
 
Limit of Self-Reflection  
In order to achieve peaceful and flourishing society Confucius envisioned that people have to develop 
their own virtue.521 This asked them to reflect deeply upon what they studied. In other words, Confucius 
expounded self-reflection in relation to study; ‘Study without reflection is a waste. Self-reflection 
without study is in peril.’ 522  This indicates that study and self-reflection are complementary. In 
particular, he states that ‘if a man take no thought about what is distant, he will find sorrow near at 
                                           
521 Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 2.  
522 Analects, 2.15. Translation adapted from Dawson and Ivanhoe. 子曰：「學而不思則罔，思而不學則殆。」 
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hand.’523 Furthermore, he presented nine things the man of virtue thinks as follows:  
 
The man of virtue has nine things which are subjects with him of thoughtful consideration. In 
regard to the use of his eyes, he is anxious to see clearly. In regard to the use of his ears, he is 
anxious to hear distinctly. In regard to his countenance, he is anxious that it should be benign. 
In regard to his demeanor, he is anxious that it should be respectful. In regard to his speech, 
he is anxious that it should be sincere. In regard to his doing of business, he is anxious that it 
should be reverently careful. In regard to what he doubts about, he is anxious to question 
others. When he is angry, he thinks of the difficulties (his anger may involve him in). When 
he sees gain to be got, he thinks of righteousness.524 
 
This indicates that Confucius dealt with self-reflection in the dimension of how to live as the man of 
virtue. However, there are the dangers of two misunderstandings of Confucius’s self-reflection. The one 
is, as Ivanhoe argues, that for Confucius self-reflection never means abstract and theoretical cogitation. 
It is not ratiocination, in the sense of a logical process of deduction or demonstration that leads one to 
conclusions.525 Chiefly it indicates to keep one’s attention engaged with something, often a goal or 
ideal which one intends to achieve. Of course, Confucius took this sense of the word to direct people’s 
attention toward moral goals and ideals, but the notion of focusing one’s attention upon and longing for 
some desired person or object may well derived from an older, more general, usage. At the same time, 
si does appear to include relating such goals and ideals to one’s attitudes and particular situation and 
hence includes a certain level of practical reasoning.526 The other is about how much Confucius deals 
with self-reflection. It is necessary to recognise that self-reflection is rarely mentioned in Analects. In 
terms of the relation between self-reflection and study, on the basis of his experience Confucius clearly 
insists that study is more important than self-reflection; ‘I once did not eat all day and did not sleep all 
night in order to think, but there was no benefit. It would have been better to study.’527 Even he advised 
                                           
523 Analects, 15.12. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「人無遠慮，必有近憂。」 
524 Analects, 16.10. Translation adapted from Legge. 孔子曰：「君子有九思：視思明，聽思聰，色思溫，
貌思恭，言思忠，事思敬，疑思問，忿思難，見得思義。」 
525 Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 2.  
526 Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 3.  




that it is enough to think twice when he heard Ji Wen Zi thought three times before acting.528 Compared 
to Mencius, for Confucius self-reflection is not important for the formation of moral self.  
  
                                           
528 Analects, 5.20. 季文子三思而後行。子聞之，曰：「再，斯可矣。」 
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Mencius’ Self-Reflection  
 
Human Nature, Sage, and Heaven 
Occasionally, Mencius mentions the value of external teachers. For example, he presents five ways in 
which the man of virtue effects his teaching:  
 
There are some on whom his influence descends like seasonable rain. There are some whose 
virtue he perfects, and some of whose talents he assists the development. There are some 
whose inquiries he answers. There are some who privately cultivate and correct themselves. 
These five ways are the methods in which the man of virtue affects his teaching.529  
 
However, Mencius fundamentally points out the limit of external teaching in the formation of moral 
self;530 ‘A carpenter or a carriage-maker may give a man the circle and square, but cannot make him 
skillful in the use of them.’531 Why did Mencius devalue it? In order to response this question, it is 
necessary to consider why he insisted that ‘the great man is the one who does not lose his child's-
heart.’532 In this context, his method for the formation of moral self is based on seeking for the lost 
mind like benevolence and righteousness as follows:     
                                           
529 Mencius, 7A40. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「君子之所以教者五：有如時雨化之者，有成德者，
有達財者，有答問者，有私淑艾者。此五者，君子之所以教也。」 
530 Nivison proposes the importance of human nature in Confucian formation of moral self. For early Chinese 
kings, how a king could acquire virtue was an important issue since it was regarded as power or charisma by 
which early Chinese kings rule without needing to resort to force or violence. Nivison points out that one cannot 
perform a genuinely virtuous act, unless one is virtuous already. He calls this ‘the paradox of virtue’, and argues 
that it is central to understanding the development of early Chinese philosophy. In contrast to Mozi who takes an 
extreme ‘voluntarist’ position and Aristotle who held that one can become a more virtuous person by performing 
virtuous actions without the appropriate virtuous motivations, Mencius solves the paradox by insisting that all 
humans already are virtuous, so we all can perform genuinely virtuous actions with his view of human nature and 
the ‘four sprouts’. For Mencius, hence, the teacher’s task is skillfully calling one’s attention to one’s moral sprouts, 
and coaching one in nurturing them since the student of morality does have to be moral already. Nivison argues 
that Mencius shows that not only how moral education is possible, but also moral education seems to be 
unnecessary. On the other hand, Nivision points out simply cultivating potentially moral-making capacities is not 
going to be sufficient to make one a moral person. Even if one has the given set of sprouts that Mencius supposes, 
one must also identify the right objects of the moral-making attitudes of sympathy, affection, dutifulness, 
courteousness, etc. And this identification must come from outside the process of cultivation itself. Mencius makes 
an emphasis on cultivating heart-mind which can lead one just to the right things. However, Nivision does not 
offer specific methods for cultivating heart-mind in his attention to moral education. Nivison, The Ways of 
Confucianism, 6, 32, 41, 43.   
531 Mencius, 7B5. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「梓匠輪輿能與人規矩，不能使人巧。」 




Benevolence is man's mind, and righteousness is man's path. How lamentable is it to neglect 
the path and not pursue it, to lose this mind and not know to seek it again! When men’s fowls 
and dogs are lost, they know to seek for them again, but they lose their mind, and do not know 
to seek for it. The great end of learning is nothing else but to seek for the lost mind.533 
 
When people lose their properties, they immediately try to retake them contrary to losing benevolence 
and righteousness.534 Why does happen such miserable situation? With regard to this problem, Mencius 
laments that people do not know how to cultivate their self in the dimension of controlling the desire of 
their body even though they know how to cultivate trees. In particular, he points out that ‘their want of 
reflection is extreme.’ 535  This shows how important self-reflection is in retaking the lost mind. 
According to Mencius, self-reflection, human nature, and Heaven are interconnected in recovering 
virtues.536  Through self-reflection one can retake benevolence embedded in his nature since this 
                                           
533 Mencius, 6A11. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「仁，人心也；義，人路也。舍其路而弗由，放其心
而不知求，哀哉！人有雞犬放，則知求之；有放心，而不知求。學問之道無他，求其放心而已矣。」 
534 Shun offers the role of self-reflecting in the formation of moral self. For Mencius the human heart/mind has 
certain predispositions such as jen, yi, li, and chih as already in human beings. Being ethical or unethical is a 
matter of preserving or losing something in one’s heart/mind. Hence, Mencius, according to Shun, regards 
‘learning as a matter of seeking the lost heart/mind.’ Being a great person is just not losing predispositions in the 
heart/mind. In seeking predispositions, Shun focuses on ‘self-reflection’ in the dimension of self-cultivation. He 
argues that for Mencius ethical failure is related to a lack of self-reflection. Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early 
Chinese Thought (Stanford: Stanford University, 1997), 136.  
535 Mencius, 6A13. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「拱把之桐梓，人苟欲生之，皆知所以養之者。至於
身，而不知所以養之者，豈愛身不若桐梓哉？弗思甚也。」 
536 According to Ivanhoe, Mencius saw himself as a follower and defender of Confucius but, in fact, in the face 
of new intellectual competitors, transformed the teachings of Confucius. Wang Yangming, on the other hand, 
borrowed freely and knowingly from Buddhism, even though Buddhist thought affected him in ways he did not 
see. Mencius based his claims about morality on his anthropology, while Wang based his moral claims on his 
metaphysical theory. In terms of self-cultivation, according to Ivanhoe, the key difference is that Mencius holds 
a ‘development model’ whereas Wang uses a ‘discovery model.’ Essentially, this means that Mencius thought of 
self-cultivation as a process of development, while Wang looked upon the task of self-cultivation as reaching 
completion upon the happy discovery that one is already perfect and always has been. At first, Ivanhoe deals with 
the thought of Confucius to explain why Mencius ought to expound human nature for self-cultivation. Ivanhoe 
claims that at the heart of Confucius’ conception of the good life as the Way (道) ‘is a model of a harmonious and 
happy family, one whose different members each contribute to the welfare and flourishing of the whole, according 
to their role-specific obligations.’ Ivanhoe believes that Confucius was a traditionalist who held that there was 
only one way to live and that this Way had been discovered and put into practice by certain sage-kings in the 
past.536 However, by Mencius’ time, many competitors like the Mohists rejected Confucius’ appeal to tradition 
and his conception of the golden age. In this context, Mencius preserved Confucius’ traditionalism but grounded 
it in a new and persuasive vision of human nature and its relation to society. For example, according to Ivanhoe, 
Mencius accepts Confucius' traditionalist account of this while adding a novel account of why those particular 
characteristics thought to have been exhibited by the sage-kings were excellences. At bottom, Mencius seeks to 
base his account of moral justification in a theory of human nature. Mencius argues ‘that the ancient traditions, 
ideals, and values that Kongzi cherished were...the perfect expression of what we by nature truly are’. Ivanhoe 
argues Mencius goes even further in his development of Confucius’ ideas by introducing a form of moral 
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process leads to knowing Heaven. For him, the way to serve Heaven is to preserve one’s mental 
constitution, and nourish one’s nature. Hence, he states that ‘when neither a premature death nor long 
life causes a man any double-mindedness, but he waits in the cultivation of his personal character for 
whatever issue; this is the way in which he establishes his Heaven-ordained being.’537 In other words, 
he stresses the importance of effort in realising virtues. For example, Mencius thinks the way the mouth 
is disposed towards tastes, the eye towards colours, the ear towards sounds, the nose towards smells, 
and the four limbs towards ease is human nature, yet securing them depends on the Decree. In contrast, 
the way benevolence pertains to the relation between father and son, the observance of righteousness to 
the relation between sovereign and minister, the ritual propriety to the relation between guest and host, 
wisdom to the good and wise man, the sage to the way of Heaven, is the Decree, but its realisation 
depends on human nature. That is why man of virtue does not ascribe it to Decree but does his best to 
actualize it by following human nature.538 This indicates self-reflection is a way of self-cultivation; 
‘The man of virtue steeps himself in the Way because he wishes to find it in himself. When he finds it 
in himself, he will be at ease in it; when he is at ease in it, he can draw deeply upon it; when he can 
draw deeply upon it, he finds its source wherever he turns. That is why the man of virtue wishes to find 
the Way in himself.’539 His self-cultivation through self-reflection is based on his human nature theory. 
Of course, at his time, not everyone agreed with his opinion. For example, Kao Tzu who insists ‘Man's 
nature is neither good nor bad’ argued that to make morality out of human nature is like making cups 
                                           
intuitionism into the foundations of the Confucian tradition. Ivanhoe suggests that a key part of Mencius's 
originality in the Western sense lies in his fusion of virtue ethics and the notion of an innate moral sense. Ivanhoe 
describes Confucius as a traditionalist holding an undeveloped form of virtue ethics, and Mencius as a virtue 
ethicist adhering to moral intuitionism and ethical naturalism. On the other hand, Wang is described the one who 
holds a form of moral intuitionism but drops Confucius and Mencius’ virtue ethics. Hence, Ivanhoe presents the 
thought of Confucius and Mencius is more contributable to the revival of virtue ethics than that of Wang. Philip 
J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming, 2nd ed (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2002), 1, 4, 12, 11, 12, 107, 109. 
537Mencius, 7A1. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣。存其心，
養其性，所以事天也。殀壽不貳，修身以俟之，所以立命也。」 
538 Mencius, 7B24. 孟子曰：「口之於味也，目之於色也，耳之於聲也，鼻之於臭也，四肢之於安佚也，
性也，有命焉，君子不謂性也。仁之於父子也，義之於君臣也，禮之於賓主也，智之於賢者也，聖人之
於天道也，命也，有性焉，君子不謂命也。」 




and bowls out of the willow since human nature is like the willow.540 Regarding his argument, Mencius 
replied that ‘If you must do violence and injury to the willow in order to make cups and bowls with it, 
on your principles you must in the same way do violence and injury to humanity in order to fashion 
from it benevolence and righteousness!’541 Thus, he warned Kao Tzu’s theory would lead all men on 
to reckon benevolence and righteousness to be calamities. Along with Kao Tzu, at his time, some 
asserted the nature of some is good, and the nature of others is bad. According to them, it was that under 
such a sovereign as Yao there yet appeared Xiang; that with such a father as Gu Sou there yet appeared 
Shun; and that with Zhou for their sovereign, and the son of their elder brother besides, there were found 
Qi, the viscount of Wei, and the prince Bi Gan.542 Against such assertions, Mencius demonstrates why 
human nature is good as follows:  
 
As far as what is genuinely in him is concerned, a man is capable of becoming good. That is 
what I mean by good. As for his becoming bad, that is not the fault of his native endowment. 
The heart of compassion is possessed by all men alike; likewise the heart of shame, the heart 
of respect, and the heart of right and wrong. The heart of compassion pertains to benevolence, 
the heart of shame to righteousness, the heart of respect to propriety, and the heart of right and 
wrong to wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not infused into us 
from the outside; they are in us originally. And a different view is simply owing to want of 
reflection. Hence it is said, ‘Seek and you will find them. Neglect and you will lose them.’ 
There are cases where one man is twice, five times or countless times better than another man, 
but this is only because there are people who fail to make the best of their native endowment. 
It is said in the Book of Poetry, ‘Heaven in producing mankind, Gave them their various 
faculties and relations with their specific laws. These are the invariable rules of nature for all 
to hold, and all love this admirable virtue.’ Confucius said, ‘The maker of this ode knew 
indeed the principle of our nature!’ We may thus see that every faculty and relation must have 
its law, and since there are invariable rules for all to hold, they consequently love this 
admirable virtue.543 
 
                                           
540 Mencius, 6A6. 告子曰：『性無善無不善也。』 
541 Mencius, 6A1. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「子能順杞柳之性而以為桮棬乎？將戕賊杞柳而後以為
桮棬也？如將戕賊杞柳而以為桮棬，則亦將戕賊人以為仁義與？率天下之人而禍仁義者，必子之言夫！」 
542 Mencius, 6A6. 或曰：『有性善，有性不善；是故以堯為君而有象，以瞽瞍為父而有舜；以紂為兄之
子且以為君，而有微子啟、王子比干。』 








The reason why there are cases where one man is twice, five times or countless times better than another 
man or becoming bad is not the fault of his native endowment. It is because there are people who fail 
to make the best of their native endowment. According to Mencius, human nature is good in that a man 
is capable of becoming good as far as what is genuinely in him is concerned. For example, Mencius 
explains why no man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others is this as follows:  
 
Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. 
He would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces 
of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor 
yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of 
the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, 
whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human and whoever is devoid 
of the heart of right and wrong is not human.544  
 
On the basis of empathy at seeing a child falling into a well, Mencius states:  
 
The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; the heart of shame, of righteousness; the 
heart of courtesy and modesty, of propriety; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom. Man has 
these four germs just as he has four limbs. For a man possessing these four germs to deny his 
own potentialities is for him to cripple himself; for him to deny the potentialities of his prince 
is for him to cripple his prince. If a man is able to develop all these four germs that he possesses, 
it will be like a fire starting up or a spring coming through. When these are fully developed, 
he can tend the whole realm within the Four Seas, but if he fails to develop them, he will not 
be able even to serve his parents.545  
 
Thus, he emphasises the importance of self-reflection in order to find virtues in our mind originally 
such as benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. Theses virtues are not infused from 
outside and universal to all people as he notes that ‘the heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; 
                                           











the heart of shame, of righteousness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of propriety; the heart of right 
and wrong, of wisdom.’546 It is natural for people to love these virtues. If one seeks them through self-
reflection, he can easily find them since he already has them in his mind:  
 
When we get by our seeking and lose by our neglecting - in that case seeking is of use to 
getting, and the things sought for are those which are in ourselves. When the seeking is 
according to the proper course, and the getting is only as appointed - in that case the seeking 
is of no use to getting, and the things sought are without ourselves.547  
 
In this context, Mencius stresses there are no differences between sages and people in finding such 
virtues in mind. For him, sages are those who only apprehended before me that of which my mind 
approves along with other men.548 According to him, all men are capable of becoming a Yao or a 
Shun.549 In this process, the important thing is to make an effort. The cause of failure is simply due to 
not making the effort. Given that the Way of Yao and Shun was simply that of filial piety and fraternal 
duty, one can be a Yao just by wearing the clothes of Yao, repeating the words of Yao, and doing the 
                                           
546 Nuyen offers the importance of innatism in Mencius’ moral education by comparing with that of Aquinas. 
Nuyen presents the key epistemological claim that combines elements of innatism and empiricism as the similarity 
between Mencius and Aquinas. Just as Aquinas speaks of the ‘seeds of knowledge’ implanted in us by God, which 
presumably include the seeds of moral knowledge, Mencius speaks of the ‘four sprouts’ that are naturally 
embedded in a person’s heart-mind (xin). However, while Aquinas takes these seeds to be general concepts and 
principles, Mencius takes them to be the psychological beginnings of the virtues. With the four ‘sprouts’ 
embedded in oneself, a person can discover moral knowledge unaided, as if being taught ‘interiorly’ by God. 
Hence, Mencius stresses the importance of ‘interior’ learning, of seeking within oneself, over being taught by 
others. In speaking of self-cultivation, Mencius means not just the cultivation of the self but also the cultivation 
by the self. The cultivation of the self by the self is the more natural process. Thus, Mencius, according to Nuyen, 
sees much less a need for exterior teaching than Aquinas who advocates the doctrine of original sin and Xunzi 
who believes that human nature is bad. As Mencius’ ‘agricultural metaphor’ shows the importance of self-
cultivation, ‘teaching is more like guiding, encouraging, and setting examples’ rather than the act of intervention. 
External teaching is only required when a person fails to cultivate the sprouts. Still, Mencius believes that the 
sprouts that nature has placed in the human heart-mind are all good and strong and will naturally grow properly, 
given the right cultivation. In spite of the emphasis of innatism, Nuyen argues Mencius attaches greater importance 
to active life than contemplative life in moral education since the ultimate aim of education is social harmony. In 
order to achieve it, rulers themselves should be morally educated in order to govern effectively. Nuyen, ‘Can 
Morality Be Taught? Aquinas and Mencius on Moral Education,’ 108, 109, 111. 
547 Mencius, 7A3. As translated by Legge. 孟子曰：「求則得之，舍則失之，是求有益於得也，求在我者
也。求之有道，得之有命，是求無益於得也，求在外者也。」 
548 Mencius, 6A7. 聖人先得我心之所同然耳。 






actions of Yao. In other words, the Way is like a wide road, so it is not at all difficult to find. The trouble 
with people is simply that they do not seek for it. The weakness of will is the main reason of failure in 
retaking the lost mind.  
 
Human Relationship, Weakness of Will, and Habit  
For Mencius the man of virtue is not a unique being but the one who preserves such virtues in his heart 
as follows;     
 
The man of virtue differs from other men in that he retains his heart. The man of virtue retains 
his heart by means of benevolence and ritual propriety. The benevolent man loves others. The 
man of ritual propriety shows respect to others. He who loves others is constantly loved by 
them. He who respects others is constantly respected by them. Here is a man, who treats me 
in a perverse and unreasonable manner. The man of virtue in such a case will turn round upon 
himself, "I must have been wanting in benevolence; I must have been wanting in ritual 
propriety; how else could such a thing happen to me? When, looking into himself, he finds 
that he has benevolent and propriety, and yet this outrageous treatment continues, then the 
man of virtue will say to himself, “I must have failed to do my best for him.” He turns round 
upon himself, and proceeds to do his utmost, but still the perversity and unreasonableness of 
the other are repeated. On this the man of virtue says, "This is a man utterly lost indeed! Since 
he conducts himself so, what is there to choose between him and an animal? Why should I go 
to contend with an animal?" Thus it is that the man of virtue has a life-long anxiety and not 
one morning's calamity. As to what is matter of anxiety to him, that indeed be has. He says, 
"Shun was a man, and I also am a man. But Shun set an example for the Empire worthy of 
being handed down to posterity, yet here am I, just an ordinary man. That is something worth 
worrying about. And in what way is he anxious about it? Just that he may be like Shun: then 
only will he stop. As to what the man of virtue would feel to be a calamity, there is no such 
thing. He does nothing which is not according to propriety. If there should befall him one 
morning's calamity, the man of virtue does not account it a calamity.550 
 
 
Here, self-reflection not only is internal but also concerns human relationships. The man of virtue who 
treats others in benevolence and ritual propriety might face a man whose behaviour is in a perverse and 
                                           









unreasonable manner. Before regarding him as a man like an animal, at first the man of virtue examines 
himself through self-reflection in order to inspect whether he is benevolent and courteous:  
 
If a man love others, and no responsive attachment is shown to him, let him turn inwards and 
examine his own benevolence. If he is trying to rule others, and his government is 
unsuccessful, let him turn inwards and examine his wisdom. If he treats others politely, and 
they do not return his politeness, let him turn inwards and examine his own respect. When we 
do not, by what we do, realise what we desire, we must turn inwards, and examine ourselves 
in every point. When a man's person is correct, the whole kingdom will turn to him with 
recognition and submission.551  
 
This is the process of self-reflection. Hence, Mencius notes that ‘all things are already complete in us. 
There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on self-reflection. If one acts with a vigorous 
effort at the law of reciprocity, when he seeks for the realisation of benevolence, nothing can be closer 
than his approximation to it.’552 Furthermore, Mencius argues such difficulty raised in spite of his 
benevolent and courteous behaviour cannot make the man of virtue anxious in the process of self-
reflection. Rather, the man of virtue has perennial worries such as how to imitate Shun while he has no 
unexpected vexations. He asserts one can overcome anxiety by imitating Shun. For the man of virtue, 
the important thing is just to live according to benevolence and propriety which are already embedded 
in his mind. 
Nevertheless, to put into practice benevolence, as Mencius points out, often seems to be hard due to 
the weakness of will. For instance, when the king Xuan of Qi saw an ox going to consecrate a bell with 
its blood, he could not bear its frightened appearance, as if it were an innocent person going to the place 
of death. Instead, he ordered to change it into a sheep. Regarding it, Mencius assessed his conduct was 
an artifice of benevolence and his heart seen in this is sufficient to carry you to the royal sway.553 This 
                                           
551 Mencius, 4A4. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「愛人不親反其仁，治人不治反其智，禮人不答反其敬
。行有不得者，皆反求諸己，其身正而天下歸之。《詩》云：『永言配命，自求多福。』」 
552 Mencius, 7A4. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「萬物皆備於我矣。反身而誠，樂莫大焉。強恕而行，
求仁莫近焉。」 






indicates that the king already has benevolence in his heart. However, even though his kindness is 
sufficient to reach to animals, no benefits are extended from it to the people. Just as the feather is not 
lifted because strength is not used, it is because he does not employ kindness for protecting and loving 
his people, not because you are not able to do it. Extending benevolence is easy like breaking off a 
branch from a tree. In this context, Mencius states that ‘treat with the reverence due to age the elders in 
your own family, so that the elders in the families of others shall be similarly treated; treat with the 
kindness due to youth the young in your own family, so that the young in the families of others shall be 
similarly treated - do this, and the kingdom may be made to go round in your palm.’554 This implies 
that he is greatly interested in the methods of extending virtues. Hence, Mencius explains benevolence 
and righteousness in the dimension of extending what one already has as follows:  
 
All men have some things which they cannot bear; extend that feeling to what they can bear, 
and benevolence will be the result. All men have some things which they will not do; extend 
that feeling to the things which they do, and righteousness will be the result. If a man can give 
full development to the feeling which makes him shrink from injuring others, his benevolence 
will be more than can be called into practice. If he can give full development to the feeling 
which refuses to break through, or jump over, a wall, his righteousness will be more than can 
be called into practice. If he can give full development to the real feeling of dislike with which 
he receives the salutation, ‘Thou,’ ‘Thou,’ he will act righteously in all places and 
circumstances.555 
 
This passage demonstrates that benevolence and righteousness are the result of extending the feeling of 
what cannot bear and awareness of what should not do respectively. 556 For Mencius, these feelings are 
                                           
臣固知王之不忍也。」 … 曰：「無傷也，是乃仁術也，見牛未見羊也。君子之於禽獸也，見其生，不
忍見其死；聞其聲，不忍食其肉。是以君子遠庖廚也。」 





555 Mencius, 7B31. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「人皆有所不忍，達之於其所忍，仁也；人皆有所不
為，達之於其所為，義也。人能充無欲害人之心，而仁不可勝用也；人能充無穿踰之心，而義不可勝用
也。人能充無受爾汝之實，無所往而不為義也。」 
556 Liu proposes and defends a human-nature-based moral sensibility theory by combining Hume’s theory of 
sympathy and Mencius’ way of moral self-cultivation. According to Liu, Mencius’ idea that humans innately 
incline to compassion, which develops through cultivation into the virtue of humanity (仁) resembles Hume’s 
discussions of sympathy and humanity. In spite of this similarity, Liu points out Hume failed to elaborate on three 
important theses: Humanity is the unity of the virtues; in order to move from sympathy to humanity, self-
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already embedded in heart, so one can extend to others by fully developing them. Hence, he highlights 
the importance of preserving what one already has as follows:  
  
The trees of the Niu mountain were once beautiful. Being situated, however, in the borders of 
a large State, they were hewn down with axes and bills - and could they retain their beauty? 
Still through the activity of the vegetative life day and night, and the nourishing influence of 
the rain and dew, they were not without buds and sprouts springing forth, but then came the 
cattle and goats and browsed upon them. To these things is owing the bare and stripped 
appearance of the mountain, and when people now see it, they think it was never finely 
wooded. But is this the nature of the mountain? And so also of what properly belongs to man; 
shall it be said that the mind of any man was without benevolence and righteousness? The 
way in which a man loses his proper goodness of mind is like the way in which the trees are 
denuded by axes and bills. Hewn down day after day, can it - the mind - retain its beauty? But 
there is a development of its life day and night, and in the calm air of the morning, just between 
night and day, the mind feels in a degree those desires and aversions which are proper to 
humanity, but the feeling is not strong, and it is fettered and destroyed by what takes place 
during the day. This fettering taking place again and again, the restorative influence of the 
night is not sufficient to preserve the proper goodness of the mind; and when this proves 
insufficient for that purpose, the nature becomes not much different from that of the irrational 
animals, and when people now see it, they think that it never had those powers which I assert. 
But does this condition represent the feelings proper to humanity? Therefore, if it receives its 
proper nourishment, there is nothing which will not grow. If it loses its proper nourishment, 
there is nothing which will not decay away. Confucius said, ‘Hold it fast, and it remains with 
you. Let it go, and you lose it. Its outgoing and incoming cannot be defined as to time or place.’ 
It is the mind of which this is said!557 
 
                                           
cultivation is absolutely necessary; and sympathy is the ground of all characteristically human feelings. Hence, 
Liu thinks Mencius’ philosophy helpfully complements Hume’s picture in that Mencius gives more explicit 
discussion of how humanity underlies and unifies the other virtues, how humanity is cultivated, and how sympathy 
is the essential human feeling which gives rise to all other characteristically human feelings. For Mencius, ren is 
different from the Christian concept of love, agape which is rooted in the transcendent idea of God. Rather, Ren 
which is rooted in the constitution of the mind starts from a family setting. In particular, Liu expounds about how 
Mencius’ ren can be actualized through self-cultivation. According to Liu, for Mencius ‘self-cultivation aims at 
two things: (a) to protect and nurture the characteristically human dispositions and tendencies; (b) to limit and 
regulate material desires and to conquer those that are harmful. Mencius claims that all human beings to some 
degree possess the characteristically human tendencies and dispositions.’ In order to achieve these goals, Mencius 
offers extending (tui, 推) and self-reflecting. Additionally, Liu proposes an interpretation of Mencius’ internalism 
in connection with motivation, human nature, and moral recognition, which, Liu argues, brings new insight to the 
ongoing internalism/externalism debate. Xiusheng Liu, Mencius, Hume and the Foundations of Ethics (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2003), 11, 49, 67, 68, 165.    









It is noticeable that Mencius thought the way in which a man loses his proper goodness of mind is 
similar to the way in which the trees are denuded by axes and bills. This shows not only the relation 
between self-cultivation and environment but also how important habit is in the process of self-
reflection for preserving goodness in heart.558 In other words, it is necessary to provide continuous 
nourishment to grow goodness in heart. According to Mencius, ‘the hungry think any food sweet, and 
the thirsty think the same of any drink, and thus they do not get the right taste of what they eat and drink. 
The hunger and thirst, in fact, injure their palate. And is it only the mouth and belly which are injured 
by hunger and thirst? Men's minds are also injured by them. If a man can prevent the evils of hunger 
and thirst from being any evils to his mind, he need not have any sorrow about not being equal to other 
men.’559 Hence, he states that ‘there are the footpaths along the hills; if suddenly they be used, they 
become roads; and if, as suddenly they are not used, the wild grass fills them up. Now, the wild grass 
fills up your mind.’560 For example, Mencius presents how to nourish courage in our mind through 
habit based on repetition as follows:   
 
Mencius told him, 'I understand words. I am skillful in nourishing my vast, flowing passion-
nature.' Chou pursued, 'I venture to ask what you mean by your vast, flowing passion-nature!' 
The reply was, 'It is difficult to describe it. This is the passion-nature: It is exceedingly great, 
and exceedingly strong. Being nourished by rectitude, and sustaining no injury, it fills up all 
between heaven and earth. This is the passion-nature: It is the mate and assistant of 
righteousness and reason. Without it, man is in a state of starvation. It is produced by the 
accumulation of righteous deeds; it is not to be obtained by incidental acts of righteousness. 
If the mind does not feel complacency in the conduct, the nature becomes starved.561  
 
The passion-nature which is can be regarded as courage cannot be obtained by incidental acts of 
righteousness but can be produced by the accumulation of righteous deeds in support of rectitude and 
                                           
558 Prasenjit Duara, The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and a Sustainable Future (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University, 2015), 2.   
559 Mencius, 7A27. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「飢者甘食，渴者甘飲，是未得飲食之正也，飢渴害
之也。豈惟口腹有飢渴之害？人心亦皆有害。人能無以飢渴之害為心害，則不及人不為憂矣。」 
560 Mencius, 7B21. As translated in Legge. 孟子謂高子曰：「山徑之蹊閒，介然用之而成路。為閒不用，
則茅塞之矣。今茅塞子之心矣。」 





no injury to mind. What kinds of injury does Mencius concern about? He suggests supposing that there 
was a man who was grieved that his growing corn was not longer, and so he pulled it up.562 Having 
done this, he returned home, looking very stupid, and said to his people, ‘I am tired today. I have been 
helping the corn to grow long.’ His son ran to look at it, and found the corn all withered. Pulling out his 
corn symbolises incidental acts. This just injures the passion-nature. Likewise, Mencius offers the 
importance of habit in nourishing benevolence; ‘The case of one of the present princes wishing to 
become sovereign is like the having to seek for mugwort three years old, to cure a seven years' sickness. 
If it has not been kept in store, the patient may all his life not get it. If one does not aim steadfastly at 
benevolence, one will suffer worry and disgrace all one’s life and end in the snare of death.’563 Why 
did he stress to aim steadfastly at benevolence? According to him, even though one plays chess which 
is a small art, one ought to give one’s whole mind to it in order to master it. He suggests supposing two 
men are taught by the best chess-player in all the kingdom.564 The one gives to the subject his whole 
mind and bends to it all his will, doing nothing but listening to him. The other, although he seems to be 
listening to him, has his whole mind running on a swan which he thinks is approaching, and wishes to 
bend his bow, adjust the string to the arrow, and shoot it. Mencius expects he does not come up to him 
although he is learning along with the other. Mencius insists that this is not due to the difference of 
intelligence. In other words, habitual self-reflection is the pivotal point in seeking for the lost mind. It 
is because ‘the student who has set his mind on the doctrines of the sage does not advance to them but 
by completing one lesson after another.’565 This is like digging a well since to dig the well to a depth 
                                           




563 Mencius, 4A9. As translated in Legge. 猶七年之病求三年之艾也。苟為不畜，終身不得。苟不志於仁，
終身憂辱，以陷於死亡。 




565 Mencius, 7A24. 君子之志於道也，不成章不達。 
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of seventy-two cubits, and stop without reaching the spring is just an abandoned well.566 To be sure, 
Mencius warns the peril of habit without self-reflection; ‘To act without understanding, and to do so 
habitually without examination, pursuing the proper path all the life without knowing its nature - this is 
the way of multitudes.’567 
 
Suffering, Patience, and Man of Virtue 
Above all, Mencius presents that the habitual self-reflection could enhance the man of virtue’s faith on 
the Way.568 When the Way disappears from the kingdom, the man of virtue does not hesitate to sacrifice 
his life in order to protect it.569 In other words, the courageous minister cultivated by self-reflection 
does not afraid of losing his head. 570  For Mencius, the man of virtue is the one who preserves 
righteousness even in suffering as follows:      
 
I like fish, and I also like bear's paws. If I cannot have the two together, I will let the fish go, 
and take the bear's paws. So, I like life, and I also like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two 
together, I will let life go, and choose righteousness. I like life indeed, but there is that which 
I like more than life, and therefore, I will not seek to possess it by any improper ways. I dislike 
death indeed, but there is that which I dislike more than death, and therefore there are 
occasions when I will not avoid suffering. If among the things which man likes there were 
nothing which he liked more than life, why should he not use every means by which he could 
preserve it? If among the things which man dislikes there were nothing which he disliked 
more than death, why should he not do everything by which he could avoid suffering? There 
are cases when men by a certain course might preserve life, and they do not employ it; when 
by certain things they might avoid suffering, and they will not do them. Therefore, men have 
that which they like more than life, and that which they dislike more than death. They are not 
men of distinguished talents and virtue only who have this mental nature. All men have it; 
what belongs to such men is simply that they do not lose it.571 
                                           
566 Mencius, 7A29. 孟子曰：「有為者辟若掘井，掘井九軔而不及泉，猶為棄井也。」 
567 Mencius, 7A5. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「行之而不著焉，習矣而不察焉，終身由之而不知其道
者，眾也。」 
568 Mencius, 6B12. 孟子曰：「君子不亮，惡乎執？」 
569 Mencius, 7A42. 孟子曰：「天下有道，以道殉身；天下無道，以身殉道。未聞以道殉乎人者也。」 
570 Mencius, 5B7. 志士不忘在溝壑，勇士不忘喪其元。 









Even though all men have righteousness most of them lose it in suffering. Why does this situation take 
place? According to Mencius, those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; 
those who follow that part which is little are little men. He claims that some parts of the body are noble, 
and some ignoble; some great, and some small. The great must not be injured for the small, nor the 
noble for the ignoble. For Mencius, the small part of body is the senses of hearing and seeing. It is 
because they do not contribute one’s self-reflection, and are obscured by external things. When one 
thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. Hence, Mencius warns a 
man who only eats and drinks will be counted mean by others since he nourishes what is little to the 
neglect of what is great.572 In contrast, Mencius presents that the organ of the mind bestowed by Heaven 
can conduct self-reflection, by which it gets the right view of things. It is noteworthy that Mencius 
describes mind in relation with Heaven. According to him, there are honours such as benevolence, 
righteousness, conscientiousness, truthfulness bestowed by Heaven, and there are honours such as the 
position of a Ducal Minister bestowed by man. Contrary to his time, the men of antiquity cultivated 
their nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man came to them in its train.573 They sought honours 
bestowed by Heaven first since the honours which men confer are not true honours. Given that all men 
have in themselves that which is truly honourable, it is not difficult to find honours bestowed by 
Heaven.574 In this context, Mencius stresses the necessity of self-reflection. For him, the method of 
being great and honour man is to make one’s stand on mind in the first instance instead of the senses of 
hearing and seeing.575  
                                           





573 Mencius, 6A16. 孟子曰：「有天爵者，有人爵者。仁義忠信，樂善不倦，此天爵也；公卿大夫，此
人爵也。古之人修其天爵，而人爵從之。 
574 Mencius, 6A16. 孟子曰：「欲貴者，人之同心也。人人有貴於己者，弗思耳。人之所貴者，非良貴
也。 




Particularly, Mencius makes an emphasis on the importance of patience in the process of self-
reflection in relation with benevolence in order to overcome suffering. Just as the five types of grain are 
the best of plants, yet if they are not ripe they are worse than the wild varieties, the value of benevolence 
depends entirely on its being brought to maturity. 576  Furthermore, he presents that benevolence 
overcomes cruelty just as water overcome fire, so it is impossible to put out a cartload of burning 
firewood with a cupful of water.577 In the process of practicing benevolence against cruelty, self-
reflection needs to be patiently conducted. Mencius shows how helpful suffering is for fostering the 
man of virtue as follows:  
 
Shun rose from the fields. Fu Yue was called to office from the midst of his building frames; 
Jiao Ge from his fish and salt; Guan Yi Wu from the hands of the prison officer; Sun Shu Ao 
from his hiding by the sea-shore; and Bai Li Xi from the market. Thus, when Heaven is about 
to confer a great office on any man, it first exercises his mind with suffering, and his sinews 
and bones with toil. It exposes his body to hunger, and subjects him to extreme poverty. It 
confounds his undertakings. By all these methods it stimulates his mind, hardens his nature, 
and supplies his incompetence. As a rule, men can mend his ways only after he has made 
mistakes. They are distressed in mind and perplexed in their thoughts, and then they arise to 
vigorous reformation. When things have been evidenced in men's looks, and set forth in their 
words, then they understand them. If a prince have not about his court families attached to the 
laws and worthy counsellors, and if abroad there are not hostile States or other external 
calamities, his kingdom will generally come to ruin. From these things we see how life springs 
from sorrow and calamity, and death from ease and pleasure.578 
 
Heaven first exercises one’s mind with sufferings such as poverty when it is going to confer a great 
office on any man. The suffering including physical difficulties makes his character patient and 
improves his ability. In particular, that one can reform his thought after being frustrated in mind 
indicates the critical role of self-reflection. For Mencius, such suffering is an essential course for the 
                                           
而蔽於物，物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者，先立乎
其大者，則其小者弗能奪也。此為大人而已矣。」 
576 Mencius, 6A19. 孟子曰：「五穀者，種之美者也；苟為不熟，不如荑稗。夫仁亦在乎熟之而已矣。」 
577 Mencius, 6A18. 孟子曰：「仁之勝不仁也，猶水勝火。今之為仁者，猶以一杯水，救一車薪之火也；
不熄，則謂之水不勝火，此又與於不仁之甚者也。亦終必亡而已矣。」 







man of virtue. According to Mencius, ‘men who are possessed of intelligent virtue and prudence in 
affairs will generally be found to have been in sickness and sufferings. They are the friendless minister 
and concubine's son, who keep their hearts under a sense of peril, and use deep precautions against 
calamity. On this account they become distinguished for their intelligence.’579 In other words, the man 
of virtue is different from ordinary people. The man of virtue can be content even in suffering and does 
not lose righteousness in poverty since he attends to his own virtue in solitude.580 When he advances 
to dignity, he makes whole kingdom virtuous not by leaving the proper path. In this context, ordinary 
people cannot be expected to understand the behaviour of the man of virtue.581 Suffering makes the 
man of virtue more virtuous.     
 
  
                                           
579 Mencius, 7A18. As translated in Legge. 孟子曰：「人之有德慧術知者，恒存乎疢疾。獨孤臣孽子，其
操心也危，其慮患也深，故達。」 
580 Mencius, 7A9. 曰：「尊德樂義，則可以囂囂矣。故士窮不失義，達不離道。窮不失義，故士得己焉；
達不離道，故民不失望焉。古之人，得志，澤加於民；不得志，脩身見於世。窮則獨善其身，達則兼善
天下。」 
581 Mencius, 6B6. As translated in Legge. 君子之所為，眾人固不識也。 
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Augustine’s Contemplation  
 
Contemplative Ascension  
In antiquity, ‘that God should exist outside the physical cosmos’ and ‘that the soul might come to 
perceive ultimate reality through spiritual reflection and recover its roots beyond space and time’ were 
challenging conceptions.582 With regard to this matter, Augustine shows about how to see God as 
follows:  
 
Since, therefore, we must enjoy to the full that truth which lives unchangeably, and since, 
within it, God the Trinity, the author and creator of everything, takes thought for the things 
that he has created, our minds must be purified so that they are able to perceive that light and 
then hold fast to it. Let us consider this process of cleansing as a trek, or a voyage, to our 
homeland; though progress towards the one who is ever present is not made through space, 
but through the cultivation of pure desires and virtuous habits.583  
 
As a way of purifying our minds, Augustine makes an emphasis on cultivating ‘pure desires and virtuous 
habits.’ For him contemplation of things unseen as immediate knowledge of a transcendent God 
discovered within the soul plays an important role in the formation of moral self.584 As he states that 
‘you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you,’ soul’s hungers and thirsts 
can be found real satisfaction only in God.585 He regards contemplation of God as the supreme good 
(Summum Bonum). 586  The rubric under which Augustine above all comprehends the mind’s 
transformative engagement with God is contemplation (contemplatio), and to understand what he means 
by knowledge of God, we must take the significance of contemplation in his thought.587 It is because 
his contemplation was not formed just by abstract consideration. It stemmed from his life. In a very real 
                                           
582  John Peter Kenny, Contemplation and Classical Christianity: A Study in Augustine (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), vi.  
583 doc. Chr. 1.10. cf. Trin. 1.8.17.   
584 John Peter Kenney, The Mysticism of Saint Augustine: Rereading the Confessions (London: Routledge, 2005), 
ix.  
585 conf. 1.1.   
586 Trin. 1.13.31.  
587 A. N. Williams, “Contemplation: Knowledge of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate,” in Knowing the Triune God: 
The Work of the Spirit in the Practice of the Church, ed. James J. Buckley & David S. Yeago (Cambridge: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 137.  
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sense, he continually faced relationship between action and contemplation as he struggled to reconcile 
his early and continuing preference for the contemplative life with the many duties surrounding his 
priesthood, and later, his episcopacy.588 In the absence of his enforced ordination and subsequent role 
as ecclesiastical leader, Augustine would seek the peace of a monastic community modeled on his 
Cassiciacum experience, but a growing sense of responsibility to the temporal needs of his congregation 
contributed to a balancing of contemplation and action in Augustine’s writings and life.589 
Particularly, the matter of essence of contemplation has been a heated issue in the discussion of 
Augustine’s contemplation. Butler, who regards Augustine as the prince of mystics,590 deals with his 
contemplation under the rubric of mysticism.591 He claims that the beginnings of his conversion to 
Christianity derive from the fact that in 385 some books of the Neo-Platonists came into his hands and 
greatly impressed him , so that from that time onward he accepted the main principles of the neo-
Platonic philosophy, and his whole intellectual outlook, his mysticism included, was coloured by it to 
the end.592 In this aspect, he explains Augustine’s contemplation in a process of purification in that ‘the 
indispensable condition of contemplation is such a purification of the soul as will render it fit for the 
ascent to the contemplation of God: a purification which is the result of a long process of self-denial 
and self-conquest, of mortification and the practice of virtue.’593 Burnaby insists upon Augustine’s 
view of contemplation as the task of all Christians, not only those who have reached extraordinary 
heights in prayer.594 Nash views reason in Augustine’s thought as the contemplation of the truth.595 
Stalnaker regards Augustine’s contemplation as just one of three main types of prayer.596 For him, 
                                           
588 N. Joseph Torchia, “Contemplation and Action,” in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan 
D. Fitzgerald (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 235.  
589 Torchia, “Contemplation and Action,” 235.  
590  Dom Cuthbert Butler, Western Mysticism: The Teachings of SS Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard on 
Contemplation and the Contemplative life: Neglected Chapters in the History of Religion (London: Constable, 
1922), 24. 
591 Butler, Western Mysticism, 26.  
592 Butler, Western Mysticism, 23.  
593 Butler, Western Mysticism, 36.  
594 John Burnaby, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), 61, 
64.  
595 Nash, The Light of the Mind, 64 
596 Stalnaker, Overcoming Our Evil, 227.  
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prayer consists of petitionary, confessional, and contemplation. However, for Augustine contemplation, 
as Williams demonstrates, is not an advanced form of prayer.597 According to Williams, contemplation 
is clearly not construed as a form of wordless prayer practised by the spiritually adept. Williams 
demonstrates that such modern associations of contemplation with advanced forms of prayer led to 
missing significant aspect of contemplation. He stresses that for Augustine contemplation is equated 
with wisdom and he uses wisdom to denote knowledge of God;598 ‘contemplation of eternal things… 
is ascribed to wisdom. … wisdom belongs to contemplation.’599 This wisdom is about eternal things, 
not knowledge of temporal matter. Augustine’s wisdom corresponds to knowledge of God. He 
understands contemplation in the dimension of a binding of the mind to God.600 
Augustine’s understanding of contemplation is based on his depiction of human nature as a 
substantial unity of soul and body, the inner and outer aspects of the person, respectively.601 For 
Augustine, purification is prerequisite in order to have knowledge of God. Augustine’s initial 
deliberations on contemplation reveal an emphasis on the importance of individual effort in purifying 
the soul and attuning the mind to God.602 It is because man’s supreme good is not the supreme good of 
the body alone, but the supreme good of the soul.603 As Augustine demonstrates that ‘order is what 
leads us to God,’ he emphasises the importance of orderly progression from one step to the next step.604 
In De quantitte animae, the sequence of these steps sets out.605 The first degree of the soul is animation 
(animatio). The activity of the soul as the vegetative stage is directed towards the nutrition, growth and 
reproduction of the body; ‘The soul by its presence gives life to this mortal and earthy body; it brings 
the body together into a unity and keeps it in unity; it prevents the body from breaking up and wasting 
                                           
597 Williams, “Contemplation: Knowledge of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate,” 137.  
598 Williams, “Contemplation: Knowledge of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate,” 138.  
599 Trin. 12. 22.  
600 Williams, “Contemplation: Knowledge of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate,” 138.  
601 Torchia, “Contemplation and Action,” 233. Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: the Legacy 
of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10. 
602 Torchia, “Contemplation and Action,” 234.  
603 mor. 1.5.7.   
604 ord. 1.9.27. trans. Silvano Borruso (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007). Hereafter I use this translation. 
605 quant. 33.70-76. trans. John J. McMahon in the Fathers of the Church, vol. 4 (Washington: The Catholic 
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away; it regulates the proper distribution of nourishment throughout the parts of the body, giving each 
its due share; it preserves the apt arrangement and proportion of the body, not only to delight the eye 
but to grow and generate. But, these powers are easily seen to be the common possession of men and 
plants. For, we say of them, too, that they live; we see and acknowledge that every one of them in its 
own way is preserved and nourished, grow and germinates.’606 The second degree of the soul is sense 
perception (sensus). The soul applies itself to the sense of touch, through which it feels and distinguishes 
hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, light and heavy. Then it distinguishes between 
unnumbered differences of taste and smell and sound and shapes, by tasting, smelling, hearing and 
seeing. Then it distinguishes between unnumbered differences of taste and smell and sound, and shapes, 
by tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing. It comes to know what suits the nature of its body.607 This is 
the stage of habit formation, which man shares with the animals. The third degree of the soul is the 
stage of art (ars). The activity of the soul is directed to understanding the natural world and the ways in 
which its materials are used by man to serve his needs. Augustine shows evidences for it such as many 
arts of craftsmen, the building of cities, the inventions of so many signs in letters, words, gesture, and 
paintings, languages, the great number of books and similar documents for preserving memory, and 
music. However, he argues that ‘this heritage, common to all rational souls, is shared in by the learned 
and the unlearned, by the good and the wicked.’608 The fourth degree of the soul is the stage of moral 
goodness (virtus).609 From this grade the soul commences to direct its attention toward itself by striving 
to gain its rightful mastery over own body and material world.610 It leads to purifying itself from the 
dominance of false values and develops a more humane outlook. The fifth degree of the soul is 
tranquility (tranquillitas). The soul is freed from all disease and cleansed of all its stains, and then finally 
it possesses itself in all joy and is not disturbed at all for any reason of its own.611 This is the stage of 
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self-purification; ‘It advances toward God that is, to the contemplation of Truth itself, that Truth, the 
highest and most hidden reward for all the labour it has exerted.’612 The six degree of the soul is advance 
(ingressio). This activity is ‘the soul’s highest vision.’ 613  The seventh degree of the soul is 
contemplation (contemplatio). This is not only the last step but also ‘a dwelling place’ to which the 
previous steps have brought us.614 In this step, soul perceives it supreme good and rejoices in the 
knowledge of it by distinguishing vanity and truth. Even though all visible things seem to be marvelous, 
they are nothing in comparison with the unseen realities. In obedience to the divine law corporeal nature 
undergoes so many changes and vicissitudes. ‘In the contemplation of truth, no matter from what side 
we study it, so great is the joy, so great the purity, the sincerity, and the certainty of faith that one at 
length comes to think that the previous knowledge he thought he is really nothing. Then death, which 
was an object of fear and an obstacle to the soul’s fullest union with the full truth, death, namely, the 
sheer flight and escape from this body, is now yearned for as the greatest boon.’615 In Augustinian 
contemplation, it is also necessary to recognise his contemplation is always a gift from above, for 
humans are unable to come to such an understanding without divine aid. 616 These seven steps can be 
named also in this way: ‘of the body; through the body; about the body; toward itself; in itself; toward 
God; in God.’617 Soul’s force and power are great in that nothing is nearer to God among all the things 
God created than the human soul.618 According to Augustine, reason insists that a single soul is of far 
greater value than all material things, if only lovers of the truth will dare to pursue with unfaltering and 
respectful steps the path the soul points out, a path that is hard because it lies the well-worn road of 
common experience.619 God who alone is the maker of soul is alone to be adored and worshiped by 
soul.620  
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Contemplative Souls at Ostia  
According to Augustine, contemplation must rely upon the mediation of the ideas as the intelligible 
expressions of divine truth in the present life.621 It is required to distinguish such an imperfect mode of 
contemplation from the pure, unimpeded vision of God reserved for the life to come.622 At best, the 
soul can enjoy only a sporadic knowledge of true being. In this regard, Augustine frequently explains 
the act of contemplation in the dimension of mystical experiences.623 Given that Augustine regards 
contemplation as the practice of transcendence for the interior access of the soul to God, his most 
famous account of contemplation must be situated the vision at Ostia in Confessions IX, which is 
following Augustine’s baptism. It shows a vivid and consistent account of Augustine’s efforts to engage 
in the practice of contemplation. The theological purpose of the Ostian narrative is to demonstrate 
exactly what salvific value can be discovered through contemplation, and how deeply the baptised soul 
can reach into eternity.624 Through it, where Platonism succeeds and where it fails are revealed in the 
dimension of its cognitive value and its salvific inadequacy. According to Augustine, Platonism 
provides knowledge of God, but not salvation. The mystical experience at Ostia is presented in two 
initial sections, 23 and 24, followed by a further meditation in section 25 on the significance of the 
ascension. Here is the text of the first two narrative sections as follows:  
 
Not long before the day on which she was to leave this life – you knew which day it was to 
be, O Lord, though we did not – my mother and I were alone, leaning from a window which 
overlooked the garden in the courtyard of the house where we were staying at Ostia. We were 
waiting there after our long and tiring journey, away from the crowd, to refresh ourselves 
before our sea-voyage. I believe that what I am going to tell happened through the secret 
working of your providence. For we were talking alone together and our conversation was 
serene and joyful. We had forgotten what we had left behind and were intent on what lay 
before us (Phil. 3:13). In the presence of Truth, which is yourself, we were wondering what 
the eternal life of the saints would be like, that life which no eye has seen, no ear has heard, 
no human heart conceived (1 Cor. 2:9). But we laid the lips of our hearts to the heavenly 
stream that flows from your fountain, the source of all life which is in you (Ps. 35:10), so that 
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as far as it was in our power to do so we might be sprinkled with its waters and in some sense 
reach an understanding of this great mystery. Our conversation led us to the conclusion that 
no bodily pleasure, however great it might be and whatever earthly light might shed lustre 
upon it, was worthy of comparison, or even of mention, beside the happiness of the life of the 
saints. As the flame of love burned stronger in us and raised us higher towards the eternal God, 
our thoughts ranged over the whole compass of material things in their various degrees, up to 
the heavens themselves, from which the sun and the moon and the stars shine down upon the 
earth. Higher still we climbed, thinking and speaking all the while in wonder at all that you 
have made. At length we came to our own souls and passed beyond them to that place of 
everlasting plenty, where you feed Israel for ever with the food of truth. There life is that 
Wisdom by which all these things that we know are made, all things that ever have been and 
all that are yet to be. But that Wisdom is not made: it is as it has always been and as it will be 
for ever – or, rather, I should not say that it has been or will be, for it simply is, because eternity 
is not in the past or in the future. And while we spoke of the eternal Wisdom, longing for it 
and straining for it with all the strength of our hearts, for one fleeting instant we reached out 
and touched it. Then with a sigh, leaving our spiritual harvest bound to it (Rom 8:23), we 
returned to the sound of our own speech, in which each word has a beginning and an ending 
– far, far different from your Word, our Lord, who abides in himself for ever, yet never grows 
old and gives new life to all things.625 
 
The text begins with the dramatic announcement of its poignant context.626 This conversation between 
Augustine and Monica took place in Ostia just a fortnight before her death. Augustine sketches the 
garden scene in the hope of Monica’s heavenly future. He surmises her future salvation and devises his 
setting accordingly. They converse about the eternal life of the saints, establishing a dialogue which 
frames the ascension narrative, one that is superseded only at the apex of contemplation. This narrative 
is, as Kenny argues, a Christian explanation of contemplation, not a Plotinian one.627 The vision at 
Ostia is a Christian experience rather than a philosophical one. In the Ostian narrative, scriptural texts 
are effective in securing a deeper Christian resonance. Augustine’s points are developed both by the 
force of the passage’s explicit autobiographical details and by the continued use of imbedded scriptural 
references, particularly Pauline ones. In the passage, Augustine and Monica’s discussion introduced by 
Philippians 3:13, a resurrection text. This Pauline references serves to secure a specifically Christian 
outlook on this episode by focusing on its Christ centric character. Not only does it provoke Monica’s 
aspiration for resurrection to Christian reader, it also gives a forceful sanction for Augustine’s 
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pilgrimage.628 In order to gain Christ, he gives up ambition, marriage, and sexuality. Adapting Paul’s 
rejection of legal righteousness to his own ends, Augustine describes himself as seeking God, not 
through the willed perfection of Platonic philosophy, but through the power of Christ. Furthermore, 
through discussion by Monica and Augustine the promise of a higher Christian wisdom, superior to that 
of the pagans, is presented by the use of 1 Corinthians 2:9. Their conversation pertains to eternal life of 
the saints and attempt to reflect on this eternal life. Spiritual truths are obtainable only to those who 
possess the Spirit who alone can search for the depths of God. Because the Spirit comes upon them at 
Ostia, mother and son will know each other’s inner thoughts and achieve for a moment the mutual 
lucidity of the saints. Augustine then demonstrates a formal pattern of ascent: the bodily senses, 
corporeal objects, the heavens, the mind, and Divine Wisdom.629 The pilgrim souls begin with the levels 
of temporal existence. In the last level, the souls return upon completion of the ascent as the stage of 
internal reflection, dialogue, and reflection upon empirical knowledge. At Ostia the contemplative souls 
ascend from discursive reasoning directly into eternity and divine wisdom, so that they transcend their 
own minds and move beyond the temporal self. God rarely grants humans mystical experience, but it is 
not impossible. As Augustine said that humans touched divine wisdom in some small degree by a 
moment of total concentration of the heart, contact with divine wisdom is a matter of the moral self. As 
Augustine mentions from Romans 8 that the contemplative souls sigh and leave behind the first fruit of 
the Spirit, for him contemplation is inherently eschatological unlike Plotinus.630 Contemplation is 
momentary insight and glimpse from a fallen world through an aperture opened by the grace of Christ 
emergent within the soul. The contemplative soul cannot discover its real self within eternal wisdom, 
but only be an exercise in hope. Eschatological hope is not realised by the embodied soul, but only be 
actualized after death. Even though Monica and Augustine achieve in contemplation an initial hold on 
wisdom, and discover their place of hope, their true place within the divine wisdom, this option cannot 
be exercised until the soul has followed Christ into both death and resurrection.631 Augustine then 
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reflects upon the ascension that he and Monica experienced at 25 as follows:     
 
And so our discussion went on. Suppose, we said, that the tumult of a man's flesh were to 
cease and all that his thoughts can conceive, of earth, of water, and of air, should no longer 
speak to him; suppose that the heavens and even his own soul were silent, no longer thinking 
of itself but passing beyond; suppose that his dreams and the visions of his imagination spoke 
no more and that every tongue and every sign and all that is transient grew silent – for all these 
things have the same message to tell, if only we can hear it, and their message is this: We did 
not make ourselves, but he who abides for ever made us (Ps. 79:3, 5). Suppose, we said, that 
after giving us this message and bidding us listen to him who made them, they fell silent and 
he alone should speak to us, not through them but in his own voice, so that we should hear 
him speaking, not by any tongue of the flesh or by an angel's voice, not in the sound of thunder 
or in some veiled parable, but in his own voice, the voice of the one whom we love in all these 
created things; suppose that we heard him himself, with none of these things between 
ourselves and him, just as in that brief moment my mother and I had reached out in thought 
and touched the eternal Wisdom which abides over all things; suppose that this state were to 
continue and all other visions of things inferior were to be removed, so that this single vision 
entranced and absorbed the one who beheld it and enveloped him in inward joys in such a 
way that for him life was eternally the same as that instant of understanding for which we had 
longed so much – would not this be what we are to understand by the words Come and share 
the joy of your Lord (Matt. 25:21)?1 But when is it to be? Is it to be when we all rise again, 
but not all of us will undergo the change (1 Cor 15:51)?632 
 
According to this section 25, there are two sorts of voices such as that of creatures and that of the 
creator.633 The text contrasts mediated reports about Wisdom, whether through human, angelic, or 
symbolic form of representation, with direct encounter. In contemplation, the soul closes the gap of its 
separation from God. The contemplative souls at Ostia seek to discover the authentic voice of a divine 
being wholly distinct from their souls. The God discerned at Ostia is not just the source of the soul, a 
power like the One distinct from its products. The soul only hears directly the God for which it yearns 
momentarily, and only achieves unmediated contact with him for a limited time. The embodied soul, 
even after baptism and under the direction of divine grace, can only achieve an instance of unmediated 
association. Contemplation is not an act of salvation, so that it cannot accomplish this in our present 
life. By drawing upon a Pauline resurrection text, 1 Corinthians 15:51, Augustine demonstrates the 
limited value of contemplation. This text shows a model of our final state, which is both psychic and 
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corporeal, over against the merely psychic character of the vision at Ostia. Contemplation at Ostia leaves 
the body behind while Christian resurrection does not. Salvation is once again shown to be distinct from 
contemplation. Augustine demonstrates the limit of contemplation when he wrote Confessiones. He 
recognises his utter dependence upon God in both metaphysical and moral terms by rejecting the 
Neoplatonic and Stoic ideals of the autonomous, self-sufficient sage which he embraced in his earliest 
writings. 634  The aftermath of his personal moral struggles and his subsequent conflicts with 
Pelagianism, as Torchia argues, led to developing firm in his conviction of our radical contingency and 
the necessity of grace for our salvation.635 Since from this later perspective only Christ can enable us 
to accomplish what we could never achieve on our own in our sinful condition, the soul’s contemplative 
movement to God must be interpreted as the gift of grace.636  
Unlike the ascent of Book Seven of Confessions, the vision at Ostia allows the pilgrim souls to find 
happiness with God in anticipation of their final state of eternal association with him. However, despite 
enjoying this vision at Ostia, Monica’s soul in need of redemption. In this context, Augustine prays after 
her death.637 For Augustine contemplation is transformed into a double-edged recognition of the certain 
existence of transcendent Wisdom together with the soul’s tragic loss and fall. Contemplation secures 
the transcendental hope of the soul at the expense of its equanimity.638  
 
Contemplation of Scripture  
Augustine’s contemplation is contemplation of scripture to be closer to divine wisdom. His exegesis of 
the scriptural accounts of contemplation is inextricably related to the matter of action. He perceives a 
real tension between the active and contemplative ways of life. Augustine’s exegeses on action and 
contemplation as ways of life are grounded upon three pairs of contrastive figures: Martha and Mary, 
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Leah and Rachel, and Peter and John.639 Mary, Rachel, and John who devote to religious contemplation 
seeks fulfillment in prayer or intellectual endeavors while Martha, Leah, and Peter who emphasise 
active ministry commit to the performance of charitable works of mercy.640 The active life symbolised 
by Martha, Leah, and Peter provides paradigms of temporal existence, while Mary, Rachel, and John 
point to the peace and stability of eternal life and an unimpeded devotion to God.641 
By drawing upon Luke 10:38, Augustine describes the matter of action and contemplation in Martha 
and Mary.642 When Jesus was invited by a religious woman Martha into her house, she was occupied 
in the care of serving in contrast to her sister Mary who was sitting at the Lord's Feet, and hearing His 
Word. Martha was busy and giving out but Mary was still and was being filled. Hence, Martha appealed 
to the Lord, and complained of her sister, for she did not help her in her labour. But the Lord answered 
Martha for Mary; and He became her Advocate, who had been appealed to as Judge. Jesus said that 
Martha occupied about many things, when one thing is necessary. Mary has chosen the better part, 
which shall not be taken from her. Mary was intent on the sweetness of the Lord's word. Martha was 
intent, how she might feed the Lord; Mary intent how she might be fed by the Lord. By Martha a feast 
was being prepared for the Lord, in whose feast Mary was even now delighting herself. As Mary then 
was listening with sweet pleasure to Jesus’ most sweet word, and was feeding with the most earnest 
affection, when the Lord was appealed to by her sister. For by a wondrous sweetness was she held; a 
sweetness of the mind which is doubtless greater than that of the senses. She was excused, she sat in 
greater confidence. In this context, Augustine pays attention to how she was excused. According to 
Augustine, Martha is occupied about many things, when one thing is needful.643 Mary has chosen the 
better part. Martha did not choose a bad part, but Mary a better. And how better? Martha is about many 
things, while Mary about one thing. One is preferred to many. It is because one does not come from 
many, but many from one: 
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The things which were made, are many, He who made them is One. The heaven, the earth, the 
sea, and all things that in them are, how many are they! Who could enumerate them? Who 
conceive their vast number? Who made all these? God made them all. Behold, they are very 
good. Very good are the things He made; how much better is He who made them!644 
 
What Martha did for Jesus is about mortal flesh. Yet, he is not in it. As Augustine stresses that in the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God, he focuses on what Mary 
was listening to. Jesus did not blame Martha's work, but distinguished between their services. Martha 
is occupied about many things, but one thing is needful. That is why Mary chose this for herself. The 
labour of manifoldness passes away and the love of unity abides. Therefore, what she chose shall not 
be taken from her, but what Martha chose shall be taken away. Hence, Augustine said that Mary is 
already in port, but Martha is still on the sea.645 Through these two women, Augustine shows there are 
two lives; the life present, and the life to come, the life of labour, and the life of quiet, the life of sorrow, 
and the life of blessedness, the life temporal, and the life eternal.646 For Augustine Martha’s life does 
not a wicked one. He thinks that both praiseworthy; the one of labour, the other of ease; neither vicious, 
neither slothful. ‘In Martha was the image of things present, in Mary of things to come. What Martha 
was doing, that we are now; what Mary was doing, that we hope for.’647 
In the Contra Faustum Manicheum written around 400, Augustine’s exegesis on action and 
contemplation is discussed through Leah and Rachel. According to Augustine, the two wives of Jacob 
signify the two lives. They were daughters of the remission of sins of Laban.648 One is loved, the other 
is borne. But she that is borne is the most and the soonest fruitful, that she may be loved, if not for 
herself, at least for her children. The toil of the righteous is especially fruitful in those whom they beget 
for the kingdom of God, by preaching the gospel amid many trials and temptations. Through two lives 
of Leah and Rachel, Augustine shows paradigms of temporal existence and eternal life as follows:  
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Such births result most easily and plentifully from the word of faith, the preaching of Christ 
crucified, which speaks also of His human nature as far as it can be easily understood, so as 
not to hurt the weak eyes of Leah. Rachel, again, with clear eye, is beside herself to God (2 
Corinthians 5:13), and sees in the beginning the Word of God with God, and wishes to bring 
forth, but cannot; for who shall declare His generation? So the life devoted to contemplation, 
in order to see with no feeble mental eye things invisible to flesh, but understood by the things 
that are made, and to discern the ineffable manifestation of the eternal power and divinity of 
God, seeks leisure from all occupation, and is therefore barren. In this habit of retirement, 
where the fire of meditation burns bright, there is a want of sympathy with human weakness, 
and with the need men have of our help in their calamities. This life also burns with the desire 
for children (for it wishes to teach what it knows, and not to go with the corruption of envy), 
and sees its sister-life fully occupied with work and with bringing forth; and it grieves that 
men run after that virtue which cares for their wants and weaknesses, instead of that which 
has a divine imperishable lesson to impart. This is what is meant when it is said, "Rachel 
envied her sister." (Genesis 30:1) Moreover, as the pure intellectual perception of that which 
is not matter, and so is not the object of the bodily sense, cannot be expressed in words which 
spring from the flesh, the doctrine of wisdom prefers to get some lodging for divine truth in 
the mind by whatever material figures and illustrations occur, rather than to give up teaching 
these things; and thus Rachel preferred that her husband should have children by her handmaid, 
rather than that she should be without any children. Bilhah, the name of her handmaid, is said 
to mean old; and so, even when we speak of the spiritual and unchangeable nature of God, 
ideas are suggested relating to the old life of the bodily senses.649 
 
Even though all who seek it must be warned that here it will bring no exemption from the ‘toil of 
righteousness’ which is its condition, Augustine thinks of an attainment of wisdom and understanding 
in this life. Augustine insists that the same thing happens constantly in the church; ‘In all their labours 
they aim chiefly at this, that their chosen way of life may have greater and wider renown, as having 
supplied the people with such leaders; as Jacob consents to go with Leah, that Rachel may obtain the 
sweet-smelling and good-looking fruit. Rachel, too, in course of time, by the mercy of God, brings forth 
a child herself, but not till after some time; for it seldom happens that there is a sound, though only 
partial, apprehension, without fleshly ideas, of such sacred lessons of wisdom.’650 
In the In Johannis evangelium tractatus, Augustine deals with action and contemplation through 
Peter and John by drawing upon John 21:19-25. He pays attention to why Jesus said to the Apostle Peter, 
‘Follow me,’ when he manifested himself to the disciples a third time but the Apostle John, ‘So I will 
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have him to remain till I come. What is it to you?’ For Augustine, it is interesting that why Jesus loved 
John more when Peter loved the Jesus himself more. John adds this fact that Jesus loved him whenever 
John mentions himself, so that by this sign he might be distinguished from the others.651 According to 
Augustine, ‘the Apostle John was more loved by Christ precisely because he did not take a wife and 
lived most chastely from the beginning of his childhood.’652 Even though this does not appear in 
canonical Scriptures, it aids the appropriateness of this opinion that that life has been signified by him 
where there will be no marriages. According to Augustine, there are two lives as follows: 
 
one in the time of sojourning abroad, the other in a eternity of dwelling; one in toil, the other 
in rest; one in the way, the other in one’s homeland; one in the effort of action, the other in 
the reward of contemplation; one turns aside from evil and does good, the other has not evil 
from which it turns aside and has great good which it is to enjoy; one fights with the enemy, 
the other reigns without the enemy; one is strong in adversity, the other perceives nothing of 
adversity; one reins in carnal lusts, the other is free for spiritual delights; one is anxious with 
a care for conquering, the other is secure in the peace of victory; one is given help in 
temptations, the other rejoices in the Helper himself without any temptation; one comes to the 
aid of the needy, the other is there where it comes upon no one in need; one forgives another’s 
sins that its own may be forgiven it, the other neither suffers what it may forgive nor does 
what it may ask to be forgiven it; one is scourged by evils that it may not be exalted in its 
goods, the other by so great a fullness of grace lacks every evil so that without any temptation 
to pride it adheres to the highest good; one sees the difference between goods and evils, the 
other sees things which are only good; therefore, one is good but still wretched, the other is 
better and happy.653 
 
Augustine perceives a real tension between the active and contemplative ways of life.654 He stresses 
their relationship and interaction rather than viewing them as mutually exclusive. In this regard, he 
considers action the necessary means to contemplation, both now and in the life to come. For example, 
‘we find Christ on earth in the poor in our midst (s. 345.4), and likewise, we secure a place in heaven 
by performing charitable works on their behalf (s. 178.4). Service to those in need, then, is nothing less 
than a means to the contemplation and love of God. For Augustine, each way of life must be permitted 
to flourish, but only in such a way that neither encroaches upon the other’s good. And while he 
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designates contemplation as the better part (melior pars), this does not imply that action is bad, but only 
that it must give way to something more perfect (s. 103.5).’655 For Augustine, the first life is signified 
by the Apostle Peter, that other by John. He regards the Apostle Peter in the effort of action as being 
still wretched, but the Apostle John in the reward of contemplation as being happy. It is because 
corruptible body weighs down the soul.656 In this context, Augustine understands Jesus’ questions as 
follows; ‘Do you follow me through the imitation of enduring temporal evils, let him wait till I come to 
restore everlasting good?’657 He explains this meaning more clearly follows:  
 
Let perfected action follow me, shaped by the example of my passion, but let contemplation 
only begun remain till I come, to be perfected when I come. For the pious plenitude of patience, 
reaching even to death, follow Christ; however, the plentitude of knowledge remains till Christ 
comes, then to be made manifest. For indeed here are tolerated the evils of this world in a land 
of the dying; there will be seen the goods of the Lord in a land of the living. For his words, I 
will have him to remain till I come, must not be understood in such a way as if he said to 
remain behind or to continue to remain, but to wait because what is signified by him will be 
fulfilled, not now, of course, but when Christ comes.658 
 
This indicates that true happiness cannot be achieved in this world in contrast with Mencius who claim 
that one can be perfect by developing virtues bestowed by the Heaven. Such differences derive from 
the understanding of human nature.    
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In this chapter, I highlighted Confucius and Mencius’s self-reflection and Augustine’s contemplation. 
In terms of Confucius’ self-reflection, it is essential in relation to the process of moral learning. Basically, 
Confucius thought study is more important than self-reflection. Particularly, when it comes to the 
essence of self-reflection, it does not indicate abstract and theoretical cogitation. It indicates to keep 
one’s attention engaged with something, often a goal or ideal which one intends to achieve. In contrast 
to Confucius, however, for Mencius self-reflection has great importance in self-cultivation in 
connection with human nature in the formation of moral self. It is because one can retake benevolence 
embedded in his nature through self-reflection. This leads to knowing Heaven. For him, the way to 
serve Heaven is to preserve one’s mental constitution, and nourish one’s nature. Mencius focused on 
the importance of self-reflection in order to find virtues originally in our mind such as benevolence, 
righteousness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. Theses virtues are not infused from outside and universal 
to all people. In this context, Mencius thought there are no differences between sages and people in 
finding such virtues in mind. Likewise, for him the man of virtue is not a unique being but the one who 
preserves such virtues in his heart. Like Confucius, of course, Mencius emphasises the importance of 
habitual self-reflection because it enhances man of virtue’s faith on the Way. In the course, suffering is 
an essential course for the man of virtue in that it makes one’s character patient and improves his ability. 
Unlike Mencius, Augustine thought contemplation in the perspective of purifying our mind. He regards 
contemplation of God as the supreme good. In other words, contemplation is not an advanced form of 
prayer. Contemplation of eternal things is connected with wisdom as knowledge of God, not knowledge 
of temporal matter. Given that his understanding of contemplation drives from his depiction of human 
nature as a substantial unity of soul and body, contemplation is a binding of the mind to God. Above all, 
his contemplation is based on his experience at Ostia. Considering that soul can enjoy only a sporadic 
knowledge of true being, Augustine explained the act of contemplation in connection with mystical 
experiences. Contemplation is momentary insight and glimpse from a fallen world through an aperture 
opened by the grace of Christ emergent within the soul. The contemplative soul cannot discover its real 
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self within eternal wisdom, but only be an exercise in hope. Furthermore, his contemplation is 









In this chapter I will arrange the comparative exegesis of Confucius and Mencius’ ritual propriety (li 
禮) and Augustine’s sacraments including music (yue 樂) as ways for the formation of moral self 
according to internal, communitarian, and transcendental dimensions including Augustine’s sacraments 
and Confucian ritualistic ceremonies. For them, music play an important role in the formation of moral 
self in relation to ritual propriety and sacrament. In this chapter, I first outline Confucius’ account of 
ritual propriety and music. This deals with why he highlights ritual propriety in relation to establishing 
harmonious government and how speech, action, and the mean are interconnected with it. This also 
covers the role of music in the formation of moral self in relation to harmony in the course of achieving 
happiness. And then I begin to show Mencius’ account of ritual propriety and music. This includes how 
his ritual propriety is inextricably related to benevolence and righteousness and why his ritual propriety 
is not anti-utilitarianism by explaining his understanding of shame, government officer, and funeral. 
This also deals with how music is connected with virtues and filial piety in communitarian dimension. 
Lastly, I examine Augustine’s account of the formation of moral self through the sacraments including 
baptism and marriage in ordering the mind toward the love of God rather than self since such sacraments 
are representative rituals in his thought. Additionally, this presents two aspects of music, music as a 
liberal discipline, and immutable truth of music.  
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Confucius’ Ritual Propriety  
 
Returning to Ritual Propriety  
When the Duke Ling of Wei asked Confucius about tactics, Confucius replied ‘I acquired some 
knowledge of the business of sacrificial vessels, but I have never studied military matters’ and then he 
took his departure the next day.659 This indicates his main academic interest was not military matters 
(軍) but ritual propriety. Why did he seek to study ritual rather than tactics? In terms of relation between 
ritual propriety and study, he states that ‘the virtue of man, extensively studying all literatures, and 
keeping himself under the restraint of the requirement of ritual propriety, may thus likewise not overstep 
what is right.’660 For Confucius, moral learning ought to be kept pace with ritual propriety in order to 
follow the Way. For instance, when he was asked about a boy from Que village who was employed by 
Confucius to carry the messages between him and his visitors, Confucius stated that ‘he is the sort of 
person who wants to get results quickly’ since according to his observation ‘he sits in an adult’s place 
and I see that he walks together with his elders.’661 He argued that a person without ritual propriety 
may be not the one who is seeking to make progress in learning. Thus, he stresses to practise ritual 
propriety in accordance with one’s role. When Confucius was inquired about government, he replied 
that ‘there is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is 
father, and the son is son.’662 
Beyond this relation between moral learning and ritual propriety, he explains why ritual propriety is 
pivotal in the matter of how to morally behave;  
 
Respectfulness, without the rules of ritual propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, 
without the rules of ritual propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of ritual 
propriety, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of ritual propriety, 
                                           
659 Analects, 15.1. Translation adapted from Dawson. 衛靈公問陳於孔子。孔子對曰：「俎豆之事，則嘗聞
之矣；軍旅之事，未之學也。」明日遂行。 
660 Analects, 6.27. Translation adapted from Legge. 子曰：「君子博學於文，約之以禮，亦可以弗畔矣夫！」 
661 Analects, 14.44. 闕黨童子將命。或問之曰：「益者與？」子曰：「吾見其居於位也，見其與先生並
行也。非求益者也，欲速成者也。」 
662 Analects, 12.11. As translated in Legge. 齊景公問政於孔子。孔子對曰：「君君，臣臣，父父，子子。」 
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becomes rudeness. When the man of virtue deals sincerely with their kinsfolk, then the people 
are stimulated towards benevolence. When old friends are not neglected, then the people will 
not behave irresponsibly.663  
 
The reason why he emphasises studying ritual propriety along with music is that it is prerequisite to be 
a government officer:  
 
Those who first approached me were rustics as far as ritual propriety and music were 
concerned, and those who approached me afterwards were the man of virtue as far as rites and 
music were concerned. If I put them to use, I follow those who first approached me.664  
 
It is because ritual propriety can make harmony (和) possible in government with the rules of propriety 
as Master You said as follows:  
 
In the practice of the rites harmony is regarded as the most valuable thing, and in the ways of 
the ancient kings this is regarded as the most beautiful thing. It is adopted in all matters, both 
small and great. But sometimes it does not work. If you behave harmoniously because you 
understand harmony, but do not regulate your conduct with ritual, surely that cannot be made 
to work.665    
 
Fundamentally, ritual propriety is inextricably linked to the man of virtue, given that for Confucius the 
man of virtue is suitable to a government official. About the question of the man of virtue raised by 
Sima Niu, Confucius replied the man of virtue is neither worried nor afraid since when he looks within 
he is not diseased.666 The man of virtue, as Zixia argues, does not need to worry even about not having 
brothers since ‘if the man of virtue is reverent and avoids error, if he is courteous in his dealings with 
others and observes the obligations of ritual, then all within the Four Seas are his brothers,’ given that 
                                           
663 Analects, 8.2. Translation adapted from Legge. 子曰：「恭而無禮則勞，慎而無禮則葸，勇而無禮則亂，
直而無禮則絞。君子篤於親，則民興於仁；故舊不遺，則民不偷。」 
664 Analects, 11.1. Translation adapted from Dawson. 子曰：「先進於禮樂，野人也；後進於禮樂，君子也
。如用之，則吾從先進。」 
665 Analects, 1.12. 有子曰：「禮之用，和為貴。先王之道斯為美，小大由之。有所不行，知和而和，不
以禮節之，亦不可行也。」 




death and life are predestined, and riches and honours depend on Heaven.667 As a result, the man of 
virtue can have a dignified ease without pride, avoiding inconstant in his virtue that causes disgrace.668 
Therefore, Confucius himself exerted all possible effort to practise ritual propriety in his life as he states 
that ‘Abroad, to serve the high ministers and nobles; at home, to serve one’s father and elder brothers; 
in all duties to the dead, not to dare not to exert one's self; and not to be overcome of wine - which one 
of these things do I attain to?’669  
Understanding Confucian thought entails, as Hagen argues, understanding a Confucian concept 
cluster, which includes a number of terms that are notoriously difficult to translate. Among these terms, 
li is one of the challenging concepts. li can be translated as ritual (Waley), ritual propriety (Behuniak), 
and rite (Slingerland, Lau) according to contexts. Regarding these various translations, one may raise a 
question about whether there is single word in any of the European languages that covers the same 
range.670 Even though there is no single word for li, for Confucius there should exist the unchangeable 
essence of li. What is this? Confucius defined ritual propriety in relation to benevolence (仁) as follows:    
 
Yan Hui asked about benevolence. The Master said: ‘To subdue oneself and return to ritual is 
to practise benevolence. If someone subdued himself and returned to ritual for a single day, 
then all under Heaven would ascribe benevolence to him. For the practice of benevolence 
does surely proceed from the man himself, or does it proceed from others?” Yan Hui said: “I 
beg to ask for the details of this.’ The Master laid: ‘Do not look at what is contrary to ritual 
propriety, do not listen to what is contrary to ritual propriety, do not speak what is contrary to 
ritual propriety, and make no movement which is contrary to ritual propriety.’ Yan Hui said: 
‘Although I am not clever, I beg to put this advice into practice.’671  
 
According to Confucius, returning to ritual propriety is to practise benevolence. In the dimension of 
                                           
667 Analects, 12.5. Translation adapted from Dawson. 司馬牛憂曰：「人皆有兄弟，我獨亡。」子夏曰：
「商聞之矣：死生有命，富貴在天。君子敬而無失，與人恭而有禮。四海之內，皆兄弟也。君子何患乎
無兄弟也？」 
668 Analects, 13.26. 子曰：「君子泰而不驕，小人驕而不泰。」; Analects, 13.22. 子曰：「南人有言曰：
『人而無恆，不可以作巫醫。』善夫！」「不恆其德，或承之羞。」子曰：「不占而已矣。」 
669 Analects, 9.16. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「出則事公卿，入則事父兄，喪事不敢不勉，不為酒困，
何有於我哉？」 
670 Kurtis Hagen, “The Propriety of Confucius: A sense-of-Ritual,” Asian Philosophy 20 (March 2010), 4.  





subduing one’s self, more specifically, he shows how to return to ritual propriety. It is not supernatural. 
Returning to ritual propriety is not to look at what is contrary to ritual propriety, not to listen to what is 
contrary to ritual propriety, not to speak what is contrary to ritual propriety, and not to make no 
movement which is contrary to ritual propriety. It is about human behaviour. This indicates that the 
matter of practicing humaneness depends on the will of man. Hence, he offers ‘courtesy, tolerance, good 
faith, diligence, and kindness’ as five things in the form of ritual propriety for achieving humaneness 
since these can be conducted by human will.672 
 
Speech, Naming, and Mean 
In contrast to Augustine who dealt with action in relation to contemplation, Confucius stresses that the 
man of virtue ought to practise consistency of speech and action in accordance with ritual propriety:  
 
The man of virtue in everything considers righteousness to be essential. He performs it 
according to the rules of propriety. He brings it forth in humility. He completes it with sincerity. 
This is indeed the man of virtue.673  
 
It is because ‘the man of virtue is modest in his speech, but exceeds in his actions.’674 As a result, the 
man of virtue, as Zi Xia describes, undergoes three changes; ‘Looked at from a distance, he appears 
stern; when approached, he is mild; when he is heard to speak, his language is firm and decided.’675 He 
hated glib-tongued people without action unlike the man of virtue:  
 
Zi Lu got Zi Gao appointed governor of Fei. The Master said, ‘You are injuring a man’s son.’ 
                                           
672 Analects, 17.6. Translation adapted from Dawson. ‘Zizhang asked Confucius about humaneness. Confucius 
said: One who can bring about the practice of five things everywhere under Heaven has achieved humaneness. 
When he begged to ask about them, he said: Courtesy, tolerance, good faith, diligence, and kindness. If one is 
courteous, one is not treated with rudeness; if one is tolerant, one wins over the multitude; if one is of good faith, 
others give one responsibility; if one is diligent, one obtains results; and if one is kind, one is competent to 
command others.’子張問仁於孔子。孔子曰：「能行五者於天下，為仁矣。」請問之。曰：「恭、寬、
信、敏、惠。恭則不侮，寬則得眾，信則人任焉，敏則有功，惠則足以使人。」 
673 Analects, 15.18. Translation adapted from Legge. 子曰：「君子義以為質，禮以行之，孫以出之，信以
成之。君子哉！」 
674 Analects, 14.27. Translation adapted from Legge. 子曰：「君子恥其言而過其行。」 




Zi Lu said, ‘There are common people and officers; there are the altars of the spirits of the 
land and grain. Why must one read books before he can be considered to have learned?’ The 
Master said, ‘It is on this account that I hate your glib-tongued people.676 
 
Hence, Confucius notes that ‘the virtuous will be sure to speak correctly, but those whose speech is 
good may not always be virtuous. Men of principle are sure to be bold, but those who are bold may not 
always be men of principle.’677 Rather, Confucius regarded the one who is hesitant in his speech as the 
humane person since he already penetrated how difficult narrowing the gap between speech and action 
is in spite of human will.678 According to him, ‘The firm, the enduring, the simple, and the modest (訥) 
are close to humaneness.’679 In this context, he emphasized that those who are sincere and truthful in 
speech can put in practice as follows:    
 
Zi Zhang asked how a man should conduct himself, so as to be everywhere appreciated. The 
Master said, ‘Let his words be sincere and truthful and his actions honourable and careful - 
such conduct may be practised among the rude tribes of the South or the North. If his words 
be not sincere and truthful, and his actions not honourable and careful, will he, with such 
conduct, be appreciated, even in his neighborhood? When he is standing, let him see those 
two things, as it were, fronting him. When he is in a carriage, let him see them attached to the 
yoke. Then may he subsequently carry them into practice.’ Zi Zhang wrote these counsels on 
the end of his sash.680 
 
If so, what does being hesitant in speech mean? For Confucius, it is linked to the matter of moderation; 
‘Since I cannot get men pursuing the due medium, to whom I might communicate my instructions, I 
must find the ardent and the cautiously-decided. The ardent will advance and lay hold of truth; the 
cautiously-decided will keep themselves from what is wrong.’681 Hence, he states that ‘when respect is 
                                           
676 Analects, 11.25. As translated from Legge. 子路使子羔為費宰。子曰：「賊夫人之子。」子路曰：「有
民人焉，有社稷焉。何必讀書，然後為學？」子曰：「是故惡夫佞者。」 
677 Analects, 14.4. As translated from Legge. 子曰：「有德者，必有言。有言者，不必有德。仁者，必有
勇。勇者，不必有仁。」 
678 Analects, 12.3. 司馬牛問仁。子曰：「仁者其言也訒。」曰：「其言也訒，斯謂之仁已乎？」子曰：
「為之難，言之得無訒乎？」 
679 Analects, 13.27. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「剛毅、木訥，近仁。」 
680 Analects, 15.6. As translated from Legge. 子張問行。子曰：「言忠信，行篤敬，雖蠻貊之邦行矣；言
不忠信，行不篤敬，雖州里行乎哉？立，則見其參於前也；在輿，則見其倚於衡也。夫然後行。」子張
書諸紳。 




shown according to what is proper, one keeps far from shame and disgrace.’682 For example, he notes 
that ‘when good government prevails in a state, language may be lofty and bold, and actions the same. 
When bad government prevails, the actions may be lofty and bold, but the language may be with some 
reserve.’683 
In speech, more specifically, Confucius made an emphasis on rectifying names as a specific method 
for rightly realising ritual propriety in managing government as follows:    
 
Zi Lu said, ‘The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the 
government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?’ The Master replied, ‘What is 
necessary is to rectify names.’ ‘So! indeed!’ said Zi Lu. ‘You are wide of the mark! Why must 
there be such rectification?’ The Master said, ‘How uncultivated you are, You! The man of 
virtue, in regard to what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve. If names be not correct, 
language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with 
the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on 
to success, ritual and music will not flourish. When ritual and music do not flourish, 
punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the 
people do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore, the man of virtue considers it 
necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks 
may be carried out appropriately. What the man of virtue requires is just that in his words 
there may be nothing incorrect.’684 
 
Confucius illustrates how harmful incorrect names are to people. It is because inappropriate names give 
rise to producing language apart from the truth of thing results in failure of affairs which might prevent 
accurately conducting ritual and music. The decline of ritual and music may lead to a situation that 
punishments are not properly awarded. As a result, the people nervously do not know how to behave. 
Rectifying names is not just an erroneous belief in word-magic or a pedantic elaboration of his concern 
with teaching tradition.685 It is essential for executing ritual propriety. It leads to the harmony and 
beauty of social forms in that ritual propriety is public, shared, transparent.686 Like Xunzi, in particular, 
                                           
682 Analects, 1.13. 有子曰：恭近於禮，遠恥辱也 
683 Analects, 14.3. 子曰：「邦有道，危言危行；邦無道，危行言孫。」 




685 Fingarette, Confucius, 15 
686 Fingarette, Confucius, 16.  
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it is noticeable for Confucius to state the necessity of punishments in relation to ritual propriety. This 
statement seems to be against his idea of governing people by virtue and ritual rather than laws and 
punishments:  
 
If the people be led by laws, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they 
will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and 
uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, 
and moreover will become good.687  
 
However, this contradiction is about the matter of order. In other words, Confucius must have preferred 
virtue and ritual in administer people like Mencius, but he did not ignore the value of punishments.  
Along with the matter of speech and action, Confucius extensively discusses ritual propriety in 
relation to the Mean (中庸). As he states that ‘Supreme indeed is the Mean as virtue, but for a long time 
it has been rare among the people,’688 he lamented absence of the Mean in his time. Considering 
Cheng’s question about the value of ornamental accomplishments in ritual, there seemed to be some 
scholars against Confucian’s idea of ritual propriety as follows:  
 
Ji Zi Cheng said, ‘In the man of virtue it is only the substantial qualities which are wanted; 
why should we seek for ornamental accomplishments?’ Zi Gong said, ‘Alas! Your words, sir, 
show you to be the man of virtue, but four horses cannot overtake the tongue. Ornament is as 
substance; substance is as ornament. The hide of a tiger or a leopard stripped of its hair, is like 
the hide of a dog or a goat stripped of its hair.’689  
 
The matter of absence of the mean is about ritual propriety and the man of virtue. About the critique of 
ritual propriety, Zi Gong argues ornament and substance are equally important in the dimension of the 
Mean. In this context, Confucius stated that ‘Where the solid qualities are in excess of accomplishments, 
we have rusticity; where the accomplishments are in excess of the solid qualities, we have the manners 
                                           
687 Analects, 2.3. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以
禮，有恥且格。」 
688 Analects, 6.29. As translated in Dawson. 子曰：「中庸之為德也，其至矣乎！民鮮久矣。」 




of a clerk. When the accomplishments and solid qualities are equally blended, we then have the man of 
virtue.’690 For all that, Confucius did not praise too much ornament beyond substance as he insisted 
that ‘to go beyond is as wrong as to fall short.’691 Rather, about the essence of ritual propriety in the 
dimension of festive ceremonies he stated that ‘it is better to be frugal than lavish.’692 Like Mencius 
Confucius is not anti-asceticism. 
 
Sacrificial Music (樂) and Harmony   
The role of music in Confucian moral and political teachings has often been overlooked in contemporary 
studies. However, music was, as Cook argues, of paramount interest to the early Confucians for a 
number of reasons and was framed particularly in the era of the Eastern Zhou (東周) and Warring States 
(戰國).693 In this period a breakdown of the feudal structure upon which society had formerly laid its 
foundations led to the importance of music in order to promote the appropriate balance between the 
desire to recover the old ways ruler ship lost from china’s past, and the need to institute new forms of 
governance to respond to the changing nature of society and the times.694 Music offerings were played 
as a part of state sacrificial ceremonies for ensuring the continued good will of the ancestral spirits. It 
drives from the fact that ancient Chinese societies were based on ceremonies in contrast with the 
Western societies based on laws.695 Musical instruments such as bronze bell-sets were thought to have 
the power to communicate directly with such spirits with their harmonious sounds. The order inherent 
within the structure of music itself reflected the structure of the cosmos as a whole with its twelve-
month cycles and alternating five phases. By helping to establish the ritual calendar in such a way that 
                                           
690 Analects, 6.18. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「質勝文則野，文勝質則史。文質彬彬，然後君子。」 
691 Analects, 11.16. As translated in Legge. 子貢問：「師與商也孰賢？」子曰：「師也過，商也不及。」
曰：「然則師愈與？」子曰：「過猶不及。」 
692 Analects, 3.4. As translated in Dawson. 林放問禮之本。子曰：「大哉問！禮，與其奢也，寧儉；喪，
與其易也，寧戚。」 
693 Cook, “Unity and Diversity in the Musical Thought of Warring States China,” iv; Jia Chen, “How Can One 
be Perfected by Music?: Contemporary Educational Significance of Chinese Pre-Qin Confucian Thought on Yue 
Jiao (Music Education),” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 2012), 38.  
694 Cook, “Unity and Diversity in the Musical Thought of Warring States China,” vi. 
695 Yue Ji, ‘Confucius on Music Education,’ Nebula 5, no. 1-2 (2008), 128.   
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ensured sacrificial music would be performed in the proper keys and modes for the different times of 
the year, the music masters assisted their rulers in tapping and harnessing the very strength of Heaven 
and Earth.696 This made music possible to become a pivotal part of the hierarchical system of ritual 
control that pervaded all aspects of ruling-class life. Music also became an important part of state 
educational institutions, through which were imparted to the young members of the ruling class a strong 
sense of noble virtues and social functions.697 From the standpoint of the performer, music was for 
some the perfect metaphor for the process of self-cultivation and the maturation of the completely 
virtuous individual. In terms of public performance and the listening audience, recognition of the 
overwhelming influential power of music led the nobility into using music as a toll by which to instill 
the masses with a sense of social harmony, to both allay their tendencies toward unrest and direct them 
as a unitary body toward desired ends. Music masters thus ranked high in the hierarchy of officialdom, 
and they tended to serve in an important advisory capacity to their rulers.698 
Throughout the Analects, Confucius continuously attempts to clarify how one can achieve happiness 
(樂) in life as follows:  
 
There are three kinds of happiness which are beneficial and three kinds of pleasure which are 
harmful. It is beneficial to find happiness in the proper arrangement of ritual and music, to 
find happiness in talking about the good points of other men, to find happiness in having a 
large number of friends who are men of quality. It is harmful to take pleasure in the delights 
of showing off, to take pleasure in a self-indulgent life-style, and to take pleasure in the 
delights of feasting.699  
 
Interestingly, among methods for finding happiness, he first offers the importance of properly arranging 
ritual propriety and music prior to taking about the good points of other men and having a large number 
of excellent friends.700 In ancient Chinese, the word for happiness and music are written with the same 
                                           
696 Cook, “Unity and Diversity in the Musical Thought of Warring States China,” v.  
697 Mary T. Guerrant, “Three Aspects of Music in Ancient China and Greece,” College Music Symposium 20, no. 
2 (1980), 91.  
698 Cook, “Unity and Diversity in the Musical Thought of Warring States China,” iv.  
699 Analects, 16.5. As translated in Legge. 孔子曰：「益者三樂，損者三樂。樂節禮樂，樂道人之善，樂多
賢友，益矣。樂驕樂，樂佚遊，樂宴樂，損矣。」 
700 Erica Brindley, “Music, Cosmos, and the Development of Psychology in Early China,” T’oung Pao 92, no. 1 
(2006), 2.    
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character. However, Confucius did not stress music just for taking pleasure. Why did Confucius focus 
on music? Confucius taught the Six Arts, which include rites, music, archery, chariot-driving, literature, 
and mathematics to his students. For him, music is a core subject for moral education among Six Arts.701 
Confucius crystallised inherited traditional teaching of Six arts, particularly the education of music from 
the three previous dynasties such as Zia, Shang, and Zhou. 702  The most significant saying of 
Confucius on moral education through music might be: 
 
Confucius said that self-cultivation begins with studying the Book of Poetry, is established by 
ritual propriety, and is perfected by music.703  
 
Given that the finish of something is usually linked to greater importance than other parts, it is 
noteworthy that Confucius regards music as the finishing strokes in the process of self-cultivation.704 
Music has its own important positon in relation to studying the Book of Poetry and ritual propriety in 
Confucius’ formation of moral self. This indicates that even poetry is inseparable with music since in 
Confucius’ time the lyrics were the Book of Poetry, one of the basic texts for Confucius’ moral education, 
so singing poetry was a method for his disciples to live in righteousness and to achieve a balanced 
emotion.705 For Confucius, music is not a mere pleasant pastime for joyful comfort and amusement, 
but ‘stands for a supreme spiritual force for the cultivation of one’s moral character’ as the purest sound 
of the heart.706 According to the Book of Rituals, it is in the play of music that the harmony of sky and 
earth is obtained while rituals represent the order of sky and earth by distinguishing the categories of 
various beings and arranging them in a proper hierarchy. Due to the importance of music, Confucius 
himself used to devote to arrange songs; ‘I returned from Wei to Lu, and then the music was reformed, 
                                           
701 Leonard Tan, “Towards an Ancient Chinese-Inspired Theory of Music Education,” Music Education Research 
(2015), 3.   
702 Youwei Xu, “Confucius: An Educationalist of Aesthetics in Ancient China,” Journal of Popular Culture 27, 
no. 2 (1993), 125.  
703 Analects, 8.8. Translation adapted from Legge. 子曰：「興於詩，立於禮。成於樂。」 
704 Yue, “Confucius on Music Education,” 128.   
705 Yeo, Musing with Confucius and Paul, 225.  
706 Wenye Jiang, Review of A Discourse on Confucius’s Music, by Huaiyu Wang, Dao 9 (2010), 115.   
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and the pieces in the Royal songs and praise songs all found their proper places.’707 In other words, just 
as for him ritual does not only indicate gems and silk, music must be beyond bells and drums.708 Like 
other methods of his self-cultivation, music is also focused on how to live in harmony as follows:  
 
The Master instructing the Grand music master of Lü said, ‘How to play music may be known. 
At the commencement of the piece, all the parts should sound together. As it proceeds, they 
should be in harmony while severally distinct and flowing without break, and thus on to the 
conclusion.709  
 
This indicates that the nature of music is to take part in playing harmoniously together. Given that the 
role of the highly original composer creates not only new works within old forms, but also creates new 
forms, in the post-Romantic West the musical-moral analogy is the matter of the fullest realization of 
that individuality due to the emphasis on the individual as of ultimate value and on free will as the 
engine of individual self-expression. However, Confucius thought that the individual can have truly 
human significance only by living communal relationship in a context of mutually shared and valued 
forms that are authentically embodied in the performance and participated in by the appreciative 
audience.710 What makes it possible? According to Confucius, it depends on whether someone has the 
virtues proper to benevolence; ‘If someone is not benevolent in spite of being a man, ritual propriety 
and music are meaningless.’711 This indicates that benevolence is the source of ritual and music. The 
ultimate goal of Confucian education is to learn to be a person of benevolence. In traditional Chinese 
society, its most important aim was to focus how to behave in such a way as to become a person of 
benevolence. For Confucius music is a tool in the formation of moral self since it was used to help in 
the teaching of the ritual propriety that develops human relationships and raises society's moral standard, 
                                           
707 Analects, 9.15. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「吾自衛反魯，然後樂正，雅頌各得其所。」 
708 Analects, 17.11. As translated in Legge. 子曰：「禮云禮云，玉帛云乎哉？樂云樂云，鐘鼓云乎哉？」 
709 Analects, 3.23. As translated in Legge. 子語魯大師樂。曰：「樂其可知也：始作，翕如也；從之，純如
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which were regarded as the essence of a peaceful society.712  
What kinds of music did Confucius recommend for self-cultivation? Regarding this question, he 
explained it in relation to governing a state, but its explanation can be applied for self-cultivation, given 
that both concepts are inextricably related in his theory. He urged to adopt the music of the shao and wu 
in the dimension of how the government of a country should be administered as follows:  
 
Yan Hui asked about governing a state. The Master said: ‘Introduce the seasons of Xia, ride 
the state carriage of Yin wear the ceremonial cap of Zhou. For music adopt the shao and wu. 
Get rid of the songs of Zheng,’ and banish clever talkers. The songs of Zheng are licentious 
and clever talkers are a menace.713  
 
For Confucius the quality of music is a major concern since it is an essential element in the formation 
of moral self. Given that Confucius assesses the songs of Zheng are licentious and clever talkers are a 
menace, the music of the shao and wu should be different from such songs. In what aspects did 
Confucius appreciate the music of the shao and wu? Confucius thinks the important elements of music 
are beauty (美) and goodness (善). With these criteria, he judges both songs; ‘The Master said of the 
Shao that it was perfectly beautiful and also perfectly good. He said of the Wu that it was perfectly 
beautiful but not perfectly good.’714 To put it another way, according to him, the Shao is equipped with 
beauty and goodness, but the Wu has only the element of beauty. For Confucius the music of Shao is 
superior to that of the Wu. It derives from their moral contents.715 The music of Shao was composed to 
praise the Emperor Shun who ascended the throne in peaceful succession to the Emperor Yao, whereas 
the music of Wu was composed to praise the Emperor Wu who attained the throne through armed 
conquest. Even though the music of Shao and the music of Wu were both good, Confucius thought that 
music could be assessed according to the moral representation of its content. For Confucius the piece 
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of music representing peace is regarded as morally good since its morally good ideas can reach the 
general public, elevate people's moral standard, and eventually bring peace and order to a country while 
the piece of music representing war is considered to be morally bad since its evil ideas will influence 
people's minds and confuse their value judgments, and eventually it will lower the moral standard. 
Confucius preferred music that is morally good and representative of peace since music greatly 
influences on a person's mind.716 For him, the music of Shao was perfect since the piece of music is 
good in terms of form as well as content. Confucius thinks the music of Shao as the best he had ever 
heard, and he states that ‘the music of Shao was so perfect that he could not even tell the taste of meat 
in three months' time after hearing it’.717  
                                           
716 Wong, “A comparison between the Philosophies of Confucius and Plato as Applied to Music Education,” 111. 




Mencius’ Ritual Propriety 
 
Essence of Ritual Propriety: Benevolence and Righteousness  
Mencius hugely emphasises the roles of ritual propriety (li 禮) in the formation of moral self. Virtually, 
li can be translated into ceremony, ritual, rites, propriety, rules of propriety, good custom, ritual propriety, 
decorum, and good form, given that its concept is linked to others.718 For Mencius, ritual propriety is 
more valuable than eating and sex. When he was asked about embarrassing question on ritual propriety 
by Wu Lu, he simply replied if, by twisting your elder brother's arm, and snatching from him what he 
is eating, you can get food for yourself, while, if you do not do so, you will not get anything to eat, will 
you so twist his arm? If by getting over your neighbour's wall, and dragging away his virgin daughter, 
you can get a wife, while if you do not do so, you will not be able to get a wife, will you so drag her 
away?719 As etymologically li symbolises a religious sacrifice, Mencius states that even an ugly man 
would be fit to offer sacrifices to God if he cleanses himself.720 For him, cleaning himself does not just 
indicate bathing but self-cultivation. Explaining that the actions of the sages have been different, he 
demonstrates that some have kept remote from court, and some have drawn near to it. For example, it 
is possible for Yi Yin to seek an introduction to Tang by the Way of Yao and Shun, not his knowledge 
of cookery. Mencius stresses that the purpose of those different courses is to keep their persons ethically 
pure.721 For Mencius, furthermore, along with moral learning ritual propriety is a matter of ups and 
downs in a nation. According to him, it is not the exterior and interior walls being incomplete, and the 
supply of weapons offensive and defensive not being large, which constitutes the calamity of a kingdom. 
It is not the cultivable area not being extended, and stores and wealth not being accumulated, which 
occasions the ruin of a State. He states that ‘when superiors do not observe ritual propriety, and inferiors 
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do not learn, then seditious people spring up, and that State will perish in no time.’722 It is because 
government officers serve their prince without righteousness and do not follow the Ways of the ancient 
kings when ritual propriety is not properly conducted.  
In particular, Mencius shows the essence of ritual propriety in relation to benevolence and 
righteousness. Contrary to Confucius, Mencius frequently mentions benevolence and righteousness at 
the same time. When Mencius went to see king Hui of Liang, the king presumed that Mencius has some 
way of profiting his kingdom. Unlike his expectation, Mencius clearly states that his topics for 
counseling with him are only benevolence and righteousness since the king’s interest for profit makes 
superiors and inferiors try to snatch this profit the one from the other and the kingdom will be 
endangered. Mencius warns that those above and below will not be satisfied without snatching all if 
righteousness is put last, and profit is put first. He underlines there never has been a benevolent and 
righteous man who neglected his parents and made his sovereign an after consideration.723  
 
Anti-Utilitarianism: Shame, Government Officer, and Funeral 
For Mencius, ritual propriety is based on benevolence and righteousness. This indicates that ritual 
propriety is not utilitarian as follows:   
 
Mencius said, 'Yao and Shun were what they were by nature; Tang and Wu were so by 
returning to natural virtue. When all the movements, in the countenance and every turn of the 
body, are exactly what is proper, that shows the extreme degree of the complete virtue. 
Weeping for the dead should be from real sorrow, and not because of the living. Following 
the path of virtue and not violating ritual propriety are not for taking up an office. When one 
invariably keeps one’s word it is not to establish the rectitude of one’s actions. The man of 
virtue performs the norm and awaits his Destiny.'724 
  
This passage shows three essential points on his ritual propriety: shame, government officer, and funeral. 
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Firstly, it is noteworthy that Mencius states the man of virtue carries out ritual propriety according to 
his nature. For Mencius, simply aiming at what is right is the way of the man of virtue who does not 
think beforehand of his words that they may be sincere, nor of his actions that they may be resolute.725 
He argues that is a distinctive difference between men and animals. Unlike animals, humans have the 
sense of shame. The sense of shame plays an important role in ritual propriety. Mencius insists that ‘a 
man must not be without shame, for the shame of being without shame is shameless indeed.’726 The 
sense of shame is to a man of great importance in that those who form contrivances and versatile 
schemes distinguished for their artfulness, do not allow their sense of shame to come into action.727 
Mencius thinks that those who do violence to themselves and throw themselves away are shameless. It 
is because to disown ritual propriety in one’s conversation is to violate one’s self. Given that 
benevolence is the tranquil habitation of man, and righteousness is his straight path, rejecting to dwell 
in benevolence or pursue the path of righteousness is to throw one's self away.728 He offers Shun as an 
example of practicing benevolence and righteousness. According to Mencius, Shun, who clearly 
understood the multitude of things and closely observed the relations of humanity, does not exploit 
benevolence and righteousness as a means. He merely walked along the path of benevolence and 
righteousness.729 In this context, Shun could be regarded as the great man. Mencius defines the great 
man according to ritual propriety. For him, the great man is the one who lives in benevolence as the 
spacious dwelling, stand in ritual propriety as the correct seat, and goes along righteousness as the great 
path. When the great man achieves his ambition he shares these with the people; when he fails to do so 
he practises the Way alone. He cannot be led into excesses when wealthy and honoured or deflected 
from his purpose when poor and obscure, nor can he be made to bow before superior force.730  
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Secondly, it is noticeable that Mencius deals with the matter of how to obtain a government position 
in connection with ritual propriety as he states that ‘Following the path of virtue and not violating ritual 
propriety are not for taking up an office.’ He acknowledges how important taking office is for the man 
of virtue in that the loss of his place to an officer is like the loss of his State to a prince. For example, 
when Confucius was not in the service of a lord for a period of three months, he looked anxious and 
unhappy. According to the Book of Rituals, it is because the scholar unemployed for three months cannot 
supply the grain and animals for performing sacrifice. Hence, in ancient times when a man was not in 
the service of a lord for a period of three months he was offered condolences. Why the man of virtue 
ought to take office according to ritual propriety in spite of its urgent matter? Mencius uses the metaphor 
of marriage to explain it. According to him, every parent wishes to find a wife and a husband one day 
when their children are born. If the young people, without waiting for the orders of their parents, and 
the arrangements of the go-betweens, shall bore holes to steal a sight of each other, or get over the wall 
to be with each other, then their parents and all other people will despise them. In ancient times, likewise, 
the man of virtue was indeed eager to take office, but he disliked seeking it by dishonourable means 
against ritual propriety, for to seek office by an improper way is no different from the man and women 
who bore holes in the wall.731 Even Mencius demonstrates that the man of virtue ought to be responded 
to a summons by a prince when he takes proper ritual propriety:  
 
When a prince wishes to see a man of talents and virtue, and does not take the proper course 
to get his wish, it is as if he wished him to enter his palace, and shut the door against him. 
Righteousness is the road and the ritual propriety is the door. Only the man of virtue follows 
this road and goes in and out through this door.732  
 
With regard to taking up an office, Mencius also advises that individuals should not change their places 
to speak with one another, nor may they pass from their ranks to bow to one another in the court 
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according to ritual propriety.733 This indicates the man of virtue should live everywhere according to 
ritual propriety. 
Thirdly, it is significant that Mencius mentions the matter of funeral in the dimension of ritual 
propriety. Through the Book of Mencius, the matter is frequently dealt with. Why did he focus on funeral 
in relation with the formation of moral self? In order to understand it, it is necessary to comprehend 
who were his counterparts such as Yang Zhu and Mo Di. Mencius states as follows:  
 
Once more, sage sovereigns cease to arise, and feudal lords give the reins to their lusts. 
Unemployed scholars indulge in unreasonable discussions. The words of Yang Zhu and Mo 
Di fill the Empire. The teachings current in the Empire are those of the school of Yang or of 
the school of Mo. Yang's principle is each one for himself, which does not acknowledge the 
claims of the sovereign. Mo's principle is to love all without discrimination, which amounts 
to a denial of one’s father. To ignore one’s father on the one hand, and one’s prince on the 
other, is to be no different from the beast. … If the principles of Yang and Mo be not stopped, 
and the principles of Confucius not set forth, then those perverse heresies will delude the 
people, and stop up the path of benevolence and righteousness. When benevolence and 
righteousness are stopped up, beasts will be led on to devour men, and men will devour one 
another. I am alarmed by these things, and address myself to the defence of the doctrines of 
the former sages, and to oppose Yang and Mo. I drive away their licentious expressions, so 
that such perverse speakers may not be able to show themselves. Their delusions spring up in 
men's minds, and do injury to their practice of affairs. Shown in their practice of affairs, they 
are pernicious to their government. When sages shall rise up again, they will not change my 
words.734 
 
According to Mencius, political disorders in the Empire result from the principles of Yang Zhu and Mo 
Di, for their teachings ignore loyalty to one’s king and filial piety to one’s father contrary to the Way of 
sage kings. Mencius warns affairs and politics are interfered when their delusions spring up in men's 
minds. It is because holding to one point is the injury it does to the way of right principle by taking up 
one point and disregarding a hundred others.735 Hence, he is convinced that ‘those who are fleeing from 
the errors of Mo naturally turn to Yang, and those who are fleeing from the errors of Yang naturally turn 
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735 Mencius, 7A26. 為其賊道也，舉一而廢百也。 
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to Confucianism.’736 In this context, the purpose of his moral education is to defend the doctrines of 
the former sages such as Yu, Zhou Gong, and Confucius and rectify men's hearts by driving away Yang 
and Mo’s licentious expressions. Mencius states:  
 
In former times, Yu repressed the vast waters of the inundation, and the country was reduced 
to order. Zhou Gong's achievements extended even to the barbarous tribes of the east and 
north, and he drove away all ferocious animals, and the people enjoyed repose. Confucius 
completed the Spring and Autumn Annals, and rebellious ministers and villainous sons were 
struck with terror. … These father-deniers and king-deniers would have been smitten by Zhou 
Gong. I also wish to rectify men's hearts, and to put an end to those perverse doctrines, to 
oppose their one-sided actions and banish away their licentious expressions - and thus to carry 
on the work of the three sages. Do I do so because I am fond of disputing? I am compelled to 
do it. Whoever can, with words, combat Yang and Mo is a true disciple of the sages.737  
 
As Mencius claims that the true disciple of the sages is the one who is verbally able to combat Yang 
and Mo, he himself heartily takes part in refuting them. Particularly, this is shown in a debate between 
Mencius and the Mohist Yi Zhi on funeral.738 According to Yi Zhi, follow the way of frugality in 
funerals, for frugal funerals could change the customs of the kingdom. However, Mencius points out 
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the expression of a standard (fa 法) far removed from the sages’ own concrete circumstances, while for Mencius 
human virtue comes from particular humans.738 In spite of the importance of family affection, Mencius does not 
identify it as a sprout and it is more likely that family affection is the ‘soil’ from which the ‘four sprouts’ emerge. 




the limit of frugality in funerals in connection with filial piety.739 In the most ancient times, according 
to him, there were some who did not bury their parents. When their parents died, they took them up and 
threw them into some water-channel. Afterwards, when passing by them, they saw foxes and wild-cats 
devouring them, and flies and gnats biting at them. The perspiration started out upon their foreheads, 
and they looked away, unable to bear the sight. Mencius shows it was not on account of other people 
that this perspiration flowed, for it was an outward expression of their innermost heart. Hence, they 
instantly went home, and came back with baskets and spades and covered the bodies. Through this story, 
Mencius demonstrates the filial sons and virtuous men ought to act in accordance with ritual propriety 
if it was truly right for them to bury the remains of their parents. In this context, Mencius buried his 
mother with a good coffin unlike the Mohists, for he thought the man of virtue would not skimp on 
expenditure where his parents are concerned.740 According to him, contrary to high antiquity where 
there was no rule for the size of either the inner or the outer coffin, in middle antiquity the inner coffin 
was made seven inches thick, and the outer one the same. This was done by all, from the sovereign to 
the common people, and not simply for the beauty of the appearance, but because they thus satisfied 
the filial piety of their hearts. It is because there is no satisfaction to the natural feelings of a man, in 
preventing the earth from getting near to the bodies of his dead. Mencius warns that men cannot have 
the feeling of pleasure if prevented by statutory regulations from making their coffins as the Mohists 
suggests. Fundamentally, Mencius’ emphasis on funerals is based on his understanding of filial piety in 
connection with ritual propriety as Zeng defines it. Mencius states:  
 
When parents are alive, they should be served according to ritual propriety; when they are 
dead, they should be buried according to ritual propriety; and they should be sacrificed to 
according to ritual propriety - this may be called filial piety.741  
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Hence, he claims that ‘the nourishment of parents when living is not sufficient to be accounted the great 
thing. It is only in the performing their obsequies when dead that we have what can be considered the 
great thing.’742 For him, in discharging the funeral duties to parents, men indeed feel constrained to do 
their utmost.743 Furthermore, as Mencius makes an emphasis on sacrifice after burying according to 
ritual propriety, he presents to hold three years as the mourning period, mourning dress made of rough 
hemp with a hem, the eating of nothing but rice gruel, for these were observed in the Three Dynasties 
by men of all conditions alike from the sovereign to the mass of the people.744 Compared to the Mohists, 
the funeral procession guided by Mencius seems to be ineffective. Nevertheless, why did Mencius stress 
funeral according to ritual propriety? When the duke Ding of Teng died, the prince tried to do the three 
years’ morning. In contrary to his desire, all his officers opposed to his plan. Regarding this concern, 
Mencius advised to him as follows:  
 
In this matter the solution cannot be sought elsewhere. Confucius said, "When a prince dies, 
his successor entrusts the administration to the prime minister. He sips the congee. His face is 
of a deep black. He approaches the place of mourning, and weeps. Of all the officers and 
inferior ministers there is not one who will presume not to join in the lamentation, he setting 
them this example. What the superior loves, his inferiors will be found to love exceedingly. 
The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and grass. The grass 
must bend when the wind blows upon it." The business depends on the will of the prince.745 
 
Mencius urges the prince to do three years mourning with a firm will. It is because conducting funeral 
according to ritual propriety as moral education could lead to political authority just as highly respected 
old men such as Bo Yi and Tai Gong decided to follow king Wen as soon as they heard of the rise of 
him, for they heard that he knows well how to nourish the old with sincerity.746 His people, as Mencius 
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presents, will follow what the sovereign loves just as the grass must bend when the wind blows upon it. 
This indicates that filial piety could be the source of political authority. According to Mencius, those 
who wish to win the confidence of their sovereign ought to make their parents pleased. How can they 
make their parents pleased? Mencius highlights the value of ‘sincerity’ (誠) in serving parents just as 
he stresses honouring and respecting in treating a scholar since to feed a scholar and not love him is to 
treat him as a pig and to love him and not respect him is to keep him as a domestic animal.747 Given 
that there has never been a man possessed of complete sincerity who did not move others, sincerity is 
the pivotal attitude in filial piety. Contrary to the Mohists, Mencius insists customs in the kingdom can 
be changed by sincere funeral procession rather than frugal one. For Mencius, thinking of how to be 
sincere is the way of man. In this context, he regards sincerity as the way of Heaven in that 
understanding what is good is a way to the attainment of sincerity in one's self.748 Therefore, Mencius 
asks the prince to do three years mourning with a firm will in the dimension of sincerity, for the good 
is practicing filial piety which is the source of political authority. From the perspective of Mencius, this 
shows the absence of the true good in Mohism. In the debate between Mencius and Yi Zhi, a Mohist on 
funeral, this issue can be deeply expounded through the matter of graded love as follows:   
 
Yi Zhi said ‘The Confucians praised the ancient rulers for acting "as if they were watching 
over an infant." What does this expression mean? To me it sounds that we are to love all 
without difference of degree; but the manifestation of love must begin with our parents.' … 
Mencius said ‘Does Yi Zhi truly believe that a man's affection for the child of his brother is 
merely like his affection for the infant of a neighbour? What is to be approved in that 
expression is simply this: that if an infant crawling about is likely to fall into a well, it is no 
crime in the infant. Moreover, Heaven gives birth to creatures in such a way that they have 
one root, and Yi Zhi makes them to have two roots. This is the cause of his error.749 
 
Notwithstanding his emphasis on frugal funeral, as Mencius points out, Yi Zhi ironically gave his 
parents lavish burials. With regard to Mencius’ critique, Yi Zhi defends by combining his Mohist 
                                           
747 Mencius, 7A37. 食而弗愛，豕交之也；愛而不敬，獸畜之也。恭敬者，幣之未將者也。 
748 Mencius, 4A12. 誠身有道：不明乎善，不誠其身矣。是故誠者，天之道也；思誠者，人之道也。 





commitment to universal love with this Mencian idea of benevolence as an apology for his own act of 
filial piety. Regarding to this argument, Mencius points out that Yi Zhi misunderstood the parable of 
the ‘child in peril’ as a case of natural compassion shown to any child. Mencius argues under more 
normal or less urgent circumstances, one would not love all children equally. One naturally loves a 
nephew more than a neighbour's child. According to Mencius, we learn to love the neighbour's child as 
an extension of the love we feel for our nephew. In this context, Mencius stresses ‘one root’ of Heaven 
which is naturally graded in his moral universe. This indicates that Heaven produced the natural 
distinctions of superior and inferior.750 It is not some homogeneous substance found in all things as 
Taoist and Buddhist would have it.751 Mencius makes an emphasis on the order of love in connection 
with living creatures, people, and parents:  
 
In regard to living creatures, the man of virtue loves them but show no benevolence towards 
them. In regard to people generally, he shows benevolence towards them but not affectionate. 
He is affectionate to his parents, but is merely benevolent towards the people. He is benevolent 
towards the people but is merely love living creatures.752  
 
For example, the benevolence of Yao and Shun did not extend to love everything. Instead, they earnestly 
devoted themselves to what was important and good and wise men.753 In other words, even such sages 
did not conduct love without discrimination. In Mencius’ ritual propriety, three years’ mourning is 
regarded as one of important priorities. Hence, he demonstrates for a man to observe meticulously three 
years mourning, while failing to observe three years’ mourning, or for him to ask whether he is guilty 
of breaking the food with his teeth while bolting down his food and drink is for him to show an ignorance 
of priorities.754 For Mencius, three years’ mourning is ritual propriety.   
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Filial Piety, Happier Together, and Music (樂)    
Contrary to Confucius, Mencius rarely mentions on music in the Book of Mencius, but it still plays an 
important part in the formation of moral self. Mencius shows a vision of ebullient happiness resulting 
from the balanced practice of the great virtues such as benevolence, righteousness, and wisdom in 
relation to music as follows:  
 
The content of benevolence is the serving of one's parents. The content of righteousness is 
obedience to one's elder brothers. The content of wisdom is to understand those two things, 
and not departing from them. The content of ritual propriety is the ordering and adorning those 
two things. The content of music is the happiness that comes of delighting in them. When 
happiness arises how can one stop it? And when one cannot stop it, then one unconsciously 
begins to dance with one’s feet and wave one’s arms.755 
 
For Mencius, the nature of music is happiness in that the sense of happiness catalyses the growth of the 
virtues, and leads to ecstatic experiences such as dance by delighting the contents of benevolence and 
righteousness. Given that such virtues are inextricably related to filial piety in the context of family life, 
the essence of music should be understood in a communitarian way. 
In his cultivation of self through music, the happiness does not just abide in family life. Beyond 
family, the influence of music precisely targets the national life. In other words, music has intense 
political tendency.756 For example, when Mencius discusses on music with king Hui of Liang, he 
expects that the kingdom of Qi would be near to a state of good government because of the king’s great 
fondness for music. Mencius takes no account of what the king loves popular music rather than the 
music of the ancient sovereigns, for there are no differences between them in effecting the function of 
music.757 Mencius believes that music with noble ideology can educate people. For Mencius, the 
purpose of music is to form a harmonious society and government.  
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This indicates post-Confucius thinkers such as Mencius and Xunzi share Confucian ideas in spite of 
their differences of human nature and musical pedagogy.758 According to Xunzi, music is inextricably 
linked to the truth. Xunzi defines music as happiness. The man of virtue takes it in attaining the Way, 
but the small man takes it in attaining the object of his desires. Those who takes the Way to regulate 
their desires can be happy.759 Xunzi states that ‘music has the power to make good the hearts of the 
people, to influence men deeply, and to reform their manners and customs with facility’, so ‘the former 
kings guided the people with ritual and music, and the people became harmonious and congenial.’760 
Music as ‘the height of ordering people’ makes the people turn toward what is correct.761 Balanced, 
peaceful, solemn and majestic music make people harmonious and being uniformly ordered, by which 
state can be protected.762 Xunzi conceives music as a corrective measure for chaos.763  
Mencius highlights how to enjoy music in the perspective of community. Regarding this question, 
the king states that enjoyment in the company of many is more pleasant rather than enjoyment by 
himself and enjoyment in the company of a few. For Mencius, this has significant political implication. 
He explained to the king that why people differently react to the king’s fondness for music? When the 
king enjoys the music by himself alone, the people complains that why does the king’s fondness for 
music bring us to such straits that fathers and sons do not see each other, and brothers, wives and 
children are parted and scattered? According to him, it is because the king failed to share your happiness 
with the people. In contrast, if the people enjoy hearing the noise of his bells and drums, and the notes 
of his fifes and pipes, it is because the king shared his happiness with the people.764 For Mencius, the 
way to be a true king is to share his happiness with the people. In other words, music is the expression 
of the common happiness in social harmony among various relations.  
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Augustine’s Sacrament  
 
Confucius and Mencius stress human efforts such as ritual propriety in order to cultivate moral self. By 
comparison Augustine did not insist that personal effort alone can take care of soul in attaining 
happiness. For Augustine there is a complex relationship between the formation of moral self and the 
grace of God in which ritual as well as the interior life, and contemplation, play significant roles. In the 
following exposition, I will unfold the relevant passages of Augustine on the role ritual of moral 
formation in order to highlight the contrast with the emphasis on ritual propriety in Confucius and 
Mencius as well as music. The key question I intend to address is where and how grace enters into his 
account. It is also an interesting question to ask if there is any equivalent to the role of grace in Confucius 
and Mencius or if their accounts solely reliant on outward mimesis having an interior effort in forming 
the moral self toward the Way. Though partaking in the sacraments, we are ordered to God rather than 
to self.765 As Augustine states that ‘there can be no religious society, whether the religion be true or 
false, without some sacrament or visible symbol to serve as a bond of union,’766 he initially has a very 
broad understanding of sacrament. But especially through his debate with the Manichees, the Donatists, 
and Pelagians his sacrament shows its clarity. In this section, Augustine’s baptism and marriage as 
sacraments and music are intensively expounded in relation to formation of moral self.  
 
Baptism: Forgiveness of Sins and Starting Point of Salvation  
Many research of Augustine concentrates on the inward drama of conversion in Confessiones, but 
Augustine himself saw the event of baptism as having equal or in all likelihood greater importance in 
comparison with the moment of conversion. Augustine was not baptised until age thirty-three. In 
Confessiones, he describes the dramatic journey of his conversion. He had been made catechumen in 
his child, and would have undergone the traditional rite of entry. Augustine states:  
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While still a boy I had been told of the eternal life promised to us by Our Lord, who humbled 
himself and came down amongst us proud sinners. As a catechumen, I was blessed regularly 
from birth with the sign of the Cross and was seasoned with God's salt, for, O Lord, my mother 
placed great hope in you.767  
 
However, Augustine delayed his baptism as his ill was quickly recovered as follows:   
 
Once as a child I was taken suddenly ill with a disorder of the stomach and was on the point 
of death. You, my God, were my guardian even then, and you saw the fervour and strength of 
my faith as I appealled to the piety of my own mother and to the mother of us all, your Church, 
to give me the baptism of Christ your Son, who is my God and my Master. My earthly mother 
was deeply anxious, because in the pure faith of her heart, she was in greater labour to ensure 
my eternal salvation than she had been at my birth. Had I not quickly recovered, she would 
have hastened to see that I was admitted to the sacraments of salvation and washed clean by 
acknowledging you, Lord Jesus, for the pardon of my sins. So my washing in the waters of 
baptism was postponed.768  
 
As a catechumen, Augustine would have been considered a Christian and a member of the church even 
though he was not baptised yet. While in Carthage in his late teens, Augustine left the Catholic Church 
and joined the Manichees. When he arrived in Milan in 384 as a Manichee and city orator, he began to 
attend the sermons of Ambrose, the Christian bishop of Milan. Augustine was deeply impressed not 
only by his rhetoric but especially by his philosophical and exegetical sophistication. Soon after, he 
gave up the Manichees and began to consider himself Christian catechumen as follows:  
 
Next I tried my utmost to find some certain proof which would convict the Manichees of 
falsehood. If I had been able to conceive of a spiritual substance, all their inventions would at 
once have been disproved and rejected from my mind. But this I could not do. However, the 
more I thought about the material world and the whole of nature, as far as we can be aware of 
it through our bodily senses, and the more I took stock of the various theories, the more I 
began to think that the opinions of the majority of the philosophers were most likely to be true. 
So, treating everything as a matter of doubt, as the Academics are generally supposed to do, 
and hovering between one doctrine and another, I made up my mind at least to leave the 
Manichees, for while I was in this state of indecision I did not think it right to remain in the 
sect now that I found the theories of some of the philosophers preferable. Nevertheless I utterly 
refused to entrust the healing of the maladies of my soul to these philosophers, because they 
ignored the saving name of Christ. I therefore decided to remain a catechumen in the Catholic 
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Church, which was what my parents wanted, at least until I could clearly see a light to guide 
my steps.769 
 
However, even after listening to Ambrose’s sermon, he postponed receiving baptism again. Augustine 
still pursued the advance of his career. Only after his dramatic conversion experience in the garden in 
the summer of 386 he wrote to Ambrose with acknowledging his past errors and formally put in his 
name for baptism as follows:   
 
When the autumn vacation was over, I notified the people of Milan that they must find another 
vendor of words for their students, because I had chosen to be your servant and also because 
the difficulty I had in breathing and the pain in my lungs made me unfit for the duties of a 
professor. I wrote to your bishop, the saintly Ambrose, to tell him of my past errors and the 
purpose I now had in mind. I asked him to advise me which books of Scripture it would be 
best for me to study, so that I might be better prepared and more fitted to receive so great a 
grace. He told me to read the prophet Isaiah, presumably because the Gospel and the calling 
of the gentiles are foretold more clearly in that book than in any other. But I did not understand 
the first chapters and, on the assumption that the rest of the book would be equally difficult, I 
laid it aside to be taken up again later, when I should be more used to the style in which God's 
word is spoken.770 
 
Eventually, at the Easter vigil, 24-25 April 387, Augustine was baptised. ‘While the term baptism can 
refer specifically to the rite of immersion, patristic authors often used it to refer to the whole complex 
of initiation rites that took place at the Easter vigil, including what we now call confirmation.’771 He 
was joined by his son, Adeodatus, and his friend Alypius. In the Confessiones, he discusses nothing of 
the ceremonial, emphasizing instead the inner intensity of the experience. Augustine states:  
 
We were baptised, and all anxiety over the past melted away from us. The days were all too 
short, for I was lost in wonder and joy, meditating upon your far-reaching providence for the 
salvation of the human race. The tears flowed from me when I heard your hymns and canticles, 
for the sweet singing of your Church moved me deeply. The music surged in my ears, truth 
seeped into my heart, and my feelings of devotion overflowed, so that the tears streamed down. 
But they were tears of gladness.772  
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Why was Augustine happy by baptism? It is because for Augustine baptism is the way in which God’s 
grace acts on us to forgive and wash away of all previous our sins, and the beginning of membership in 
the church, the body of Christ here on Earth, oriented toward its heavenly head, that is, Christ. For 
Augustine baptism as a sacrament is the starting point of forgiving sins, while for Confucius and 
Mencius ritual propriety make it possible to return to benevolence and righteousness. For Augustine, 
Christ is the one who opens up the way to our heavenly country by forgiving our sins. Augustine states:  
 
when we are on the way, and that not a way that lies through space, but through a change of 
affections, and one which the guilt of our past sins like a hedge of thorns barred against us, 
what could He, who was willing to lay Himself down as the way by which we should return, 
do that would be still gracious and more merciful, except to forgive us all our sins, and by 
being crucified for us to remove the stern decrees that barred the door against our return?773  
 
Without this cleansing bath, humans are still trapped in sin, and will receive no real benefit from any of 
the spiritual exercises. Augustine writes on the forgiveness of sins by baptism as follows:  
 
If this were not to be had in the Church, there would be no hope. If the forgiveness of sins 
were not to be had in the Church, there would be no hope of a future life and eternal liberation. 
We thank God, who gave his Church such a gift. Here you are; you are going to come to the 
holy font, you will be washed in saving baptism, you will be renewed in the bath of rebirth 
(Ti 3:5), you will be without any sin at all as you come up from that bath. All the things that 
were plaguing you in the past will there be blotted out. Your sins will be like the Egyptians, 
hard on the heels of the Israelites; pursuing them, but only as far as the Red Sea. What does it 
mean, as far as the Red Sea? As far as the font, consecrated by the cross and blood of Christ. 
… That's why baptism is signed with the sign of Christ.774  
 
Augustine frequently draws on the image of the exodus to explain baptism. Just as the Israelites had 
passed through the Red Sea while the pursuing Egyptians were drowned, the candidates would pass 
through the Red Sea of baptism, a sea reddened and consecrated by the blood of Christ, while their sins 
would be left to drown in the waters of the font.775 For Augustine baptism that provides the only hope 
of human salvation is efficacious ritual of purification committed to the reality of the Catholic Church’s 
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social role as divinely ordained custodian of grace on Earth.776 However, Augustine does not regard 
baptism as the completion on the way of salvation. He is against those who overemphasise the effects 
of baptism:  
 
For they fail to observe that men severally become sons of God when they begin to live in 
newness of spirit, and to be renewed as to the inner man after the image of Him that created 
them. For it is not from the moment of a man's baptism that all his old infirmity is destroyed, 
but renovation begins with the remission of all his sins, and so far as he who is now wise is 
spiritually wise.777  
 
Baptism gives us new start on the way of salvation and the full renewal of the image of God within our 
minds is only completed in the afterlife. This indicates that we need to struggle for the rest of our lives 
with the will to evil which remains in us after baptism.778 The road to perfection so long that Augustine 
questions whether anyone comes to the end of it in this life.    
Fundamentally, Augustine developed theology of baptism in his debate with the Donatists. When 
Augustine returned to Africa in 388, church was divided. The Donatist Church, born of the disputes 
which followed the Diocletianic persecution about the validity of sacraments conducted by those 
alleged to have been guilty of the sin of traditio, but with a lineage extending back to the days of St 
Cyprian and reflecting only too well the stormy African temperament, had, in three-quarters of a century, 
grown and expanded until it more than equaled the Catholic as the church of Africa.779 According to 
Bonner, whereas the Catholics were indissolubly related in the eyes of the African peasant with the 
Roman state, the pagan oppressor, the Donatists were the sons of the martyrs, members of a church 
which had never compromised with the godless tyrant but had retained that spirit of defiance, implicit 
in the fulminations of Tertullian and expressed in the life and death of the great Cyprian, the hero of all 
Africans, to whom Catholic and Donatist alike looked as the doctor of the African Church.780 The 
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Donatists maintain two positions that they had inherited from Cyprian.781 First, there is no salvation 
outside the Church, for if one is to have God as Father, one must first have the Church as Mother. 
Second, baptism given by heretics can have no validity, since heretics who cannot possess the Holy 
Spirit cannot give what they do not have. The Donatists claimed that Catholics had descended from 
those who had betrayed the church during the persecution of Diocletian and were therefore not just 
sinners, but traitors, the ‘church of Judas’. Therefore, Donatists routinely rebaptised converts from the 
Catholic camp.  
Against such views Augustine developed three key positions in his treatise On Baptism against 
Donatists.782 Firstly, he demonstrated that the purity of the minister was irrelevant, that it was the purity 
and power of Christ that made baptism effective. Much of Augustine's teachings on the sacraments were 
in response to the Donatists' misleading views on the theology of the sacraments. The Donatists had 
taught that the validity and the proper operation of the sacraments depended on the state of the minister 
of the sacraments whom they regarded as the giver, if not the subject of the sacraments. They also 
believed that the origin (origo), root (radix) and head (caput) of the baptised person is none other than 
the human minister by whom he is baptised. Such a doctrinally incorrect position on the sacraments not 
only undermined the credibility and the authority of Christ as the sole giver and subject of baptism, but 
was also largely seen as the root cause of rebaptism blasphemy which was a characteristic error of the 
Donatists in African Christianity.783 Augustine wrote:  
 
Nor is the water ‘profane and adulterous’ over which the name of God is invoked, even though 
it be invoked by profane and adulterous persons; because neither the creature itself of water, 
nor the name invoked, is adulterous. But the baptism of Christ, consecrated by the words of 
the gospel, is necessarily holy, however polluted and unclean its ministers may be; because 
its inherent sanctity cannot be polluted, and the divine excellence abides in its sacrament, 
whether to the salvation of those who use it aright, or to the destruction of those who use it 
wrong. Would you indeed maintain that, while the light of the sun or of a candle, diffused 
through unclean places, contracts no foulness in itself therefrom, yet the baptism of Christ can 
be defiled by the sins of any man, whatsoever he may be? For if we turn our thoughts to the 
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visible materials themselves, which are to us the medium of the sacraments, every one must 
know that they admit of corruption. But if we think on that which they convey to us, who can 
fail to see that it is incorruptible, however much the men through whose ministry it is 
conveyed are either being rewarded or punished for the character of their lives?784  
 
Augustine’s view of the sacraments is based upon the conception of Christ, the high priest without sin, 
who is the sole giver of sacramental grace because to Him alone belongs the power of conferring it, but 
who administers it by human agents. What these administer is the baptism of Christ, whose sanctity 
cannot be corrupted by unworthy ministers, any more than the light of the sun is corrupted by shining 
through a sewer. Like water passing through a stone irrigation channel, the power of Christ passes 
through a sinful minister unpolluted and bears fruit in the recipient. A little consideration will 
demonstrate this, since we are well aware that the materials with which the sacraments are administered-
water, wine, bread, and the like-are corruptible, but the grace which they convey is not corruptible. So 
it is with human ministers; good or bad, their character does not affect the validity of the sacrament.785 
In the In Johannis evangelium tractatus, Augustine expounds this matter by draws upon John 1:33 as 
follows:  
 
Still living in the darkness of this life, we are walking by the lamp of faith; let us too hold on 
to the lamp which John was, let us use it also to put Christ’s enemies to confusion; or rather, 
let him confound his enemies himself with his own lamp. Let us also ask the question which 
the Lord put to the Jew, let us ask it and say, John’s baptism, where is it from? From heaven 
or from men? What are they going to say? If they say, ‘From men.’ Even their own people 
will stone them; while if they say, ‘From heaven,’ we will say to them, Why then did you not 
believe him? Perhaps they say, ‘We do believe him.’ ‘Then how can you say that you are the 
ones who baptise, and John says, This is the one who baptises?’ ‘But,’ they say, ‘the ministers 
of such a great judge, the ministers through whom baptism is given, should be just. I too say 
(and we all say) that the ministers of such a great judge should be just. Let the ministers be 
just if they are willing; but if they are not willing to be just-those who occupy the chair of 
Moses-my master, about whom his Spirit said, This is the one who baptises, has assured me. 
How has he assured me? The scribes and Pharisees, he said, occupy the chair of Moses; do 
what they say, but do not do what they do; for they say and do not do (Mt 23:2-3). If the 
minister is just, I regard him as I regard Paul, as I regard Peter; with them do I count ministers 
who are just because ministers who are really just do not seek their own glory; they are, after 
all, ministers; they do not want to be taken for judges; they shudder at the thought of hope 
being placed in themselves. So I reckon the just minister as one with Paul. After all, what does 
Paul say? I planted, Apollos wanted; but God caused the growth. Neither the one who plants 
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not the one who waters is anything, but God is the one who causes the growth. (1 Cor 3:6-7) 
Yes, a proud minister is to be aligned with Zabulus, but Christ’s gift is not contaminated; what 
flows through the minister remains pure, the liquid that passes through him reaches fertile soil. 
Think of the proud minister as made of stone, because he cannot produce fruit when watered; 
and the water passes along a stone channel, the water passes along to the little garden beds. It 
produces no fruit in the stone channel, but nonetheless it makes the gardens very fruitful 
indeed. The spiritual power of the sacrament, you see, is like light; and it is received pure by 
those to be enlightened, and if it passes through tainted beings, it is not defiled. Certainly let 
the ministers be just and not seek their own glory but the glory of the one whose ministers 
they are. Let them not say, ‘It is my baptism,’ because it is not theirs. Let them pay attention 
to John himself. John was full of the Holy Spirit, and he had a baptism from heaven, not from 
men. But up to when did he have it? He said himself, Prepare a way for the Lord. But, when 
he was made known, the Lord himself became the way; there was no longer any need for the 
baptism of John which prepared a way for the Lord.786     
 
Augustine demonstrates that the sacrament of holy baptism is of God and not of men. He relativized 
the importance and the status of the minister of baptism (just as Optatus did) by likening him to an 
instrument rather than the causal agent or the source of grace and the origin of baptism itself. He 
reminded the Donatists that baptism, which is an exclusive property of Christ, is neither 
characteristically ascribed to any human agent nor is it an attribute of any minister. In other words, it is 
never called the baptism of Caecilianus, or of Donatus, or of Petilianus, or even of himself, Augustine, 
but essentially the baptism of Christ.787  
Secondly, Augustine claimed that baptism marked one as belonging to the flock of Christ in an 
indelible way, what he called the ‘dominicus character’. The analogy he often appealed to was a military 
one. Roman soldiers received brand, known as a stigma, on the back of the right hand. Just as soldiers 
who deserted were not re-tattooed, so those who received baptism outside the church were not to be 
rebaptised. Augustine states:   
 
Further, if any one fails to understand how it can be that we assert that the sacrament is not 
rightly conferred among the Donatists, while we confess that it exists among them, let him 
observe that we also deny that it exists rightly among them, just as they deny that it exists 
rightly among those who quit their communion. Let him also consider the analogy of the 
military mark, which, though it can both be retained, as by deserters, and, also be received by 
those who are not in the army, yet ought not to be either received or retained outside its ranks; 
and, at the same time, it is not changed or renewed when a man is enlisted or brought back to 
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his service. However, we must distinguish between the case of those who unwittingly join the 
ranks of these heretics, under the impression that they are entering the true Church of Christ, 
and those who know that there is no other Catholic Church save that which, according to the 
promise, is spread abroad throughout the whole world, and extends even to the utmost limits 
of the earth.788  
 
Augustine was careful not to adopt and appropriate the Donatists' popular slogan or practice of referring 
to baptism frequently as the ‘baptism of heretics’ or the ‘Catholic baptism.’ He repeatedly identified 
baptism specifically as the baptism of Christ. That is, for him, there is nothing like the baptism of 
heretics in the strict sense. It is basically the baptism of Christ administered by the heretics. Therefore, 
Augustine admitted that Donatists possessed valid baptism, that they bore the brand-mark of Christ; but 
since they had broken from the unity of the church, they were in effect deserters from the militia of 
Christ.789   
 
Therefore Cyprian writes to Jubaianus as follows, ‘concerning the baptism of heretics, who, 
being placed without, and set down out of the Church,’ seem to him to ‘claim to themselves a 
matter over which they have neither right nor power. Which we,’ he says, ‘cannot account 
valid or lawful, since it is clear that among them it is unlawful.’ Neither, indeed, do we deny 
that a man who is baptised among heretics, or in any schism outside the Church, derives no 
profit from it so far as he is partner in the perverseness of the heretics and schismatics; nor do 
we hold that those who baptise, although they confer the real true sacrament of baptism, are 
yet acting rightly, in gathering adherents outside the Church, and entertaining opinions 
contrary to the Church. But it is one thing to be without a sacrament, another thing to be in 
possession of it wrongly, and to usurp it unlawfully. Therefore they do not cease to be 
sacraments of Christ and the Church, merely because they are unlawfully used, not only by 
heretics, but by all kinds of wicked and impious persons. These, indeed, ought to be corrected 
and punished, but the sacraments should be acknowledged and revered.790 
 
Augustine further argued that there are not two baptisms. For him, the just and the unjust have not two 
different baptisms but only one baptism, and he believed that both heretics and schismatics, as well as 
Donatists and Catholics, all equally and commonly possessed and administered the one baptism of 
Christ. He maintained that baptism, strictly speaking, is not putting on the Donatist or the Catholic 
Church, but it is putting on Christ. Augustine did not regard a baptised person as having been converted 
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unto the minister that baptised him, ‘but unto the living God’; nor did he the recipient of baptism believe 
in the minister; ‘but in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,’ Augustine insisted. The baptism of 
Christ according to Augustine does not make one a heretic or a schismatic, it is rather, the wicked 
perfidy of separation from the unity of the Church that does that.791 The Donatist attempt to defend 
rebaptism by the example of Apostle Paul at Ephesus, who caused certain men who had been baptised 
with the baptism of John to be baptised with the baptism of Christ, is wholly misleading, since that 
Apostle did not reiterate the baptism of John but gave the baptism of Christ to those who lacked it. The 
schismatic and the heretic are in a quite different situation. The baptism they receive is the baptism of 
Christ, and it is not the Christian sacraments which they receive which make them heretical but their 
wicked separation. For this reason, Augustine does not command the Donatists to cease to give the 
sacraments, but to cease to give them in separation; nor does he forbid their lay people to cease to 
receive, but to cease to receive in separation; nor does he forbid their lay people to cease to receive, but 
to cease to receive in separation. Indeed, he lays it down as a principle that, in a case of extreme necessity, 
a Catholic catechumen who cannot find a Catholic priest may receive baptism from a Donatist, so long 
as he guards in his heart the Catholic peace. If he should then die, the Catholic Church will reckon him 
among her members; and if he should survive and return to a Catholic congregation, his action will not 
merely be condemned but will be applauded.792     
Thirdly, Augustine distinguished between the validity of baptism and its fruitfulness. By this 
distinction Augustine would claim that the Donatists were validly baptised, but they would not enjoy 
the fruits of baptism – forgiveness of sins, eternal life – unless they ended their schism and rejoined the 
church.  
 
‘Can the power of baptism,’ says Cyprian, ‘be greater or better than confession? Than 
martyrdom? That a man should confess Christ before men, and be baptised in his own blood? 
And yet,’ he goes on to say, ‘neither does this baptism profit the heretic, even though for 
confessing Christ he be put to death outside the Church.’ This is most true; for, by being put 
to death outside the Church, he is proved not to have had charity, of which the apostle says, 
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‘Though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profits me nothing.’ (1 Co 13:3) 
But if martyrdom is of no avail for this reason, because it has not charity, neither does it profit 
those who, as Paul says, and Cyprian further sets forth, are living within the Church without 
charity in envy and malice; and yet they can both receive and transmit true baptism. 
‘Salvation,’ he says, ‘is not without the Church.’ Who says that it is? And therefore, whatever 
men have that belongs to the Church, it profits them nothing towards salvation outside the 
Church. But it is one thing not to have, another to have so as to be of no use. He who has not 
must be baptised that he may have; but he who has to no avail must be corrected, that what he 
has may profit him. Nor is the water in the baptism of heretics ‘adulterous,’ because neither is 
the creature itself which God made evil, nor is fault to be found with the words of the gospel 
in the mouths of any who are astray; but the fault is theirs in whom there is an adulterous spirit, 
even though it may receive the adornment of the sacrament from a lawful spouse. Baptism 
therefore can ‘be common to us, and the heretics,’ just as the gospel can be common to us, 
whatever difference there may be between our faith and their error—whether they think 
otherwise than the truth about the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit; or, being cut away 
from unity, do not gather with Christ, but scatter abroad, (Mt 12:30) — seeing that the 
sacrament of baptism can be common to us, if we are the wheat of the Lord, with the covetous 
within the Church, and with robbers, and drunkards, and other pestilent persons of the same 
sort, of whom it is said, ‘They shall not inherit the kingdom of God,’(1 Co 6:10) and yet the 
vices by which they are separated from the kingdom of God are not shared by us.793  
 
Because his theology represented a break from the traditional theology of North Africa, Augustine found 
it important to explain why Cyprian and other venerable figures had denied that heretics or schismatics 
could validly baptise.    
Along with debate with Donatists, it is necessary to take a look at controversy with the Pelagians in 
the dimension of caring for infant’s soul. This indicates that Augustine paid attend to infants as well as 
adults while Confucius and Mencius offer moral education for adults. A pivotal aspect of Augustine’s 
debate with the Pelagians was the interpretation of infant baptism. In 411, he faced a tribunal headed 
by Aurelius, Augustine’s friend and episcopal colleague in Carthage when Caelestius, one of Pelagius’s 
disciples, applied to be ordained for the church of Carthage. At this tribunal Paulinus, a deacon from 
Milan and Ambrose’s biographer, accused Caelestius of unorthodox stances: that the sin of Adam 
injured no one but himself and that newborn infants are in that state which Adam was in before the fall. 
While Caelestius was willing to grant the legitimacy of infant baptism, he was unwilling to accept that 
the transmission of original sin was part of Christian teaching.794 Augustine wrote:  
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And I suspect that there are still some here, especially in Carthage, but they now whisper in 
hiding, fearing the most well-founded faith of the Church. For in the church of the same city 
one of them by the name of Caelestius had already deviously begun to seek the honor of the 
priesthood, but he was brought by the solid faith and freedom of the brothers straight to an 
episcopal court on account of these discourses opposed to the grace of Christ. He was, 
however, forced to confess that infants must be baptised because they too need redemption. 
Although at the time he refused to say there anything more explicit about original sin, he did, 
nonetheless, do considerable harm to his position by the mention of redemption.795   
 
In On the Merits and Remission of Sins and on the Baptism of Infants and On the Grace of Christ and 
Original Sin, Augustine argues that Jesus and the apostles handed down the church’s practice of infant 
baptism in the aspect of the remission of sin.796 If infants were baptised, then they were baptised for 
the remission of some sin:  
 
Catholic Church … truly baptises infants for the remission of sins— not, indeed, sins which 
they have committed by imitation owing to the example of the first sinner, but sins which they 
have contracted by their very birth, owing to the corruption of their origin.797  
 
Early in the debate Augustine suggested that unbaptised infants were not saved, though he conceded 
that they would suffer only ‘the mildest condemnation of all’:  
 
Accordingly, one can correctly say that little ones who leave the body without baptism will 
be under the mildest condemnation of all. But one who preaches that they will not be under 
any condemnation misleads others very much and is himself very mistaken. For the apostle 
says, Judgment starts from one sin and leads to condemnation (Rom 5:16) and a little later, 
The sin of one led to the condemnation of all human beings (Rom 5:18).798  
 
What deeply offended him in Pelagian claims about infant sinlessness was that such claims implicitly 
denied that Jesus had saved infants, for if they were truly sinless, then there would be nothing for him 
to save them from.799 Augustine states:  
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Those who say that infancy has nothing in it for Jesus to save, are denying that Christ is Jesus 
for all believing infants. Those, I repeat, who say that infancy has nothing in it for Jesus to 
save, are saying nothing else than that for believing infants, infants that is who have been 
baptised in Christ, Christ the Lord is not Jesus. After all, what is Jesus? Jesus means 
Saviour.Jesus is the Saviour. Those whom he doesn't save, having nothing to save in them, 
well for them he isn't Jesus. Well now, if you can tolerate the idea that Christ is not Jesus for 
some persons who have been baptised, then I'm not sure your faith can be recognised as 
according with the sound rule. Yes, they're infants, but they are his members. They're infants, 
but they receive his sacraments. They are infants, but they share in his table, in order to have 
life in themselves.800 
 
With regard to the Pelagians’s argument that infant baptism is unnecessary and meaningless, Augustine 
stresses that Christ must have died for infants as ‘the Saviour’; ‘After all, Christ died for sinners (Rom 
5:6). But, if they are not held by any bond of sinfulness stemming from their origin, how did Christ, 
who died for the sinners, die for these infants who obviously have done nothing sinful in their own 
lives?’801 In fact, he took the anxiety of mothers who brought their children for baptism and the crying 
of the infants themselves as signs of the inner yearning for the liberation that only Christ could bring. 
By their baptism, infants came to enjoy the ‘benefits of the Mediator’: they were delivered from evil 
from evil, reconciled with God, enlightened by the Spirit, and incorporated into the body of Christ, the 
church.802  
 
Marriage: Procreation, Fidelity, and Sacramental Bond  
Augustine’s thought on marriage developed throughout his lifetime. His thought on marriage developed 
as the result of dealing with these different situations and controversies. Augustine reflected upon 
marriage soon after his conversion to Christianity. He then modified and expanded his thought on this 
topic largely in response to challenges to marriage proposed by different heretical groups. Early in his 
life as a Christian, Augustine addressed the Manichean view of marriage. Shortly after the year 400, 
Augustine addressed the errors of Jovinianism. Finally, at the end of his life Augustine entered 
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theological battles with the Pelagians. In each of these controversies and throughout his life as a 
Christian Augustine upheld the goodness of marriage.803  
He addressed the topic of Christian marriage in several of his works from his early writings. In the 
Soliloquia written between his conversion in 386 and his baptism in 387, for example, he writes that ‘I 
have decided that there is nothing I should avoid so much as much as marriage. I know nothing which 
brings the manly mind down from the heights more than a woman’s caresses and that joining of bodies 
without which one cannot have a wife.’804 Such as perspective still dominates the Confessiones, where 
Augustine describes marriage primarily as a safe harbour from the shipwrecks caused by youthful 
sexual desire:  
 
Was there no one to lull my distress, to turn the fleeting beauty of these new-found attractions 
to good purpose and set up a goal for their charms, so that the high tide of my youth might 
have rolled in upon the shore of marriage? The surge might have been calmed and contented 
by the procreation of children, which is the purpose of marriage, as your law prescribes, O 
Lord. By this means you form the offspring of our fallen nature, and with a gentle hand you 
prune back the thorns that have no place in your paradise.805  
 
Between his baptism (387) and his ordination to the priesthood (391) Augustine wrote De Genesi contra 
Manichaeos around 388-389 in order to refute the Manichean interpretation of the book of Genesis. The 
Manichees taught a dualistic cosmology in which the forces of light and darkness (good and evil, God 
and matter) were opposed to each other. Under the Manichean scheme marriage and sexuality were evil 
because procreation led to the imprisonment of spiritual souls of light in material bodies. Augustine 
was a follower of Manichaeism from around 373-383/84 and was intent upon refuting the errors which 
had once seduced him. In particular, Augustine was concerned to uphold the goodness of God’s creation. 
This over-arching purpose must be kept in mind when one reads what Augustine writes in this work 
and other anti-Manichean works regarding marriage, because Augustine goes to great lengths to show 
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that as a part of God’s creation marriage is good:806  
 
This good, in fact, is threefold: fidelity, offspring, sacrament. What fidelity means is that 
neither partner should sleep with another person outside the marriage bod; offspring means 
that children should be welcomed with love, brought up with kindness, given a religious 
education; sacrament means that the union should not be broken up, and that if either for 
embellishing the fertility of nature, or putting straight the crookedness of lust.807  
 
Against the Manichees and their rejection of sexual intercourse and procreation as inherently evil, 
Augustine defended the goodness of the married state and the fact that marriage was instituted by God 
at the beginning of creation by citing the sayings of Jesus (Matt. 19:3-9) and the letters of Paul (1 Cor. 
7; Eph. 5).808  
By devoting three different treatises specifically to the topic of marriage such as De bono coniugali 
(401), De adulter inis coniugiis (419/420), and De nuptiis et concupiscentia (419/420) a new phase in 
Augustine’s reflections on marriage began. In his Retractationes, Augustine states that he wrote De 
bono coniugali in response to the controversy surrounding the monk Jovinian:  
 
The heresy of Jovinian, by equating the merit of consecrated virgins and conjugal continence, 
was so influential in the city of Rome that even some nuns, about whose incontinence there 
had been no suspicion heretofore, were precipitated into marriage, it was said, especially by 
the following argument: he kept urging them saying: ‘Are you, then, better than Sarah, better 
than Susanna or Anna?’ and by mentioning other women, highly praised according to the 
testimony of Holy Scripture, to whom they could not think themselves superior or even equal. 
In this way, too, he shattered the holy celibacy of holy men by reminding them of and 
comparing them with fathers and husbands.809  
 
In De bono coniugali and De sancta virginitate, Augustine began to engage a new opponent, the monk 
Jovinian who had been condemned in the early 390s at Rome and Milan for teaching that Christian 
marriage and celibacy were equally pleasing to God. Augustine not only responded by arguing that 
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celibacy is superior to marriage but also tried to show the genuine goodness of the marital relationship 
since some of Jovinian’s previous opponents such as Jerome had radically devalued marriage in their 
defence of celibacy. In other words, against Jerome and against those heretics such as the Manichees, 
who regarded sex and marriage as something evil, Augustine clearly delineates a variety of ‘goods’ in 
Christian marriage. In De bono coniugali Augustine articulated the idea of the three goods of marriage 
that was to become classic in Catholic moral theology: offspring (proles), mutual fidelity (fides), and 
the sacramental bond (sacramentum). According to Augustine, the primary and original good of 
marriage is the procreation of children. Although at the time of writing De bono coniugali Augustine 
had not yet made up his mind on the question of how the human race might have reproduced at the very 
beginning of creation, he was convinced that ‘in that condition of being born and dying with which we 
are acquainted, and in which we were created, the union of man and woman is something of value.’810 
Augustine shows that why God created human beings as men and women as follows:   
 
Every human being is part of the human race, and human nature is a social entity, and has 
naturally the great benefit and power of friendship. For this reason God wished to produce all 
persons out of one, so that they would be held together in their social relationships not only 
by similarity of race, but also by the bond of kinship. The first natural bond of human society, 
therefore, is that of husband and wife. God did not create them as separate individuals and 
bring them together as persons of a different race, but he created one from the other, making 
the side, from which the woman was taken and formed, a sign of the strength of their union. 
For those who walk together, and look ahead together to where they are walking, do so at each 
other's side. The result is the bonding of society in its children, and this is the one honourable 
fruit, not of the union of husband and wife, but of their sexual conjunction. For even without 
that kind of intimacy, there could have been between the two sexes a certain relationship of 
friendship and kinship where one is in charge and the other compliant.811 
 
Marriage is the ‘first natural bond of human society,’ and the producing of children is ‘the first social 
union of the human race.’812 Precisely because human nature is social, Augustine argues, God arranged 
for human beings to be connected to one another not only as members of the same species, but also by 
the bonds of physical kinship. Augustine acknowledges there could have been between the two sexes a 
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certain relationship of friendship and kinship without sexual conjunction, but he explains that marriage 
leads to ‘the bonding of society in its children, and this is the one honourable fruit, not of the union of 
husband and wife, but of their sexual conjunction.’ Augustine states:  
 
marriages also have the benefit that sensual or youthful incontinence, even though it is wrong, 
is redirected to the honourable purpose of having children, and so out of the evil of lust sexual 
union in marriage achieves something good. Furthermore, parental feeling brings about a 
moderation in sensual desire, since it is held back and in a certain way burns more modestly. 
For a certain seriousness attaches to the ardour of the pleasure, when in the act whereby man 
and woman come together with each other, they have the thought of being father and 
mother.813  
 
Marriage is a way for the formation of moral self in that becoming parents might make them virtuous. 
For Augustine, sexual intercourse is allowed in the condition of marriage. It is because sexual union is 
for the health of the race just as what food is for the health of a person.814 Augustine states: 
 
Neither is devoid of pleasure for the senses, and when this is regulated and put to its natural 
use under the restraint of moderation there cannot be passion. On the other hand, what 
forbidden food is in relation to sustaining life, fornication and adultery are in relation to 
seeking to have offspring; and what forbidden food is in the case of gluttony, unlawful 
intercourse is in the case of passion without desire for offspring; and what excessive appetite 
for lawful food is for some people, the intercourse that is excusable is for married persons.815  
 
Hence, Augustine claims that it is better to die without children than to look for descendants by an illicit 
union just as it is better to die of hunger than to eat food that has been sacrificed to idols.816 In other 
words, Augustine does not allow having children through concubinage. He images that one takes a 
concubine for a certain period and seeks only to have children from that relationship but the one do not 
want to marry her. He explains this situation as follows:  
 
In the same way, if anyone unfairly and wrongly usurped some land so as to give generously 
to charity with its produce, that would not justify the theft; and if another selfish and greedy 
person occupies land as a family estate or by legitimate acquisition, this is no reason to blame 
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the legal regulation that makes him the legitimate owner. Similarly, the illegitimacy of a 
tyrannical government will not become praiseworthy, because a tyrant treats the subject 
people with regal gentleness, nor the institution of royalty become detestable, because a king 
rages with tyrannical cruelty. Choosing to use unjust power justly is one thing; using just 
power unjustly is another.817  
 
Accordingly, Augustine claims that if temporary concubines have intercourse for the sake of having 
children, they do not thereby make their concubinage right while married women who are lascivious 
with their husbands do not make the institution of marriage responsible for their guilt.818 Nevertheless, 
according to Augustine, children of concubinage can be honourable and saved if they do not follow the 
vices of their parents and give God due worship: ‘Whatever person it comes from, the human seed is 
created by God, and while it will go badly for anyone who uses it badly, it will never itself be bad. Even 
so, just as the good children of adulterers do not justify the adulteries, so too the bad children of married 
persons are not the fault of marriage.’819 In this context, Augustine defends the fathers of the Old 
Testament. Augustine states:   
 
There is no comparison at all between the fathers of New Testament times who took 
nourishment because it was their duty, even though they ate it with natural physical enjoyment, 
and the pleasure of those who ate the food from sacrifices (1 Cor 8:7), or those who over-
indulged even in food that was not forbidden. So too the fathers of the Old Testament had 
intercourse because it was their duty, and their natural enjoyment of it was never let go to the 
point of becoming irrational or sinful passion, and there is no comparison between this and 
the depravity of adultery or married persons' excesses. Children have had to be provided for 
our mother Jerusalem, now spiritually and at that time physically, but always from the same 
source, love.820  
 
Augustine stresses that the fathers of the Old Testament had intercourse for ‘their duty’. Just as those 
who already longs to die and be with Christ, no longer takes nourishment because of a desire to go on 
living here but out of duty to remain in the body because of the needs of others, for holy men the lawful 
act of intercourse in marriage was an act of duty, not sensuality.821 Augustine regards the marriages of 
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the holy fathers as life of celibacy. It is not that Augustine does not find marriages comparable to their 
marriages for the same gift to mortal human nature is present in all of them equally; but he does not 
find persons making use of marriage whom Augustine would compare to the persons of those times 
who made use of marriage in a very different way. Augustine shows Abraham as a specific example for 
it: 
 
For this reason we have to go further, and ask what celibate persons might be comparable to 
those married persons. The alternative is to think that Abraham could not refrain from 
marriage for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, although for the sake of the kingdom of 
heaven he could resolutely sacrifice his only guarantee of descendants, which is the reason 
why marriage is held dear.822 
 
The particular significance of the sacrament in marriage varies according to its location in salvation 
history. For example, in the Old Testament divorce and polygamy were allowed; in the New Testament 
and subsequent Christian history, strict monogamy is the rule. Holy fathers possessed their own unique 
kind of sacramentality even though marriages were neither monogamous nor indissoluble in the Old 
Testament. Augustine wrote: 
 
Therefore, just as the sacrament of polygamous marriages of that age was a symbol of the 
plurality of people who would be subject to God in all nations of the earth, so too the 
sacrament of monogamous marriage of our time is a symbol that in the future we shall all be 
united and subject to God in the one heavenly city.823  
 
For Augustine, hence, the indissolubility of marriage is fundamental to its sacramentality in the 
Christian era.824   
In addition to procreation, for Augustine the good of marriage is the mutual fidelity of spouses. 
Fidelity is the commitment to engage in sexual relations only with one’s spouse to avoid adultery. But 
fidelity also involves the mutual responsibility of married persons to engage in sex with each other by 
relieving the pressure of sexual desire in order to help the other to refrain from adultery. Augustine 
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shows marriage as a remedy for sensuality for those who are lack in self-control as follows:  
 
In the same way there are men who are so lacking in self-control that they do not spare their 
wives even when they are pregnant. Whatever married people do between themselves that is 
impure or shameful or sordid, therefore, is a sin of the persons, not the fault of marriage. When 
the performance of the marriage duty is insisted on unreasonably, so that they have intercourse 
even when it is not for the purpose of having children, the apostle allows this as something 
that can be excused, though it is not something he lays down as a command. So, even if a 
perverted morality motivates them to have intercourse like that, marriage still saves them from 
adultery or fornication. It is not that conduct of that kind is accepted because of marriage, but 
it is forgiven because of marriage. Married people, therefore, not only owe each other fidelity 
in relation to sexual union for the sake of having children, which in this mortal state is the 
human race's first social union, but also in a certain way they owe each other a mutual service 
to relieve each other's weakness, and thereby avoid illicit unions. As a result even if one of 
them favours permanent abstinence, this is not possible unless the other agrees to it. It is for 
this reason that the wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does; 
and likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does (1 Cor 
7:4), so that they will not refuse each other what the husband looks for from the marriage or 
the wife looks for from the husband, even when it is not for the sake of having children but 
because of weakness and lack of self-control. In this way, with Satan tempting them, they will 
not lapse into depraved conduct deserving of damnation because of the lack of restraint of one 
or other or both of them. Marital intercourse for the sake of procreating is not sinful. When it 
is for the purpose of satisfying sensuality, but still with one's spouse, because there is marital 
fidelity it is a venial sin. Adultery or fornication, however, is a mortal sin.825 
 
Augustine argues that it is no sin to have sex with one's partner for this reason, even apart from the 
intention to procreate. The married person who seeks sexual relations out of excessive desire (‘the 
concupiscence of the flesh’) commits a sin that is forgivable, but adultery is a sin.826 Augustine 
describes fidelity as ‘a mutual service to relieve each other's weakness, and thereby avoid illicit unions.’ 
Why does he focus on the weakness of will? It derived from his experience. Before conversion into 
Christianity, Augustine was not interested in fulfilling the duties of maintaining a well-ordered marriage 
and raising a family. At this time, he was ‘a prisoner of habit’ due to ‘suffering cruel torments through 
trying to satisfy a lust that could never be sated.’827 He was bound down by this disease of the flesh 
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827 conf. 6.12.22. In contrast to Augustine, Aristotle stresses the importance of habit in acquiring virtue (EN 
1098b28). For Aristotle the relation between happiness and virtues is quite ambiguous to be regarded as ‘means-
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be clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, — that is, that by means of what is material and 
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and was afraid to be freed from it.828 In book VIII of the Confessiones, Augustine shows the conflict of 
two wills at the scene of his conversion in relation to sexual desire:  
 
I longed to do the same, but I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon me by another, but by 
my own will, which had the strength of iron chains. The enemy held my will in his power and 
from it he had made a chain and shackled me. For my will was perverse and lust had grown 
from it, and when I gave in to lust habit was born, and when I did not resist the habit it became 
a necessity. These were the links which together formed what I have called my chain, and it 
held me fast in the duress of servitude. But the new will which had come to life in me and 
made me wish to serve you freely and enjoy you, my God, who are our only certain joy, was 
not yet strong enough to overcome the old, hardened as it was by the passage of time. So these 
two wills within me, one old, one new, one the servant of the flesh, the other of the spirit, were 
in conflict and between them they tore my soul apart.829  
 
Even though the new will that would worship and enjoy God emerges in his mind, it struggles to 
overcome the old will as the legacy of habit for sexual desire. The force of habit leads to devastating 
the new will.830 Augustine demonstrates the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord can cure it.831 
In other words, sexual desire is an inevitable matter for those who are lack in self-control. In this context, 
                                           
temporary we may lay hold upon that which is spiritual and eternal.’ (doc. Chr. 1.4.) In Resurrection and Moral 
Order, Oliver O’Donovan raises the question about whether virtue ethics can provide soteriological answer as 
follows; ‘An ethic of character, therefore, raises the soteriological question in relation to morality; that is why the 
Catholic tradition of moral theology has been right to retain it. However, it does not answer that question 
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for agents to remake their own wills ex nihilo—and also explains why both Pelagian and modern concepts of the 
will as sheer volition go wrong when they abstract the will from time and memory. However, for Augustine virtues 
as the gift of God ‘enable us to work at attaining salvation.’ (Kent, ‘Augustine’s ethics’, 212) For Augustine 
salvation is the purpose of life while virtues are a mean to attain it. Augustine insists that no one can have true 
virtue without true piety such as true worship of the true God rather than habit and learning Aristotle suggested. 
(civ. Dei. 5.19, 19.4) ‘It is for this reason that the virtues which it seems to itself to possess, and by which it 
restrains the body and the vices that it may obtain and keep what it desires, are rather vices than virtues so long 
as there is no reference to God in the matter.’ (civ. Dei. 19.25.) Habituation simply anchors them more deeply in 
pride and self-love. He regards habit as the enemy of virtue. For Augustine character depends on the will by which 
one might break the bonds of habit and turn away from one’s own past, so the importance of conversion, the 
‘turning around’ that marks the decisive moment in a Christian’s life. God is external good so that through human 
efforts virtue cannot be achieved. (civ. Dei. 19.4.) 
828 conf. 6.12.21.  
829 conf. 8.5.10.  
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he shows that the pressure of sexual desire can be relieved in the condition of marriage.  
The third good of marriage that Augustine shows is what he calls its sacramentum, that is, its 
significance as a sacred symbol or sign. Augustine defines marriage as an outward and visible sign of 
an inward and invisible grace. Augustine is among the very first to articulate the notion of the 
sacramentality of Christian marriage, which to him means its character as a union that is both 
monogamous and indissoluble until the death of one of the spouses. In De nuptiis et concupiscentia, 
Augustine demonstrates the indissolubility of marriage through the sacramentality of Christian marriage 
as follows:  
 
It is certainly not fecundity only, the fruit of which consists of offspring, nor chastity only, 
whose bond is fidelity, but also a certain sacramental bond in marriage which is recommended 
to believers in wedlock. Accordingly it is enjoined by the apostle: Husbands, love your wives, 
even as Christ also loved the Church. Of this bond the substance undoubtedly is this, that the 
man and the woman who are joined together in matrimony should remain inseparable as long 
as they live; and that it should be unlawful for one consort to be parted from the other, except 
for the cause of fornication. For this is preserved in the case of Christ and the Church; so that, 
as a living one with a living one, there is no divorce, no separation forever. And so complete 
is the observance of this bond in the city of our God, in His holy mountain — that is to say, in 
the Church of Christ— by all married believers, who are undoubtedly members of Christ, that, 
although women marry, and men take wives, for the purpose of procreating children, it is 
never permitted one to put away even an unfruitful wife for the sake of having another to bear 
children.832 
 
For Augustine, marriage is ‘a certain sacramental bond’, so that divorce is not allowed. Just as Christ 
loved the Church, the man and the woman who are joined together in matrimony should remain 
inseparable as long as they live:  
 
We can say now that in that condition of being born and dying with which we are acquainted, 
and in which we were created, the union of man and woman is something of value. The divine 
Scripture is so much in favour of this union that it is not lawful for a woman put aside by her 
husband to marry another as long as the husband lives, nor for a man put aside by his wife to 
take another, unless the woman who has separated from him has died. As even in the Gospel 
the Lord confirmed that marriage is something of value, not only because he forbade divorce 
except for the reason of adultery, but also because he attended a wedding as a guest, so with 
good reason one asks in what lies its value.833  
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This indicates that divorce or separation is not acceptable when a wife cannot procreate children. For 
Augustine, the good of marriage is:  
 
not only because of the procreation of children, but also because of the natural sociability that 
exists between the different sexes. Otherwise in the elderly it would no longer be called 
marriage, especially if they had lost their children or had not had any. As it is, however, in a 
good marriage, even with older people, although the passion of youth between man and 
woman has waned, the relationship of love between husband and wife continues strong, and 
the better persons they are, the earlier they begin by mutual consent to abstain from carnal 
union. So what happens is not that later on, by necessity, they are not able to do what they 
would like to do, but that beforehand, to their credit, they choose not to do what they are able 
to do. If, therefore, they are faithful to the duty of honor and respect of one sex for the other, 
even though their bodies are feeble and deathlike, the chastity of minds properly joined in 
marriage is so much more honourable for being more genuine, so much more secure for being 
more fully accepted.834  
 
Furthermore, Augustine deals with divorce in relation to apostasy since both of them are linked to the 
matter of sacrament; ‘In like manner the soul of an apostate, which renounces as it were its marriage 
union with Christ, does not, even though it has cast its faith away, lose the sacrament of its faith, which 
it received in the laver of regeneration. It would undoubtedly be given back to him if he were to return, 
although he lost it on his departure from Christ. He retains, however, the sacrament after his apostasy, 
to the aggravation of his punishment, not for meriting the reward.’835 Likewise, Augustine claims that 
divorce is guilty of adultery on the basis of the law of the gospel. He makes an emphasis on enduring 
as the rights of marriage between those who have contracted them as long as they both live. To be sure, 
‘if the husband die, with whom a true marriage was made, a true marriage is now possible by a 
connection which would before have been adultery. Thus between the conjugal pair, as long as they live, 
the nuptial bond has a permanent obligation, and can be cancelled neither by separation nor by union 
with another. But this permanence avails, in such cases, only for injury from the sin, not for a bond of 
the covenant.’836 Augustine shows the marriage of Joseph and Mary who are parents of Christ as the 
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perfect good of the nuptial institution. It is because there was, offspring, faithfulness, and the bond in 
that as offspring the Lord Jesus Himself; the fidelity, in that there was no adultery; the bond, because 
there was no divorce:  
 
Only there was no nuptial cohabitation; because He who was to be without sin, and was sent 
not in sinful flesh, but in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom 8:3) could not possibly have been 
made in sinful flesh itself without that shameful lust of the flesh which comes from sin, and 
without which He willed to be born, in order that He might teach us, that everyone who is 
born of sexual intercourse is in fact sinful flesh, since that alone which was not born of such 
intercourse was not sinful flesh.837  
 
How did Joseph become the father of Christ? Augustine demonstrates that it derives from true wedlock 
between Mary and Joseph as follows:   
 
But God forbid that the nuptial bond should be regarded as broken between those who have 
by mutual consent agreed to observe a perpetual abstinence from the use of carnal 
concupiscence. Nay, it will be only a firmer one, whereby they have exchanged pledges 
together, which will have to be kept by a special endearment and concord—not by the 
voluptuous links of bodies, but by the voluntary affections of souls. For it was not deceitfully 
that the angel said to Joseph: Fear not to take unto you Mary your wife. (Mt 1:20) She is called 
his wife because of her first troth of betrothal, although he had had no carnal knowledge of 
her, nor was destined to have. The designation of wife was neither destroyed nor made untrue, 
where there never had been, nor was meant to be, any carnal connection. That virgin wife was 
rather a holier and more wonderful joy to her husband because of her very pregnancy without 
man, with disparity as to the child that was born, without disparity in the faith they cherished. 
And because of this conjugal fidelity they are both deservedly called parents (Lk 2:41) of 
Christ (not only she as His mother, but he as His father, as being her husband), both having 
been such in mind and purpose, though not in the flesh.838 
 
Joseph had no carnal connection with Mary, so it was not necessary to marry her. Nevertheless, he did 
not withdraw. For Joseph the virgin wife was a holier and more wonderful joy because of her very 
pregnancy without man. Augustine states:  
 
since she bore Him without his engendering, they could not surely have both been His parents, 
of that form of a servant, if they had not been conjugally united, though without carnal 
connection. Accordingly the genealogical series (although both parents of Christ are 
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mentioned together in the succession) had to be extended, as it is in fact, down rather to 
Joseph's name, that no wrong might be done, in the case of this marriage, to the male, and 
indeed the stronger sex, while at the same time there was nothing detrimental to truth, since 
Joseph, no less than Mary, was of the seed of David, of whom it was foretold that Christ 
should come.839  
 
Thus, they are both deservedly called parents of Christ owing to the conjugal fidelity.  
In his later two books De adulterinis conjugiis, Augustine intensively defends indissolubility of 
marriage on the basis of the Scripture. There Augustine focuses on the biblical grounding of the 
prohibition of divorce and remarriage. It is because it was written in the course of responding to 
questions proposed by Pollentius who read Augustine's two books, The Lord's Sermon on the Mount, 
and was troubled by his strict interpretation of Jesus' teaching on divorce in Matthew 5:31-32 and 
Matthew 19:9. Book one is concerned primarily with the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:10-18 and 
Matthew 19:9. Reading Paul in the light of Matthew, Pollentius claims that a distinction should be made 
between divorce that takes place because of unchastity and divorce that occurs on other grounds. In 
both cases, Pollentius argued, divorce is allowed. When adultery has occurred, Pollentius suggested, 
remarriage is allowed as well, because of Matthew's exception. Paul's prohibition of remarriage, he 
argued, applies only in cases where spouses separated for reasons other than adultery.840 With regard 
to Pollentius’ views, Augustine strongly rejects. He argues that Matthew 19:9 implies that the only 
legitimate reason for the separation of spouses is adultery. Augustine notes that neither the gospel nor 
Paul admits any other grounds for divorce; unilateral separation, even for the sake of pursuing a life of 
continence, is to be rejected. And in cases of divorce because of adultery, Augustine maintains, the 
marriage remains intact, and remarriage is forbidden. He states:  
 
Since, therefore, we say that even the woman who divorces a husband who commits adultery 
is not allowed to remarry, whereas you say it is allowed, but not advisable, without argument 
we both say that the one who divorces a husband who commits adultery ought not remarry. 
What is at issue is that we say that, when both the partners are Christians, a woman is not 
allowed to remarry if she leaves a husband who commits adultery, but if the husband does not 
commit adultery she is not allowed to leave him at all, whereas you say that if a woman leaves 
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a husband who is not guilty of adultery, it is not right for her to remarry because of a 
commandment, but if she leaves a husband who is guilty of adultery, it is not advisable for her 
to remarry because of the scandal. You say, therefore, that, if she intends to remain unmarried, 
a woman is allowed to leave her husband, whether or not he commits adultery.841 
 
In response to Pollentius' objection that in Matthew 19:9 Jesus makes a clear exception for divorce in 
the case of adultery, Augustine suggests that this exception means that remarriage after a spouse has 
been divorced because of adultery is less culpable than remarriage in other cases; nonetheless, 
remarriage is prohibited in all cases:  
 
Who are we to say that one person who marries again after divorcing his wife commits 
adultery, but someone else who does this does not commit adultery, when the gospel says that 
everyone who does it commits adultery? Hence, if anyone, that is everyone, who does this—
divorces his wife and marries someone else—commits adultery, then without doubt this 
includes the two, both the one who divorces his wife when it is not for adultery and the one 
who does so on account of adultery. This is what Whoever divorces means; this is what 
Everyone who divorces means.842  
 
Augustine appeals to the fact that the gospels of Mark (10:11-12) and Luke (16:18) contain the 
prohibition of divorce in an unqualified form and, therefore, the qualified prohibition of Matthew 19:9 
must be read in the light of these other gospels.843 How did Augustine deal with the matter of adultery? 
He shows the ground of forgiving the sin of adultery in Christ. For Augustine, it is not difficult for a 
husband or wife to forgive the other partner who committed adultery because if there is faith. Through 
baptism and penance, they were cleansed and healed. These crimes were not washed away by any 
sacrifices in the Old Testament where it was absolutely forbidden to take a wife contaminated by another 
man. Yet, these ones were washed away by the blood of the New Testament. Regarding this views, 
Augustine shows David and Jesus as examples:  
 
although David unhesitatingly accepted back the daughter of Saul, whose own father had 
taken her from him and given her to another man, he did this as a sign of what was to come 
in the New Testament. Now, however, Christ has said to the woman who committed adultery, 
Neither do I condemn you; go now and sin no more (Jn 8:11). After that, is there anyone who 
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does not understand that a husband should forgive what the Lord, the Lord of both of them, 
has forgiven, and a woman one believes has repented and had her crime wiped away by the 
divine mercy should no longer be called an adulteress?844  
 
In terms of divorce with a non-Christian spouse, Augustine interprets the text of 1 Corinthians 7:12-16 
in the perspective of the indissolubility of marriage. In the text, Paul demonstrates that Christians are 
not bound to remain in marriages with non-Christians, if the non-Christian spouse wishes to separate. 
In this case, Augustine acknowledges, the apostle has made an allowance for separation between a 
Christian and a non-Christian when the faith of the Christian is endangered. However, He stresses that 
a lawful (licere) separation may not always be ‘beneficial’ (expedire).845 Augustine wrote: 
 
It is permitted [to divorce an unbelieving spouse], but it is not good to do, because people 
might take offense at the breakup of marriages and abhor the very doctrine of salvation that 
forbids the things that are not permitted. They would then continue on in the same state of 
unbelief, worse than before and destined to perish. For this reason the apostle intervenes with 
the advice forbidding us to do what is permitted though not good. While the Lord does not 
forbid the faithful, men and women, to leave husbands or wives who are not believers, at the 
same time he does not command them to do so. If he did command it, the apostle's advice not 
to act in that way would be out of place. The Lord's faithful slave would never forbid doing 
what the Lord commands us to do.846  
 
When the non-Christian partner presents no obstacle to the Christian's faith, charity dictates that the 
spouses should remain together, so that the non-Christian partner might be converted.  
In book two of De adulterinis conjugiis, Augustine disputes Pollentius’ claim on spiritual death by 
adultery as follows:   
 
You say this because you think those words of the same apostle, A woman is bound to her 
husband, as long as he lives; but if her husband dies, she becomes free, and she may marry 
as she chooses (1 Cor 7:39), should be taken to mean that a husband or wife who has 
committed adultery should be regarded as having died, and therefore after adultery the other 
partner, husband or wife, is allowed to marry again, in the same way as after the partner's 
death.847  
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According to Augustine, Pollentius presents that the ‘death’ to which Paul refers is the spiritual death 
caused by adultery. In this way Pollentius had taken Paul to agree with Matthew 19:9, the passage in 
which Jesus allowed an exception to the rule against divorce and remarriage in cases where one spouse 
was guilty of adultery. Augustine rejects Pollentius' interpretation, arguing that even when a spouse has 
been legitimately divorced because of adultery, the ‘bond of marriage’ lasts until the death of one of 
the spouses. For example, if a wife divorces an adulterer, she too may not enter a union with anyone 
else; for she is bound as long as her husband is alive, and only if he dies is she freed from the law of 
her husband and so able to be with another man without being an adulteress.848 Like the sacrament of 
baptism, which remains valid even after serious sin and excommunication, Augustine argues, the bond 
of marriage remains intact even when a divorce has occurred because of adultery: 
 
When someone guilty of some crime is excommunicated, the sacrament of rebirth remains 
present in that person, and that person does not lose that sacrament even if he or she is never 
reconciled with God. In the same way, when a wife is divorced for committing adultery, the 
bond of the marriage union remains in her, and she does not lose that bond even if she is never 
reconciled with her husband. She will lose it, however, if her husband dies. The person who 
suffers the penalty of excommunication, on the other hand, will never lose the sacrament of 
rebirth, even if he or she is never reconciled, because God never dies.849  
 
In this context, just as Christ forgives the sin of adultery, Augustine urges Christians to forgive the 
adulterous spouse. Augustine criticises false advice that simply divorce those adulteresses and marry 
someone else who can comfort you while the first spouse is still alive. He thinks that the purpose of 
such arguments is not ‘out of respect for God, but for the freedom to marry again’:  
 
Finally, I ask you whether, either by the old law of God or by Roman law, a Christian husband 
is allowed to take the life of an adulteress? If it is allowed, then it is better for him to refrain 
from both actions, namely, the punishment that is lawful because the woman has sinned, and 
the marriage that is unlawful because she is still living. If he insists on choosing one or the 
other, it is more acceptable for him to do what is lawful for him to do, have the adulteress 
punished, than to do what is not lawful, commit adultery while she is still living.850  
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However, everyone cannot forgive the other partner who commits adultery. In this case, Augustine 
advises that it is better for those who are afraid to take back partners who committed adultery to stay 
celibate rather than remarry.851 It is because this is not broken, even when the wife is separated after 
being divorced by an innocent husband. Augustine states: 
 
For, whether he is an adulterer or chaste, a woman is bound to her husband, as long as he 
lives (1 Cor 7:29), and she commits adultery if she marries anyone else; and the man, since he 
is tied to his wife as long as she lives, whether she is an adulteress or chaste, commits adultery 
if he marries another woman.852  
 
According to Augustine, it is broken only by the death of the husband, not when he commits adultery 
but when he leaves the body. Hence, he advises that if a woman leaves a husband who commits adultery, 
and she does not choose to be reunited with him, she must remain unmarried; and if a man divorces a 
wife who commits adultery, and he does not choose to take her back, even after she has repented, then 
he must stay celibate. Augustine warns that if they do not this out of desire to choose the greater good, 
then certainly they must do it to avoid deadly evil:  
 
So then, even after divorcing a wife who is an adulteress, with any other woman he is an 
adulterer, since not just this particular one or that particular one, but everyone who divorces 
his wife and marries someone else commits adultery (Lk 16:18). Consequently if there is little 
desire for the life of the saints free from the bond of marriage, let there be dread of the 
punishment of adulterers, and if celibacy is not chosen out of love, at least let the desires of 
the flesh be curbed by fear. If the effort is made because there is fear, because the effort is 
made there will also be love. We must not trust in our own strength, but must combine effort 
with prayer, so that the one who deters us from evil will fill us with goodness.853  
 
Augustine advises that celibacy must not be conducted by our won strength but by prayer. Augustine 
presents celibacy is possible with God’s help; ‘If the burden is Christ's, it will be light; and it will be 
Christ's, if there is faith, as this procures from the one who commands it the accomplishment of what 
he commands.’ 854  Augustine’s sacramental aspect of marriage is clearly different from that of 
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Confucius and Mencius.  
 
Music: Immutable Truth of Music as a Liberal Discipline   
For Augustine the final end is enjoyment of God. Virtue is not an end in itself but a means. In the process 
of being virtuous there are two kinds of activity on the part of the senses which prevent enjoyment of 
God: concupiscence of the flesh and eyes.855 Concupiscence of the flesh is called ‘pleasure-seeking’ 
which lure us to indulge in the pleasures of all the senses, and brings disaster on its slaves who flee far 
from God. Concupiscence of the eyes is called ‘curiosity’ which is ‘subject to a certain propensity to 
use the sense of the body, not for self-indulgence of a physical kind, but for the satisfaction of its own 
inquisitiveness.’856 In the Scriptures it is called ‘gratification of the eye’ since sight is the principal 
sense by which knowledge is acquired.857 Pleasure through concupiscence of the flesh pursues the 
beautiful, the melodious, the fragrant, the tasty and the silky, whereas curiosity seeks the opposite to all 
these, not because it wants to undergo discomfort but from lust to experience and find out.858 For 
example, no one obtain sensual pleasure in viewing a mangled corpse, but people congregate in order 
to experience ashen-faced horror if there is one lying anywhere.  
 
At the same time they are frightened that it may give them nightmares! Anyone would think 
they had been forced to look at the thing while awake, or had been persuaded to do so by some 
rumour of its beauty. The same holds for the other senses, but it would be tedious to pursue 
the point through them all.859  
 
Due to this unhealthy curiosity that freaks and prodigies are put on show in the theatre, likewise, men 
are led to examine the secrets of nature, which are not relevant to our lives, although such knowledge 
is of no value to them and they wish to gain it merely for the sake of knowing. It is curiosity, too, which 
causes men to turn to sorcery in the effort to obtain knowledge for the same perverted purpose. And it 
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even invades our religion, for we put God to the test when we demand signs and wonders from him, not 
in the hope of salvation, but simply for the love of the experience. 860  Hence, Augustine thinks 
concupiscence of the eyes is more seductive than concupiscence of the flesh.  
When it comes to music, concupiscence of the flesh is more related to it. According to Augustine, 
concupiscence of the flesh can be activated by sense of touch, taste, sight, smell, and hearing. Augustine 
shows his experiences of these temptations in Confessiones. In terms of sense of touch, As God 
commanded him to abstain from fornication, Augustine took even before he was ordained as a dispenser 
of sacrament owing to God’s grace. However, in his memory sexual images survived because they were 
imprinted there by ‘former habit’ (consuetudo). While he was awake they suggested themselves feebly 
enough, but in dreams with power to arouse him not only to pleasurable sensations but even to consent, 
to something closely akin to the act they represent. So strongly does the illusory image in his mind 
affect his body that these unreal figments influence him in sleep in a way that the reality could never do 
while he was awake.861 Augustine also deals with temptation of taste. He was taught to take food at 
mealtimes as medicine, but when he passed from uncomfortable need to tranquil satisfaction, the snare 
of concupiscence lies waiting for me in the very passage from one to the other. Augustine said that ‘for 
this transition itself was pleasurable and there is no other means of satisfying hunger except the one 
which we are obliged to take. And although the purpose of eating and drinking is to preserve health, in 
its train there follows an ominous kind of enjoyment, which often tries to outstrip it, so that it is really 
for the sake of pleasure that I do what I claim to do and mean to do for the sake of my health.’862 
Furthermore, he did not know how much food is required to maintain health. By using this uncertainty, 
his unhappy soul cheered up and marshalled excuses in its own defence, glad to take advantage of the 
ambiguity about what temperate preservation of health requires, and cloaked its self-indulgence under 
the pretence that health is being prudently provided for.863 In addition, Augustine shows how influential 
the temptation of sight is. According to him, men make innumerable things by every kind of art and the 
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skill of their hands such as clothes, shoes, pottery, and other useful objects, besides pictures and various 
works which are the fruit of their imagination. He points out that ‘they make them on a far more lavish 
scale than is required to satisfy their own modest needs or to express their devotion, and all these things 
are additional temptations to the eye, made by men who love the worldly things they make themselves 
but forget their own Maker and destroy what he made in them.’864 Above all, Augustine deals with 
matter raised by the temptation of hearing in the music of hymns as follows:       
 
I used to be much more fascinated by the pleasures of sound than the pleasures of smell. I was 
enthralled by them, but you broke my bonds and set me free. I admit that I still find some 
enjoyment in the music of hymns, which are alive with your praises, when I hear them sung 
by well-trained, melodious voices. But I do not enjoy it so much that I cannot tear myself 
away. I can leave it when I wish. But if I am not to turn a deaf ear to music, which is the setting 
for the words which give it life, I must allow it a position of some honour in my heart, and I 
find it difficult to assign it to its proper place. For sometimes I feel that I treat it with more 
honour than it deserves. I realise that when they are sung these sacred words stir my mind to 
greater religious fervour and kindle in me a more ardent flame of piety than they would if they 
were not sung; and I also know that there are particular modes in song and in the voice, 
corresponding to my various emotions and able to stimulate them because of some mysterious 
relationship between the two. But I ought not to allow my mind to be paralysed by the 
gratification of my senses, which often leads it astray. For the senses are not content to take 
second place. Simply because I allow them their due, as adjuncts to reason, they attempt to 
take precedence and forge ahead of it, with the result that I sometimes sin in this way but am 
not aware of it until later.865  
 
Augustine points out the matter raised by the pleasures of sound. He used to be fascinated by the music 
of hymns of well-trained voices rather than sacred word itself. As a result, it was hard for him to put it 
in proper place by treating it with more honour than it deserves. He knew that he ought not to allow his 
mind to be paralysed by the gratification of my senses. As he was deceived by sensuous gratification, 
he committed a sin inadvertently, and only realised it later. In order to avoid this trap from over-anxiety 
he made the mistake of being too strict on music. When this happens, he wished to exclude all the 
melody of those lovely chants to which the Psalms of David are habitually sung from my ears, and from 
the ears of the Church as well. For Augustine, it seemed safer to follow Athanasius’ advice, which is to 
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‘recite the psalms with such slight modulation of the voice that they seemed to be speaking rather than 
chanting.’866 On the other hand, Augustine acknowledges the value of music in ordering our self to 
God; ‘But when I remember the tears that I shed on hearing the songs of the Church in the early days, 
soon after I had recovered my faith, and when I realise that nowadays it is not the singing that moves 
me but the meaning of the words when they are sung in a clear voice to the most appropriate tune, I 
again acknowledge the great value of this practice.’867 
Music is an important part of Christian moral formation in being ordered to God rather than to self.868 
When compared to the extensive literature on works such as Confessiones, De civitate Dei, De Trinitate, 
or his commentary on the book of Genesis, Augustine’s De musica has been largely ignored in recent 
times. However, this work was storehouse of vocabulary, conceptualisation, topics of discussion or 
subject matter, as well as a basis for the discussion of music itself. During the medieval period, 
manuscripts of De Musica were the major sources of moral learning. 869 Why did music play an 
important role in moral learning in the medieval period? This can be explained through the role of music 
as liberal discipline in De Ordine, which was written as a catechumen awaiting baptism at Cassiciacum 
near Milan in 386-87. This treatise deals with the problem of order first at a metaphysical level, 
examining divine providence, good, and evil, then moves to a full-blown theory of an order of study in 
the liberal arts, whereby one can proceed from corporeal to incorporeal things. The classic dilemma – 
can God be both good and omnipotent in the face of evil – is quickly dismissed, and the inability of the 
human mind to grasp the overall divine order is urged instead. The ability to perceive the divine order 
is achieved through that spiritual and intellectual discipline which leads to knowledge of self and of the 
spiritual world. Only by withdrawing form knowledge of material things can the true beauty of the 
universe be understood. Augustine thinks the liberal arts directly contribute to the quality of the 
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Christian quest for love and knowledge of God, which is the pivotal core of happy life. For Augustine, 
the liberal arts lead the mind to God. Augustine states:  
 
the truly learned are those who, not allowing all the different realities to distract them, attempt 
their unification into a simple, true, and certain whole. Having done so, they can soar on to 
divine realities not rashly and by faith alone, but contemplating, understanding, and retaining 
them.870  
 
He planned to write individual treaties on grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, music, geometry, arithmetic, and 
astronomy, but he completed only two, on grammar and music. This is the first attestation of the 
systematisation of knowledge at two levels that will later be called the trivium and the quadrivium. The 
first level consists of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. On the first are grammar, the study of language 
in a very full sense, including literature and even history as part of the study of letters871; dialectic, the 
‘discipline of disciplines,’ which covers reason itself, including how to think, teach, and learn; and 
because people generally follow their feelings and habits rather than truth, rhetoric is added, to charm 
the crowd and move them to action for their own good.872 The second level consists of music, geometry, 
astronomy, and arithmetic. This is the task of contemplation of eternal truth by way of recognition of 
truth to the experience of happiness. This second step is made possible by the mathematical disciplines 
that lead the person from sensible, material things to intelligible numbers. Music is the study of rhythm 
in language and sound, and numeric proportion as the mathematical discipline. Augustine wrote:  
 
reason understand that number, both in rhythm and modulation, was supreme and all-
encompassing. It scrutinized number, therefore, most minutely. When reason realised that with 
the help of number it had organised all the foregoing, it called number divine and almost 
eternal. And so it grievously tolerated that the splendor and purity of number should be 
somewhat clouded by the material sound of voices. Now number is a mental construct and, as 
such, ever present in the mind and understood as immortal. Sound, on the other hand, is 
temporary and fleeting, but can be memorized.873  
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Geometry is the study of dimensions and thus number and astronomy is the study of distance, dimension, 
and number in the heavenly realm.874 These seem to be crowned by mathematics, the study of numbers 
themselves, which holds the key to the study of metaphysics, which in turn is necessary to successfully 
investigate basic questions about God and the soul.  
The representative evidence for Augustine’s continued high regard for the liberal disciplines is his 
De Musica.875 This treatise as an early work began from 387, shortly after Augustine’s baptism and 
shortly before the death of his mother, Monica. In six books, the work represents the only substantial 
result issuing from an ambitious project conceived of during the period following his return from 
Cassiciacum. Penetrated with his conviction that the liberal disciplines could provide an excellent ladder 
for the soul’s ascent, as O’Connell demonstrates, he intended to take those liberal disciplines in turn, 
presenting each of them in such a fashion as to lead the reader’s mind upward, through the corporeal to 
the incorporeal.876 The purpose of his treaties De Musica is to undertake connections of smallest units 
of sound material within describable, delimited units. In book 1 of De Musica Augustine writes of 
motion itself, of ‘rational motions,’ of complex as well as measured proportional motions, and ‘intervals 
of motion, in which two motions, congruent, effected voluptuousness.’877 In books 2-5 Augustine treats 
of the copulationes of individual sound discretions, as single syllables, into groups, which result in 
extensions or metric organisation – although the writer indicates that both terms, rhythm and meter, 
raise difficulties of definition. In Book 6, the liberal discipline of music, as Harrison shows, ‘is 
effectively transposed into a carefully arranged, systematic theology of God, Creation, the Fall and 
redemption: God is the eternal, immutable source of music (or rhythm/number); creation is brought into 
existence from nothing insofar as it possesses music (or rhythm/number); human beings fall insofar as 
they have become caught up in this music (or rhythm/number) and failed to look beyond it; they are 
redeemed insofar as they are once again inspired to love and delight in it as God’s creation (in other 
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words, to use it rather than enjoy it or take it as an end in itself).’878 In book 6 Augustine traces out the 
grades of the various numbers involved in poetic meters. Even the limited focus on meter brings the 
mind to realise that the universe entire is at every level formed into beauty by the pervasive power of 
number. He establishes a hierarchy leading from the lowest numbers accessible to sense observation, 
upward through six higher levels-the familiar septenary scheme remains intact-terminating at the very 
seat of intelligibility and beauty, the divine.879  In particular, the doctrine of the fall is discreetly 
insinuated in Augustine’s morality verses. Augustine is bringing his disciple to see that the various 
operations involved in the investigation of metrics suppose the existence, first, of sounding numbers, 
numerical proportions embodied in spoken verse; then reacting numbers embodied in the ear’s rhythmic 
reaction to the sounding numbers it hears. Another grade, of advancing numbers, is required to explain 
the soul’s capacity to produce numerically proportioned sounds. Still another grade is needed: the soul 
must harbour a store of sensible memorial numbers, equipping it to recognise meters it has become 
familiar with. Finally, but still on the sense-level, a fifth set of judicial numbers must account for the 
natural, pre-rational judgments of sense whereby sounds are found either pleasant or painful. 880 
Augustine sets out to rank these various grades of number hierarchically. The question swiftly arises 
whether sounding or reacting numbers are superior. Initially, the answer is entertained that the former 
seem to act toward production of the latter, and therefore, as causes to effects, must be of a higher order. 
But this would imply that the body is superior to soul, since the sounding numbers are evidently bodily, 
whereas the reacting numbers are present in the soul. This power of the body to act upon the soul 
Augustine concedes to be subject of amazement.881  
 
There is nothing lost in our looking more carefully. For, either we shall find in the human soul 
superior ones, or, if it should be clear there are none in it higher, we shall confirm these to be 
the highest in it. For it is one thing not to be, and another not to be capable of being found 
either by us or any man. But I think when that verse Deus creator omnium we quoted is sung, 
we hear it through reacting numbers, recognise it through memorial numbers, pronounce it 
through advancing numbers, are delighted through judicial numbers, and appraise it by still 
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others, and in accordance with these more hidden numbers we bring another judgment on this 
delight, a kind of judgment on the judicial numbers.882 
 
According to Augustine, the mind is raised from the consideration of changeable numbers in inferior 
things to unchangeable numbers in unchangeable truth itself. The implication is that the sound-
embodied numbers, which delight us in measures of verse as they strike our ear, proceed in downward 
cascade from the eternal numbers, which themselves proceed from God. Augustine states:  
 
We have only recalled what belongs most to this present discussion, that all this is done by 
God’s Providence He has created and rules all things through, so even the sinful and miserable 
soul may be moved by numbers and set numbers moving even to the lowest corruption of the 
flesh. And these numbers can be less and less beautiful, but they can’t lack beauty entirely. 
But God, most good and most just, grudges no beauty whether fashioned by the soul’s 
damnation, retreat, or perseverance. But number also begins from one, and is beautiful in 
equality and likeness, and bound by order.883  
 
This cosmic backdrop for the mind’s ascent from lowest to highest numbers and to God, the fount of 
numerical beauty, is precisely what Augustine had in mind when he conceived of his ambitious project 
on the disciplines. The mind must be led through corporeal to incorporeal realities. Augustine wrote:  
 
But God alone is superior to it, and only body is inferior to it, if you mean the soul whole and 
entire. … But when the Lord is neglected, intent on its servant with the carnal concupiscence 
it is seduced by, the soul feels the movements it gives its servant, and is less; yet not so inferior 
as its servant, even when it is ate the lowest in its own nature.884  
 
At the end of Book 6, Augustine suggests that music and the words are not just inseparable but one and 
the same thing. Augustine thinks that the reason why the immutable rules of music is possible, and the 
reason why he is able to use classical meter as a way of identifying the immutable truths of music in 
Books 1–5, is because God is the Creator of that music; He is the eternal, immutable rhythm who is 
heard in and through the temporal rhythms of music.885 In other words, the music and the words, the 
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In this chapter, I showed huge differences between classical Confucians and Augustine in li (禮) and 
sacrament in the formation of moral self as well as music (樂). Confucius highlighted ritual propriety 
because it makes harmony (和) possible in government. Hence, he urged to return to ritual propriety. 
According to Confucius, returning to ritual propriety is to practise benevolence by subduing one’s self. 
It is not supernatural. Returning to ritual propriety is not to look at what is contrary to ritual propriety, 
not to listen to what is contrary to ritual propriety, not to speak what is contrary to ritual propriety, and 
not to make any movement which is contrary to ritual propriety. It is about personal effort. In particular, 
Confucius stresses that the man of virtue ought to practise consistency of speech and action in 
accordance with ritual propriety. Interestingly, he stressed to rectify names as a specific method for 
rightly realising ritual propriety in managing government in the discussion of speech. In addition, 
Confucius extensively discussed ritual propriety in relation to the Mean (中庸). In terms of Confucius’ 
music, it has an important position in achieving happiness. However, it is not a mere pleasant pastime 
for joyful comfort and amusement, but represents a supreme spiritual force for the cultivation of one’s 
moral character as the purest sound of the heart. This indicates the transcendental aspect of Confucius’ 
music. Like other methods of his self-cultivation, Confucius’ music also focuses on how to live in 
harmony in communitarian aspect. It is because the nature of music is to take part in playing 
harmoniously together. 
Like Confucius, Mencius also highlighted the role of ritual propriety in relation to benevolence and 
righteousness. This indicates that ritual propriety is not utilitarian. Mencius states that the man of virtue 
carries out ritual propriety according to his nature which is the sense of shame unlike animals. In 
obtaining a government position, he emphasized to follow ritual propriety even though for the man of 
virtue taking an office is deeply important. He thought that funeral ought not to be dealt with utilitarian 
aspect but ritual propriety. Like Confucius, Mencius presented a vision of happiness resulting from the 
balanced practice of the great virtues such as benevolence, righteousness, wisdom. The content of music 
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is the happiness that comes of delighting in such virtues. Given that such virtues are inextricably related 
to filial piety in the context of family life, the essence of music should be understood in a communitarian 
way. Hence, he highlighted how to enjoy music in the perspective of community. 
In contrast to Confucius and Mencius who emphasised human efforts to conduct ritual propriety, 
Augustine offered how grace enters to the formation of moral self through sacraments such as baptism 
and marriage in the course of ordering mind to God rather than self. Augustine thinks that personal 
effort is not sole means for caring of moral self. Contrary to Confucius and Mencius, Augustine makes 
a room for grace through sacraments in the formation of moral self. Augustine’s view of the sacraments 
is based upon the conception of Christ, the high priest without sin, who is the sole giver of sacramental 
grace. However, it is necessary to observe that Augustine did not regard baptism as the completion on 
the way of salvation. He is against those who overemphasise the effects of baptism. Baptism gives us 
new start on the way of salvation and the full renewal of the image of God within our minds is only 
completed in the afterlife. In terms of marriage, he developed his idea on it in controversies with 
different heretical groups such as Manicheans, Jovinians, and Pelagians. According to him, advantages 
of marriage are procreation of children, mutual fidelity of spouses, and sacramentality of Christian 
marriage which means its character as a union that is both monogamous and indissoluble until the death 
of one of the spouses and in the situation of spouse’s adultery. If it is not acceptable, celibate is only 
available instead of remarriage. This indicates that for Augustine family is not utilitarian like Mencius. 
Confucius and Mencius focus on filial piety, so that funeral is hugely emphasised. However, for 
Augustine family is a place where the virtue of forgiveness takes place on the basis of sacramental bond 
beyond the functions of procreation of children and funeral. Like Confucius and Mencius, for Augustine 
virtue is not an end in itself but a means to achieve happiness. For Augustine the final purpose of life is 
the enjoyment of God. He pointed out that the temptation of hearing in the music of hymns prevents the 
enjoyment of God in the process of ordering our soul to God. On the other hand, in his early work 
Augustine regarded music as a liberal art that leads the mind to God. It is an important part of Christian 
moral formation. Music is the study of rhythm in language and sound, and numeric proportion as the 
mathematical discipline like other liberal arts such as grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, astronomy, 
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and arithmetic. These seem to be crowned by mathematics, the study of numbers themselves, which 
holds the key to the study of metaphysics, which in turn is necessary to successfully investigate basic 
questions about God and the soul. In De Musica, Augustine transposed the liberal discipline of music 
into a carefully arranged, systematic theology of God, Creation, the Fall and redemption: God is the 
eternal, immutable source of music (or rhythm/number); creation is brought into existence from nothing 
insofar as it possesses music (or rhythm/number); human beings fall insofar as they have become caught 
up in this music (or rhythm/number). The music and the words, the sound and signification of the hymn 




Chapter Five: Towards Confucian Augustinianism as a New Theological 
Perspective on Christian Ethics   
 
In this thesis my main aim was to show Confucian Augustinianism as a new theological angle on 
Confucian-Christian ethics and modern Augustinianism such as Augustinian realism, Augustinian 
proceduralism, Augustinian civic liberalism, and Radical Orthodoxy by discovering the analogies and 
differences in Confucius’ and Mencius’ self-cultivation and Augustine’s caring of the soul for 
cultivating virtue which bridges between Confucians and Augustine. In order to cultivate virtues 
Confucius and Mencius shows xue (學), si (思), and li (禮) including yue (樂).886 These methods offer 
a framework for comparing with Augustine’s moral learning, contemplation, sacrament, and music. As 
intertextual reasoning, as many scholars such as Gadamer, Clooney, Sugirtharajah, and Yeo argue, 
points out the limit of neutrality,887 such a comparison of Confucian and Augustinian accounts of 
formation in the virtues is not confined in academic discourse to just identifying their similarities and 
differences conducted by religious scholars in university settings who would seek to find a neutral 
standpoint. Comparative theology which requires faith is different from comparative religion, but the 
fields are not entirely separate. The comparative theologian also needs to be an academic scholar in the 
field of religious study.888 This research reveals new theological angles on the formation of moral self 
in the two traditions.  
This research presents a way to think about what a Confucian Augustinianism might look like, which 
might in turn inform Christian identities in Asian contexts shaped by Confucianism. Given that some 
urban Chinese intellectuals are converting to Protestantism, which is deeply formed by the Neoplatonic 
worldview of Augustine, 889  this intertextual reading of Confucianism and Augustinianism offers 
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theological hermeneutics on the formation of moral self to them.890 We have observed an antecedent to 
this thesis in the dialogues between Confucianism and Christianity initiated by Matteo Ricci, who was 
influenced by the Aristotelian worldview of Thomas Aquinas. Protestant missionaries to China in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as non-conformists are thought not to contribute to the East-West 
cultural exchange in spite of productive results of their charitable works such as hospitals and schools.891 
In this thesis, we have seen that dialogue between the two traditions which draws on an Augustinian 
perspective can be fruitful. In conclusion, we find that Confucian Augustinianism can be ‘a via media 
between the negative anthropology of Augustine and the positive anthropology of China traditional 
teachings.’892  
This thesis has used intertextual reasoning between Confucian and Augustinian traditions to crest a 
conceptual bridge around the acquisition of virtue in moral formation as described variously in the two 
traditions. For this task, I have sought neither Deontology nor Utilitarianism, neither syncretism nor 
theological authoritarianism, neither internalism nor transcendentalism, and neither communitarianism 
nor liberalism. 893  Instead, I have tried to show a middle way between conservative and liberal 
approaches.894 If the middle way set forth in this thesis needs a label to locate it in the context of East 
Asia, then Confucian Augustinianism would serve well in that the thesis shows potential for mutual 
learning in the dimension of constructive theology. Both classical Confucians and Augustine’s early 
works focus on the formation of moral self in order to acquire virtue which leads to happiness. This 
comparative work focuses on how to embody the Way of Heaven by cultivating virtue (德) rather than 
the theology of Heaven (天) or lists of virtues.895 There are three kinds of Confucian theology according 
to understanding of Heaven in the Confucian tradition. In the Confucian classics of Book of Documents, 
Books of Poetry, and Analects, Heaven is regarded as something transcendent of the world, similar to 
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the Christian God. For Neo-Confucians, Heaven is the wonderful life-giving activity transcending the 
world within the world. For contemporary Confucians such as Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan, and Tu 
Weiming Heaven is something ‘immanently transcendent’, the ultimate reality immanent in the world 
to transcend the world.896 Contrary to that understanding of Heaven, Confucian Augustinianism focuses 
on how to live on the basis of cultivating virtues rather than synthesis of the doctrine of God in relation 
to indigenisation and contextualisation.897 Confucian Augustinianism is different from the religious-
cultural theology of the Korean Methodist Church which was developed through discussions with 
indigenous traditions such as Shamanism (Yu Dong-Sik), Confucianism (Yun Sung-Bum who suggests 
that there are some traces of the Trinity in the myth of Dan-gun), and Buddhism (Byun Son-Hwan) in 
the aftermath of the reawakening of national consciousness after 1960.898 Confucian Augustinianism 
shows specific methods for sanctification by linking the self to family, community, nation, and 
transcendent God. 899  Confucian Augustinianism is different from the belief of many Western 
missionaries and Chinese Christians. They thought of ‘Confucianisation’ of Christian theology, usin
g the Confucian terminology or framework to articulate Christian theology, as the goal of their 
theological endeavours, especially before the twentieth century. Given that several frameworks for 
organising the broad landscape of Chinese and Korean Christian theology in the past has often tended 
to focus on certain debates and impasses, resulting in the use of labels like ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘patriot’, 
Confucian Augustinianism provides a new angle of Christian ethics beyond the two poles of 
religiophilosophical traditions and sociopolitical quests.  
This research has revealed a significant and crucial difference. For Confucius and Mencius the public 
sphere is more critical to identity formation as its end and goal, but Augustine is more drawn to a more 
inward trajectory in describing the moral formation and the core identity of the Christian. For Augustine 
the self is the metaphor of the soul in the struggle of both body and soul to construct a view of God in 
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which true happiness exists.900 For Augustine the formation of moral self is the process of finding truth, 
God. In moral learning Augustine highlights divine illumination by Christ as the inner Teacher rather 
than language by external teachers to secure certainty. Our minds have direct access to the eternal truth 
of reason in that the mind is illuminated with knowledge by the inner Teacher. By the light of Christ or 
the light of God the mind is able to distinguish the objects of intellectual vision. His moral learning is 
based on his doctrine of the image of God in that human beings were created to the image of the Trinity 
in the evidence of memory, understanding, and will. He presents the theological context of memory, 
understanding, and will as three aspects of the mind in the dimension of the Persons of the Trinity. Like 
the Persons of the Trinity, which is distinguished as one God, Augustine shows that their relations 
among memory, understanding, and will are equal to each as a whole and to all as wholes at the same 
time. For Augustine contemplation of God is to purify the self. As a way of purifying our minds, 
Augustine makes an emphasis on cultivating pure desires and virtuous habits. For him contemplation 
of things unseen, as immediate knowledge of a transcendent God discovered within the soul, plays an 
important role in the formation of moral self. Contemplation of eternal things is connected with wisdom 
as knowledge of God, not knowledge of temporal matter. Given that his understanding of contemplation 
drives from his depiction of human nature as a substantial unity of soul and body, contemplation is a 
binding of the mind to God. For Augustine sacrament is also the process of ordering the soul to God. 
In the process, he shows how grace becomes part of the formation of moral self through sacraments 
such as baptism and marriage. Augustine’s view of the sacraments is based upon the conception of 
Christ, the high priest without sin, who is the sole giver of sacramental grace. For Augustine baptism is 
the way in which God’s grace acts on us to forgive and wash away all previous sins, and the beginning 
of membership in the church, the body of Christ here on Earth, oriented toward its heavenly head, that 
is, Christ. For Augustine, Christ is the one who opens up the way to our heavenly country by forgiving 
our sins. However, it is necessary to observe that Augustine did not regard baptism as the completion 
on the way of salvation. He is against those who overemphasise the effects of baptism. Baptism gives 
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us a new start on the way of salvation but the full renewal of the image of God within our minds is only 
completed in the afterlife. For Augustine the weight of original sin cannot be neglected in the formation 
of moral self. For Mencius evil is the result of contact between a good human nature and a wicked 
environment whereas for Xunzi human nature is evil, but both agree in an overall optimism in the human 
potential in the formation of moral self.901 In Augustine’s early work he regards music as a liberal art 
that leads the mind to God. Music is the study of rhythm in language and sound, and numeric proportion 
as a mathematical discipline like other liberal arts such as grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, 
astronomy, and arithmetic. These seem to be crowned by mathematics, the study of numbers themselves, 
which holds the key to the study of metaphysics, which in turn is necessary to successfully investigate 
basic questions about God and the soul. In De Musica, Augustine transposed the liberal discipline of 
music into a carefully arranged, systematic theology of God, creation, the fall and redemption. The 
music and the words, the sound and signification of the hymn being sung are inseparable. This indicates 
that Confucian Augustinianism is not only a virtue-oriented theology but also a sin-oriented one. In 
Augustinian realism, Augustine’s controversial doctrine of original sin and his dramatic narrative about 
two cities were reconstructed in the threat of fascism and Marxism.902 Augustinian realism was closely 
allied with another kind of realism indebted to Machiavelli and Weber between World War I and the 
end of the Cold War. In Niebuhr’s version of politics, the central fact of human nature this side of the 
Eschaton is sin, and it is the purpose of government, not to eliminate sin, but to constrain or ameliorate 
its bad effects. Liberal democracy is the least bad form of government because it recognizes 
government’s limited, sin-constraining role. In defending it, Niebuhr argues it is necessary to have a 
realistic understanding of human nature and a willingness to use force and the threat of force in the 
interest of maintaining order and approximating justice. Augustinian realists offer a limited conception 
of politics as restraining evil, a conception that often travels with a troubling form of moral 
consequentialism. For Augustinian realists, sentimental attempts to drive a social ethics from the gospel 
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commandment of love are dangerous. However, Confucian Augustinianism highlights the importance 
of benevolent government by the man of virtue as a way of achieving peace and happiness. In order to 
raise the man of virtue Confucian Augustinianism offers specific methods such as moral learning, 
contemplation, sacramental ritual, and music. Confucian Augustinianism seeks economic reform for a 
just society through political reform by raising the man of virtue. It is different from Augustinian 
proceduralism which emerges in positive response to the massive influence of John Rawls’ theory of 
‘justice as fairness’ in 1970s and 1980s.903 Confucian Augustinianism provides justice in the national 
dimension whereas Augustinian proceduralism offers a minimalist conception of justice which 
privatizes important virtues such as friendship and compassion.  
For Confucius and Mencius the concept of self is different from Augustine. As Mencius states ‘the 
heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; the heart of shame, of righteousness; the heart of 
courtesy and modesty, of propriety; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom.’904 Humans already have 
potential-self in heart bestowed by Heaven. Such virtues exist in the human heart from the beginning 
as potential. Hence, Mencius emphasises self-reflection as a method for forming moral self in order to 
find virtues originally in the heart. Theses virtues are not infused from outside and universal to all people, 
so there are no differences between sages and people in finding such virtues in the mind. For him, the 
way to serve Heaven is to preserve one’s mental constitution, and nourish one’s nature. The man of 
virtue is not a unique being but the one who preserves such virtues in his heart. An achieved state of 
moral excellence is not an individual entity but a tendency. Just as Confucius highlights the importance 
of practice, Mencius stresses continually learning from sages such as the Way of Yao, Shun, and 
Confucius in order to overcome sexual desire and poverty which obstruct the goal of becoming the man 
of virtue. For Confucius and Mencius, the immanence of the Way lies in the human heart, which 
constitutes the foundation for the human potentiality for transcendence. This capacity for transcendence 
is what Christianity fails to recognise in the perspective of original sin. In contrast, for Augustine habit 
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cannot make humans perfect. The force of habit bound down by the disease of the flesh devastates the 
will of overcoming sexual desire. He states that the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord can 
cure it. Sexual desire is an inevitable matter for those who lack self-control. Hence, he demonstrates 
that the pressure of sexual desire can be relieved in the condition of marriage. In terms of inward 
sagehood, it is necessary for Augustine to learn from Confucius and Mencius who present moral 
pedagogies for ‘the proper conduct of daily life’ as the case for the Confucian Way.905 Augustine’s 
moral education, as Topping argues, can develop individuals in caring for the soul rather than 
societies.906 In Augustine’s view, progress is restricted due to the limitation of our knowledge and 
virtue. In the dimension of an eschatological goal, social progress is primarily in intellectual terms, 
secondarily in moral terms, and not at all in material terms. Hence, Topping insists, as Wetzel and 
O’Donovan argue, that Augustine’s pedagogy is best understood against the horizon of his evolution 
on the possibilities of human perfection, and in particular the limits of virtue which ‘can be encouraged 
but not guaranteed.’ 907  Augustine’s Christian virtue is far from perfect and his happiness is not 
complete. 908  Both Confucian Augustinianism and Augustinian civic liberalism pay attention to 
rectifying the limit of individualism. Augustinian civic liberalism emerged in 1990 in works by Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, Timothy P. Jackson, Rowan Williams, and Oliver O’Donovan on the roots of Paul 
Tillich, Martin Luther King Jr, Paul Ramsey, and Gustavo Gutierrez. Love of God and neighbour play 
a central role in an Augustinian social vision.909 Civic liberalism is a virtue-oriented liberalism that 
aims to avoid individualistic and rationalistic assumptions about human nature as well as romantic or 
totalitarian conceptions of political community.910 This relies on a virtue-oriented rather than merely 
sin-oriented Augustinian politics. 911  Civic liberalism corresponding to liberal perfectionism in 
contemporary political philosophy allows ideal conceptions of human flourishing into the full light of 
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the public square, conceptions that already shape practical deliberations of public decision-making and 
normatively evaluate the effects of liberal justice.912 However, given that Confucian Augustinianism is 
developed in the context of the rapid growth of East Asian Christians, Confucian Augustinianism 
realises Augustine’s Christian virtue in the public dimension by introducing methods for Confucian 
inward sagehood. Confucian Augustinianism leaves ample room for gradual process and transformation 
for sanctification in order to be renewed in God’s image through Confucian self-cultivation and 
Augustinian caring for soul. Confucian Augustinianism stresses the virtue of humility and sincerity (誠) 
in the process of cultivating virtues.       
I argue that Confucian Augustinianism offers an angle on Christian public engagement in the context 
of East Asia. Considering the Christian church has a calling to tell the truth about God in the light of 
Jesus Christ, and about human good and right action in the light of this God, Christians ought to 
participate in shaping public life by way of prophetic critique.913 In this context, this intertextual 
reasoning offers theological implications in public spheres as an important part of ‘doing’ theology in a 
multi-religious society.914 Comparing classical Confucians with Augustine enables Chinese public 
theologians to enlarge their horizons by relating their theology to their own tradition for solving their 
current socio-political issues as well as religious ones.915 Confucian Augustinianism as public theology 
has the aspect of theological contextualisation in the dimension of broader indigenisation.916 Confucian 
Augustinianism seeks happiness and virtue through multi-disciplinary engagement and open debate for 
a fair society. Confucian Augustinianism provides political and public perspectives, but it is different 
from liberation and political theologies such as Latin American liberation theology (Gustavo Gutiérrez, 
Leonardo Boff, José Míguez Bonino), Minjung theology (Suh Nam-Dong, Ahn Byeung-Mu), feminist 
theology (Elisabeth Fiorenza, Rosemary Ruether), black theology (James Cone, Dwight Hopkins, Allan 
Boesak), Dalit theology (A. P. Nirmal, Nirmal Minz, Sathianathan Clarke), and political theology 
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(Johann Baptist Metz, Jürgen Moltmann). Confucian Augustinianism is not limited in a specific race, 
ethnicity, gender, and class such as feminist theology, black theology, and Dalit theology. Confucian 
Augustinianism which is based on virtue ethics as common ground between Confucians and Augustine 
shows methodologies for engaging in public issues with civil society for its articulation of theology in 
the public sphere. Particularly, it is different from Latin American liberation theology. Both Confucian 
Augustinianism and Latin American liberation theology pay attention to the need for a just society for 
the poor and oppressed. Latin American liberation theology influenced by Marxism has the weak point 
of lacking spirituality, unlike Confucian Augustinianism. For Latin American liberation theologians, a 
system is evil or wrong like a Manichean view on the world. Augustine argues marriage was instituted 
by God at the beginning of creation by citing the sayings of Jesus against the Manichees and their 
rejection of sexual intercourse and procreation as inherently evil. 917  Every system in Confucian 
Augustinianism is not evil. In this context, Minjung theology, formed in the context of South Korea and 
influenced by Latin American liberation theology, faced a lack of support from general church members 
in spite of its contributions such as justice for minjung, having han that indicates the sense of deep 
despair and reconciliation of two Koreas.918 Unlike Latin American liberation theology and Minjung 
theology, Confucian Augustinianism offers profound spirituality with the engagement of Augustinian 
biblical and systematic theology.        
Confucian Augustinianism can also help overcome the limit of Augustinian accounts of the self. The 
Confucian concept of self is deeply situated within the family and society. For Confucius, moral learning 
is significantly public and political. He stresses the cultivation of virtue as a solution for solving political 
turmoil in relation to self-cultivation because it leads to benevolent government by fostering the man 
of virtue. He offers the Zhou dynasty as the ideal model of antiquity for an object of moral learning 
instead of exploring extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, spiritual beings, and death. In 
relation to ritual propriety, Confucius emphasises loyalty (忠) and reciprocity (恕) in the Book of Poetry.  
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He thought tradition and imitating good teachers are the best methods for the practice of virtue. Given 
that for Confucius the aim of moral learning is to cultivate moral self, he presents the importance of 
practicing filial piety (孝) and fraternal submission (弟) as a method of moral learning. Like Confucius, 
for Mencius becoming the man of virtue is extricable linked to establishing benevolent government 
since the purpose of ruler is to protect his people in supporting God. According to Mencius, kings ought 
to pay attention to the people even in commencing war because Heaven sees and hears through people’s 
eyes and ears. Considering political chaos raised by war in his time, for Mencius human unity created 
by benevolent government is the most powerful weapon. Mencius regards filial piety as a core of 
benevolent government, so he enthusiastically insists on reform of economic, social, and educational 
systems in the perspective of supporting filial piety. In other words, he thought moral learning of filial 
piety could be possible on the basis of economic and social supports for ordinary people. He stressed 
the importance of asceticism in moral learning for the superior. His anti-asceticism could be only 
justified in the relation between a king and the people. Ultimately, he stresses a moderate living in 
dealing only with lifestyle of the king in the evidence of the ancient sovereigns.  
Confucius’ ritual propriety is also highly public and political. He focuses on how to harmoniously 
live with others. That is to practise benevolence by subduing one’s self. It is about human behavior, not 
supernatural things. Returning to ritual propriety is not to look at what is contrary to ritual propriety, 
not to listen to what is contrary to ritual propriety, not to speak what is contrary to ritual propriety, and 
not to avoid any movement which is contrary to ritual propriety. It is about human behaviour. This 
indicates that the matter of practicing benevolence depends on the will of man. He highlights how the 
man of virtue maintains consistency of speech and action in accordance with ritual propriety. For 
Confucius, the man of virtue is modest in his speech, but exceeds in his actions. He regards the one who 
is hesitant in his speech as the benevolent person since he already understands the problem of narrowing 
the gap between speech and action. Hence, he emphasises the Mean (中庸) in ritual propriety. In relation 
to speech, Confucius made an emphasis on rectifying names as a specific method for rightly realising 
ritual propriety in managing government. It is because inappropriate names give rise to producing 
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language apart from the truth of thing results in failure of affairs which might prevent accurately 
conducting ritual propriety and music. The decline of ritual and music may lead to a situation that 
punishments are not properly awarded, so that the people do not know how to behave virtuously. 
Mencius also highlights the role of ritual propriety in relation to benevolence and righteousness. This 
indicates that ritual propriety is not utilitarian. Mencius states the man of virtue carries out ritual 
propriety according to his nature which includes a sense of shame, unlike animals. In obtaining a 
government position, he emphasises the importance of ritual propriety even though for the man of virtue 
taking an office is highly important. He thought that funerals ought not to be conducted with a utilitarian 
aspect but ritual propriety.  
Like other methods of his self-cultivation, for Confucius and Mencius music shows how to live in 
harmony, to be happy. For Confucius the nature of music is to take part in playing harmoniously 
together as a supreme spiritual force for the cultivation of one’s moral character. Mencius presented a 
vision of happiness resulting from the balanced practice of the great virtues such as benevolence, 
righteousness, wisdom. The content of music is the happiness that comes of delighting in such virtues. 
Given that such virtues are inextricably related to filial piety in the context of family life, the essence 
of music should be understood in political dimension. 
Compared to Confucius and Mencius, Augustine is less inclined to public engagement. Particularly, 
Augustine pays less attention to the public political self even though he also emphasises community in 
the formation of moral self. He deals with the formation of moral self in relation to how to channel 
sexual desire in the search for truth. He highlights the role of friendship in moral learning since it helps 
search for truth in life. As Augustine, in his youth, used to be led in the wrong direction not all friends 
made constructive contributions to his moral learning. Before conversion to Christianity, he planned to 
establish a common household with a group of his friends in the basis of friendship in order to live a 
life of peace away from the crowd. Friendship seemed to be a comfort in a human society filled with 
misunderstanding and calamities. After his conversion to faith in Jesus Christ in adulthood, however, 
his aim of friendship was transformed. For Augustine, the world is no longer pure material and true 
reality is only comprehended when we know of the transcendent God. In order to seek God he invited 
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a diverse group of friends such as Alypius, Nebridius, and Evodius to join him in friendship in the 
monastic community.919 By bringing together such a community, he attempted to pursue the happy life. 
They became friends in Christ. When Augustine retired to Cassiciacum in September 386 in the 
aftermath of his conversion, he gathered his friends to focus on spiritual understanding by entering upon 
a life of creative leisure. And then when he returned to Tagaste he attempted to organise his community, 
to found the personal relations within it upon a permanent code of behaviour, to be responsible for the 
measure of authority over them. At Hippo, Augustine put his heart and soul in the monastery in order 
to foster moral learning. The monastery instituted, inspired, and directed by Augustine became a pivotal 
development in the life of the church of Africa during the last decade of the fourth century and the first 
quarter of the fifth century.920 As his monastery became a ‘seminary’ in the true sense of the word, it 
came to form an influential group within African church.921 Augustine’s monastery was a community 
for seeking truth rather than political one.            
Marriage is highlighted by both classical Confucians and Augustine in connection with family. 
Contrary to Confucius and Mencius, who deal with it based on filial piety and public ritual practices 
such as a funeral, Augustine would uphold the goodness of marriage in the dimension of procreation, 
fidelity, and sacrament in relation to tackling sexual desire. For Augustine marriage is not a contract 
but a sacrament. The Manichees taught a dualistic cosmology in which the forces of good and evil were 
opposed to each other. Under the Manichean scheme marriage and sexuality were evil in that 
procreation led to the imprisonment of spiritual souls of light in material bodies. Against the Manichees 
and their rejection of sexual intercourse and procreation as inherently evil, Augustine defended the 
goodness of the married state and the fact that marriage was instituted by God at the beginning of 
creation by citing the sayings of Jesus (Matt. 19:3-9) and the letters of Paul (1 Cor. 7; Eph. 5).922 For 
Augustine, marriage is the first natural bond of human society, and offspring is the first social union of 
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the human race.923 Human nature is social, so God arranged for human beings to be connected to one 
another not only as members of the same species, but also by the bonds of physical kinship. Fidelity is 
the commitment to engage in sexual relations only with one’s spouse, to avoid adultery. But fidelity 
also involves the mutual responsibility of married persons to engage in sex with each other by relieving 
the pressure of sexual desire in order to help the other to refrain from adultery. For Augustine, marriage 
is a certain sacramental bond. It is a monogamous and indissoluble union until the death of one of the 
spouses. In the sacramentality of Christian marriage divorce is not allowed. Fundamentally, Augustine’s 
understanding of marriage is not political but sacramental. Both Confucian Augustinianism and Radical 
Orthodoxy highlight the use of a reading of Augustine, but Confucian Augustinianism is different from 
Radical Orthodoxy that emerged out of Anglican social thought (especially Christian socialism) as an 
intellectual, cultural, and ecumenical movement in the late 1980s.924 In terms of marriage, Confucian 
Augustinianism is based on the concept of Confucian family and Augustinian sacrament whereas 
Radical Orthodoxy mainly depends on the Western theology and philosophy. Confucian Augustinianism 
makes a room for Confucian thinking through virtue ethics.  
In a nutshell, Confucian Augustinianism as teleological, constructive, political, public, sacramental 
and sin-virtue oriented theology can offer a useful via media for the formation of moral self by mutually 
making up for their weak points. Augustinians can learn public ritual practices and the public political 
self from classical Confucians whereas Confucians need to attend more to spiritual experience in moral 
formation of the pubic self. Confucian Augustinianism which is based on virtue ethics as common 
ground between Confucians and Augustine not only shows methodologies for engaging in public issues 
with civil society for its articulation of theology in the public sphere, but also provides profound 
spirituality with the engagement of Augustinian biblical and systematic theology unlike liberation 
theologies. In contrast to Augustinian realism (hope), Augustinian proceduralism (justice), Augustinian 
civic liberalism (love), and Radical Orthodoxy (love), Confucian Augustinianism highlights the virtue 
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of humility and sincerity for the practice of love. Confucian Augustinianism offers distinguishing 
methods for cultivating self and sanctification by linking the self to family, community, nation, and 
transcendent God.925 It can rectify the limit of Protestant individualism. Confucian Augustinianism 
offers a perspective of Asian Christians on Augustinianism in the rapid growth of Christians in Asia 
contrary to previous Western Augustinianism. Confucian Augustinianism is to seek true happiness by 
cultivating virtue and promoting inward, outward, and upward self through moral learning, 
contemplation, sacramental ritual, and music on the basis of biblical truth in a pluralistic global context. 
Confucian Augustinianism could make Asian Christians happy in truth.  
 
Amen.  
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